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The debate on the role and value of foreign assistance in the United States rarely
explores the issue of development. impact; rather, the debate is dominated by political
considerations. Despite the politics orU~'lites States foreign assistance, millions of dollars are
spent each year in distant countries. Development interventicns Initiated by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) consequently affect the development
prospects of recipients of their assistance. This study grew out of a desire to understand the
development impact of USAID so that (at the very least) the author'h capacity to engage in
debates on the importance of foreign assistance could be more Informed,
In that sense, the study has been valuable. More imj)ortan(Jy however; my research
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Administration Department. Special thanks are extended to Drs, John Makumbe and
Jonathan Moyo. Staff .t AGRlTEX (Gokwe) were also extremely helpful. The field work
would not have occurred without the support of AGRlTEX, especially Peter Maposa, Stan
Dalu and Wilson Makwiramlti, Mr. Rashayi and Mr. Butau at the GMB depot in Gok~e
were also helpful as was Lottie Masuku at the Gokwe Fanners Co-operative. Scott Peterson
was a constant source,}lffriendship and support during my time in Zimbabwe as was Mitch,
Harry, Kim and Tracy Chittenden. Thanks also to John McPeak for his advise duting his visit
to Zimbabwe during 1992, and the great support 1received frommy fa;'~y in the United
States.
While thanks are also extended tt.Mr. Ted Morse, Ms. Kim Finan and Ms. Patricia
Buckles of USAID. It must rlso be stressed that my interactions with USAlD were
extremely 11ifficult. Mr. Morse, Ms. Finan and Ms. Buckles were extremely rude and
arrogant throughout my time in Zimbabwe, clearly worried about a student conductlng
independent research on "their" programmes. While it must be accepted that many Staff
members at lJSAID feel "under lliegell from Congress, the American public, and the pres'),
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it hardly justifies their actions or ,flPPlOach.
Finally, I would not have~icom~letedtillS'dissertation if it was not for theconstane
love, support, critical insights and suggestions 1 received from Lindsey Breslin.
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CHi\PTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Intreduetion
The impact of development interventions on recipient populations Is affected by
nU1UI..l\.lIlS factors and tensions, Development is a complicated process with unforeseen
consequences. This process unfolds in ways not foreseen by donors) the state or the
numerous resipients of a particular intervention. This study provide s insights into this
.process by assessing the it~1pactof a United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) agricultural marketing programme on recipients in Gokwe, a Communal Are~'?f
,'. ,;~/.I
Zimbabwe.
In :many respects, the African continent is a development laboratory, To illustrate a
fantastic but not completely unreasonable scenario: an Mrican farmer may be (;ffe~ctedby any
number of development initiatives which are initially beyond her controi. The crops that are
grown 1111:).), be determined by !lle state, a multilateral development bank or a bilateral aid
institution. The money required for the production inputs and the price received for the
produce could be directly affected by a devaluation scheme devised by the International
Monetary Fund. The farmer may be part of a Food and Agricultural Organizatlon (FAO)
pilot pI'oject that requires the household to leave certain parts of the family plot fallow for
a year or more. The family diet may be augmented through the parents' involvement in a
F()od·F()rwWork scheme. Different domestic and international self-help groups, non ..
governmental organizations (NOOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) operating
in the area could have new ideas on better resource management which calls for changes in
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the family production process. The international environmental community may condemn
the excessive use 0."wood for fuel consumption and suggest biomass as an alternative. An
international donor may offer the eldest son an education sponsored by a good Samaritan in
a fur off'land, and one day, when the rains have failed and the international community has
defined the region as a "famine area", the family will be fed international agricultural
surpluses until the world determines that the famine has ended.
Yet, research increasingly Illestrates the numerous ways in which recipients of
development support reshape interventions in ways unforseen by the designers of the
programmes. The "Farmer First" movement emerged as a response to the li .ations of
"transfer of'technology" (tot) initiatives where technologies developed in laboratories and
experimental stations under "ideal" conditions failed when applied in a real life context. The
primary thrust of the movement was the recognition that farmers throughout the world were
active agents of change rather than passive recipients of exogenous development support or
influences. Chambers et. 41. (1989) documented numerous cases of agricultural extension
agents and agronomists who developed sophisticated technologies, like potato dryers, only
to discover that farmers utilised these systems for other purposes, like maize processing. The
end result was not only contrary to the original design but, in many cases, yielded more
significant results for the recipients than originally conceived by the technologys designers,'
Similar results were documented in Bevin and Manger's (lg90) study on adaptive strategies
1 The Farmer First movement has correctly been criticised for neglecting critical issues
of power and overemphasismg farmers knowledge. The real challenge is to engage in
programmes tlIat clarify issues of power and powerlessness, identifY differing local opportunities
and constraints and demonstrating the roles and responsibilities of different role players .. from
local residents through exogenous development institutions .. in development initiatives. For a
further discussion of this see Breslin and Dellus (1996), Scoones at. al. (1994) and the
contributions to PM Notes 24: Critical Reflections/rom Pmctiee, 1995.
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among pastoralists in the arid regions ()f{\frica.
Long (1989) developed this idea further when exploring the notion of development
interfaces. Central to this argument was the notion that development interventions had to
be seen 0.$ the coming together of~itrerent and at times conffictual "world views", The
interrace between expatriate development bureaucrats, government extension agents and
local recipients exposed how different understandings of a particular developmerp"
((
programme inevitably shaped the outcome of that particular intervention. To illustrate, an.
I
integrated development programme sponsored by USAlD in Costa Rica was met with apathy
from 'the supposed beneficiaries as the initiative did not conform to their particular world
views. New projects, such as a water supply programme, emerged as a result ofthr.~conflicts
Ii
between local "peasants" and bureaucrats that; in the end, differed dramatically rroufthe
original programme (de Vries 1992).2
The critical point is to recognise that development interventions are reshaped and
reformulated by differ~nt recipients of this support based upon a range of complex factors
and that development rarely results in entire "communities" progressing forward.
Development, in the end, is an uneven process where some people are able to gain from a
particular intervention) others may reshape a particular intervention to suit their specine
needs while still others may be undermined during the process.
This study is designed to explore these dynamics by examining the foundations and
effect of a United States bilateral development assistance programme in the Republic of
Zimbabwe. It should be stressed that there are numerous U.S. NGOs, PVO!) semi-
2 The analysis of different world views by Long et; al. (1989 and 1992) would be
significantly strengthened if'therewes a greater appreciation for the diversity of world views that
exists within local communities themselves.
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autonomous government institutions (such as i.heOverseas Private Investment Corporation)
and federal government departments (such as the Department of Treasury) whc have an
impact on the development process but whose activities are beyond the scope of thi~analysis.
Instead, the study will concentrate on the development efforts of the United States Agency
for International Development (USA1D). The reason for this decision is that USAID is the
principle U.S. federal institution whose mission is in the development field.
Foreign assistance is an extremely contentious issue in the United States. and
elsewhere. United 'Jtates bilateral foreign assistance has been ambiguously divided between
military, security and economic development ~~:;istance. Political considerations, based upon
perceived U.S. national security, continue to playa significant role in foreign assistance
allocations. Many policymakers and businessmen in the U.S. contend thar foreign assistance
helps protect and maintain U.S. economic interests throughout the world by facilitating the
transfer of U.S. goods and services into foreign markets. Critics have questioned the
emphasis on U.S. political and economic interests in development policy as American
"interests" inmany cases are not necessarily consistent with the concerns of the recipient
state or populace. 3 These critics argue that foreign assistance has served to undermine
indigenous development efforts, making developing nations more dependent and vulnerable
to international and environmental forces Over which they exercise no control. Research by
Fantu Chern (1989: X) would support such conclusions in Africa, where rural farmers 111
Kenya, Ethiopia, Zambia, Tanzania and the Sudan exclaimed "Please don't develop us" as
they were increasingly frustrated by international development efforts that exacerbated rather
than improved their condition.
;J The notion that there are one universally accepted set of US interests which should be
promoted by foreign aid is simplistic.
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Unfortunately, much of the debate on foreign assistance has been characterised by
sweeping generalisations and narrow political agendas. Importantly, research is increasingly
focusmg on the impact internationally-funded and supported development programmes have
had on recipients of this assistance.' Donors and researchers focus their efforts on assessing
the impact of development work in particular areas and exploring what their findings mean
for future development interventions. Important lessons have been learned and efforts to
integrate these lessons into future development planning and policy do occur. One of the
main challengel> of this study is therefore to explore the impact a particular USAID
development Intervention had on residents of Gokwe to provide insights into the
effectiveness o£'foreign assistance lion the ground", This stu elythen attempts to build upon
the growing body of research that looks at how broad development policy affects recipients
(often indiffering ways) and what these findings suggest for future U.S. development work.
1.2 Tile FOl'eignAssistance Debate
As indicated above, the debate ova the merits of United States foreign assistance is
characterised by more smoke than fire. The Republican-controlled Senate's Foreign Relations
Committee is chaired by Senator Jesse Helms, who is a fierce critic of'foreign assistance. Pat
Buchanon, whose Republican Presidential primary results can not be easily dismissed, claims
_' .... . .. ~
that he will abolish all foreign aid ifelected. Supporters of Helms and Buchanon contend that
U.S. foreign assistance should be invested in middle America and that the money currently
allocated is used to bolster institutions hostile to the United States such a.. the World Banl- .
and United Nations, or governments. that do not toe the American line like Zimbabwe. This
4 Evidence to support this claim is provided below.
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constituency argues for the continued centrality ofD.S. national security interests in the
application of US foreign assistance. The argument of mutual interdependence is closely
linked to the position of national security. Proponents of'this view contend that foreign aid
could be a "win-win" proposition as the interests of poorer countries is similar to those of'the
United States. Closely linked to this argument is the beIiefthat the United States has a moral
obligation to developing countries and that it is not in the long-run interest of the US to have
large segments of the global population marginalised and destitute. Finally, there are many
critics ofbllateral and multilateral foreign assistance who believe that the programmes either
further "western II imperialism or are implemented to meet donors', as opposed to recipients',
needs. These critics often call for a reformulation of the development funding process that
decentralises the responsibility for programme design and implementation to host
communities or states. What advocates of each of t" " se positions agree upon is the need to
fundamentally transform USAID. Each of these positions will be explored in greater detail
below.
Advocates who argue that US foreign assistance should only be considered based
upon national security considerations are a powerful part of the aid lobby. This constituency
hL3 consistently argued that foreign aid allocations "should be determined exclusively by
considerations of national interest" (Riddell 1987: 61). As Riddell (1987: 61) argues,
supporters of this position make the case that
If national-interest criteria lead to the decision that aid should be provided to
assist in the relief of poverty or accelerate the pace of development in a poor
coun~tj - as frequently happens - so much the better; but these would be
subsidiary advantages and not the basis upon which the decision to provide
the aid was made.
As Sincere 0990: 1) contends. supporters of the national security argument have
consistently argued that LS foreign aid must be used as a "tool offoreign policy) to promote
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economic growth, encourage free enterprise democracy, and to serve as a weapon in. the
growing arsenal fighting the encroachment of Communism around the world It• The largest
dlsbursements of foreign aid allocations has consistently be~n targeted at countries like Egypt
and ·Israel who~~ importance to US national security far outweighs any discussion of the
\\
apparf;rit.rt~~djfaf!development resources in these countries compared with other countries
in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
It should however be stressed that those who argue that foreign aid must serve
national security interests do not argue for the,Jermination of an assistance programme.
Rather, they argue that .111 aid transfers must clearly demonstrate benefits to the United
States. An example of this approach, in the early days of USAID) was ]ljchard Nixon
/
arguing in run 1968 Presidential campaign, "let us remember that the main purpose of,/
American aid is not to help other nations but to help ourselves" (cited in Riddelt,1987:62).
Mafy in the United States as well as ful.urePresidents remain comfortable with this argument
made 26 jears ago, although the nature of'ihe debate has increasingly switched from national
security being defined in military tenus to one that increasingly emphasises American
economic interests. S Proponents of this view believe that USAlD should be dramatically
transformed. Most importantly, the underlying assumption of this position is that the
"interdependent" nature of the global economy means that the United States is fundamentauy
affected by events in other parts of the world. Poverty around the globe would, in this view,
have negative economic, social, political and environmental consequences for the United
States. Development assistance is therefore necessary. Supporters of this view often
uncritically link American interests with those of various Third World countries.
S Economic interests have always been important to policymakers but often secondary to
broader gee-strategic interests.
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A strong proponent of'this view is Sincere (1990), Sincere argues that debate on the
effect of development assistance - whether funded by the 'World Bank, USAID or numerous
smaller NGOs .. is hindered by the lack of effective or critical evaluations of development
projects. The evaluations that are conducted are genera) and serve to confirm that
development resources have been expended rather than concentrating on the impact of the
particular development intervention on the recipient population. Despite this, US foreign
assistance has been poorly conceptualised according to Sincere. He argues (1990: 133) that
"development assistance plays a limited if not exacerbating role in the development of Third
World countries ~countries that were once called 'backward' are now called 'developing",
Sincere concludes that USAID should be fundament tHy transformed itl promote stronger
linkages between American business and emergent Third World entrepreneurs, which would
lead to mutual benefits in both America and in the Third World.
Similar arguments were made in 1989 by the Phoenix Group, who argued that
To be justified, U.S. foreign aid programs must be in the U.S. national
interest. This concept is logical and evident. Aid to developing countries
does serve U.S. interests. Improving their economies improves their value
as trading partners. Aid targeted on their environmental concerns helps our
environment, It is also a way to combat globcl pollution, reduce mass
migration of people from one country to another and to help reduce global
tensions. (phoenix Group 1989.: 3)
The linkage between American interests and those of the Third World are clear and
uncomplicated according to the. Phoenix Group. The Phoenix Group concluded that US
foreign development aid should be removed from the State Departm md instead headed
by a Presidential-level council, and "most U.S. aid missions overseas must be replaced by
problem-solving, results-oriented, binational task forces" (1989: 3).
An important report that argued for a change in the United States' current approach
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to development isDevelopment anti the NatioJlalIltterest: U.S. Economie Assistance into
the 21st Century, released by former USAID Administrator Alan Woods (USAID 1989).
Woods argued that USAID needed to refocus its development strategies to incorporate not
only the changing international pelitlcal and economic climate, but also the views of the
people affected by the development process, Woods believed that this was necessary in order
to make foreign assistance more effective in meeting the basic needs of marginalized people
throughout the world. Woods did nat. offer any concrete policy recommendations however..
,'I
Instead, he posed a number of que~.tioriswhich must be reconciled in order to make United
States foreign assistance more effective, including a clear definition of the relationship
"between. national interest and development policy, growth and social progress, and the
interrelationship between trade, inve~t~q.elltand development. The1PveraUthrust of the report
was based upon the "interdependence" 61}theUnited States and the Third World, and again
assumed that the)r ~~rests of America were consistent with the interests of aid recipients.
,
Similar sentiments were conveyed in the Brands naport (1980) and appeared a decade later
in In the lUi. Interest: Resources, Growt/I, ami Se;Jllrity in theDe,'eloping W(Jri(l~Welsh
Brown 1990).
Literature pertaining to the links between foreign assistance and develqpment includes
\\
those which argue that the existing of'foreign assistance are generally adequ~'te at meeting
national interests altho~gh they do require modification. One such study is Cassen and
Associates' DoesAitl m~'i*?This study highlights both the successes and the magnitude and
causes of'aid's imperfections, Cassen et al, (1982: 1:3)believed that tithe great maj.ority of
aid succeeds in its developmental objectives", While aid may succeed in this capacity, a
limitation of the study was to examine whether aid's objectives were consistent with the needs
of the affected populace or the recipient country at that time.
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There were a number of critics 'of this view however. Lord Bauer (1984), for
instance, argued that development assistance was not effective in addressing poverty. Bauer
was a sharp critic of foreign..aid but did not necessarily argue for its complete termination.
Nevertheless, many of Bauer's arguments resonated with those who wished to abandon U.S.
foreign aid. Bauer argued that foreign aid had, in eff~ctj brought the Third World into
existence. As he comments (1984: 40), "the one common char<;.ctetistic of'the Third World
is not poverty, stagnation, exploitation, brotherhood or skin colour. It is the receipt of ,
foreign aid". The Third World was a political concept, where nation states vied for larger
donations from ~pe richer countries of the "West". Bauer argued that foreign aid allowed
governments to pursue policies that undermined development, retarded growth, exacerbated
poverty and "enhance the hold of governments over their subjects, and promote the
poflticizatlon of life II (Bauer 1984: 46).G
One of the most vocal advocates of structural changes to the development process
in the United States was The Development Group for Altemative Policies (The Development
GAP») a non-profit organization based in Washington, D.C. The Development GAP was
instrumental in reshaping u.s. development policy towards Latin America) the Caribbean and
Africa by refocusing development assistance towards the needs of the POOl' and bv increasing
local participation in the development process. Their impact on Atn,:ri(i~tn bilateral assistance
to Africa is most evident in their role as the creators of the African Development Foundation.
In 1988, three of the Development GAP's founders, Stephen Hellinger, Douglas Hellinger
and Fred M. O'Regan published Alti For Just Developmen: which argued that United States
foreign assistance needed to be fundamentally altered if it was to adequately address the
G An example used by Bauer was the villigisation programme implemented by President
Nyerere of Tanzania during tbe 1960s and 1970s.
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needs of mat'ginalized people throughout the world. Hellinger et; ul; (1988) believed that
foreign assistance would fail 'unless those affected by development assistance were involved
in the conceptualization and implementation of development programmes.
Similar criticisms of the impact of foreign aid were made at the time by Raikes
(198B). Raikes analyses the impact of western interventions (predominately European) in
AfHcalli~agricuhural sectors, demonstrating that it served to marginalize rural communities
and consequently increased their vulnerability to crisis situations such as droughts. In
opposition to conventional analyses offood deficiency in Africa, Raikes argued that increased
They are often wrongly collapsed into 1~lI1ecrisis in which increased imports
stem directly from stagnating local food production ...This exaggerates the per
capita decline in food production and generates technicist policies, whose
main, if not sole, aim is to increase aggregate production as rapidly as
possible. One major difficulty 'with this approach is that to day's short-term
"technical fix" can only too easily acidto the problems of tomorrow. Another
is that it ignores the vital issue of distribution. (198S~ 1)
imports offood to Africa and the issue of hunger were separate.
Raikes showed. that seasonal hunger often carne at times when no food shortage exists.
Raikes did not advocate the termination of food aid for the result of such action would be
catastrophic for :manycommunities which muss receive such aid in order to su- \·ive. Rather,
he posited that increased food secu.ity for the most vulnerable Africans would only be
realized by increases in aggregate food supplies and an improvement in the ability of Africans
not only to. produce their own food but also to generate incomes which could adequately
support the fool.. .quirements of the family. 1
Ferguson (1990) assessed the justifications for a joint World Bank/Canadian
7 Also see Sen's (1981) seminal study on poverty and famines and Moyes' (1987) study
on the impact of the European Commission's Common Agricultural Policy on the Third World.
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Int,~ri).~,tionalDevelopment A.w~ncy (elVA) agricultural project in Lesothc, a:t~tuing that,
.rath&r than concentrating one's ,malysis on what the project attempts to a,cCOl111)USh) one
sbould tflthe,r examine what the project a;;tually aohieved in a specific context, ',The I)tudywas
, :1
primarily c(.ltl\:,ler,!mdwith exploring bow development ideas were generated tmt~.Itdl11uustercd
by deve{()pnwnt agencies, and how these programmes affected local recipi1ents. What is
lacking in li'ergti:~on'sstuery however, is a closer examination of what the people afn~oted by
the project actu(uly thought of the project and what alternatives they would propose tIl?
ameliorate their tenuous condition.
A more [ournallstic critique of foreign aid was offered by Hancock (1989), who
argued that development assistance is geared towards the interests of:\Yestenll consultants
\\
and businesses, perpetuating Afocals current state of underdevelopment. Offering a wide
array of'failed development projects to support his thesis. Hancock concluded that. forei£u
assistance is beyond repair, and therefore should be terminated.
My own study suggests That the foreign assistance debate would be significantly
enhanced by programmes based more clearly on measurable results and tangible benefits to
recipients of United States foreign aid. USAID has, since its inception, not been judged by
Congress or the American public on whether its programmes have had a tangible impact on
recipients offorelgn assistance. 'Ihe "moral argument" for aid, which I believe does resonate
with many Americans, would be strengthened if American taxpayers felt that tbe development
prospects of African "basket-cases", for instance, were actually improving.
1.3 Overviewof the Study
This study is broken into five furtl1cr chapters. The following chapter provides a
brood overview of the evolution of United States foreign assistance from the Marshal Plan
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after World War II through the Cflrly years of the Bush administration. Significant emphasis
is placed upon the development and subsequent amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act
of1961, which continues to provide the legislative foundations for the United States's foreign
assistance programmes. This chapter also provides il,1sightsinto American foreign assistance
targeted at the southern African .sub-region during the 1970s. This section not only
demonstrates how United States foreign assistance was used as a political toll by different
administrations but also places USAI01s development programme in Zimbabwe in context.
Chapter three provides all overview of the evolution of agricultural development and
marketing in Zimbabwe. 8 The chapter primarily concentrates on how the colonial state used
statutory marketing bodies, like the Grain Marketing Board (GMB)~ to provide critical
I' .
support to small ..scale white farmers. The state also needed to ensure that grains produced
by African farmers were sold to the statutory bodies, which created opportunities for some
African producers to accumulate resources to a far greater extent than other African
producers. Most importantly, the chapter provides insights into the nature of grain marketing
\'
which is uni-directional, This system, which was perhaps appropriate when the number of
Grain Marketing Depots was small and close to city centres, has had dramatic cansequences
fOflood de..fleit lWllselwlrls when the marketing system was extended t%Oil tiejh,;it regions
of the country with the financial support of US AID. The chapter also provides insights into
the various marketing options historically utilised by African farmers and food deficit
households in isolated parts of the country which, it is argued in chapter five, have been
---..--------------
8 Zimbabwe, like many other countries, has seen the names of places, including the name
of the country, change on several occasions throughout history. The names of these places
changes throughout the study based upon the time period under discussion. For instance, the
capital is referred to as Salisbury u'jtiI sections dealing with the post-independence period (1980)
where the name is changed to Harare.
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eroded following the introduction of marketing depots in these isolated areas following
independence.
Chapter four is concerned with the design of USAIDIS agricultural programmes in
Zimbabwe following independence. The chapter critiques the assumptions that serve as the
founda~ltms for the Commodity Import Programme (eIP), which targeted tractors at
ufi!Q~~dssivcll fanners, and the Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector Assistance (ZASA)
Programme, designed to extend mar' eting facilities to "traditional" fanners throughout the
country. USAlD's assessment of the impact of the CIP are tentatively questioned in this
chapter because data from the recipients of the CIP·funded tractors Weltenot interviewed as
part of this study. Efforts to interview these farmers proved fruitless as the beneficiaries ...
white commercial farmers .. were understandably reluctant to provide information to the
author on how the tractors they received assisted them in shifting their productive base and
whether the tractors allowed them to either reduce their labour force or shift their labour
force from permanent to seasonal labour.
Chapter five brings the analysis of the programme into the context of Gokwe, an
isolated rural area specificallymentioned by the RIddell Commission (1981: 36) as a priority
area for the extension of marketing facilities following independence, USAID funded the
development offour GMB depots in the area as part of ZASA. Research was conducted in
Gokwe between 1992-93 to determine how farmers in the area were effected by the
introduction of the grain marketing system in the area Evidence presented in the chapter
strongly suggests that the GMB depots have benefitted a small number of relatively wealthy
farmers but as a whole has had a detrimental impact on residents in Go'zwe,
Chapter six brings the study together by exploring the foundations of a structural
adjustment programme sponsored by USAID that is designed to reetH.y the problems
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associated with the grain marketing system. The chapter also explo,.~s USAlD's current "re-
engineering" efforts designed to make the organisation relevant in the future and undermine
efforts in the United States to close the Agency. While the broad re-engineering strategy is
welcomed, critical questions are posed about how this process will be implemented given the
lessons drawn from the evaluation of the elP and ZASA,
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CllAPTER TWO
THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE
2.1 Intreduetlcn
The Introduction was concerned with establishing the foundations for this study. As
demonstrated, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)'s mandate
Is confusing and at times contradictory. This chapter will illustrate this by providing an
overview of the evolution offoreign assistance in the United States. This will be followed
by a brief overview of the use of foreign aid in the southern African sub-region prior to
Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, This provides the foundation for a description of
Zimbllbwe,1ilie United States development programme targeted at the agricultural sector of
the country and the impact these programmes had on people in an.isolated area of the country
to see how the different world views of the actors involved were shaped and re-shaped over
the course ofthe Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector Assi~'tance (ZASA) initiative.
2.2 Evolution of United States Development Assistance
United States post-w.r bilateral development interventions was always ambiguously
conceptualized and contradictory, as discussed in the Introduction.' The numerous changes
1 The first bilateral plan administered by the United States was the "Lend-Lease"
programme. Lend-Lease provided military aid to Britain and the Soviet Union to assist in the war
effort against the Germany during World War II. The programme was terminated in 1945.
United States multilateral development assistance began in 1944 at the Bretton Woods
Conference. At the Conference) the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(now referred to as the World Bank) was created. The Bank's initial goal was to administer
private investment in Europe following the culmination of the Second World War. United States
influence over Bank policy was clearly evident in its earliest years as the U.S. blocked World
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in goals reflected in amendments to the guiding legislation reQ,-;cted wider geo-political,
economic and development trends. An understanding of the critical interaction between t~~se
wider forces is therefore critical in order to place this study in context. It should be stressed
that the United States' approach to Africa in general, and southern Afi'ica specifically, was
determined by its global concern to retain its balance of power against Soviet expans~on a,n4,;
influence. The linchpin of this approach was to ensure that European allies could retain th4u'
sovereignty, even though this was in sharp contrast to the principles of'the Atlantic Charter.
Consequently, the first large ..scale development intervention by the United States was
the Marshall Plan. The goals of the Marshall Plan were clear and short ..term - to rebuild
'1
"
PQst..War Europe.
f/
European reconstruction was always seen as a finite short-term exercise that
would end upon the attainment of a clearly defined goal. And, from the
beginning, the reconstruction was an obvious success. It did, in fact, end.
(USAlD 1989: 17)
Europe required the infusion of large amounts of capital to assist in its reconstruction
following World War Il as Europe already possessed the necessary "management, skilled
labor, and ..Jngralned market instincts II (USAID 1989: 17) due to their developed status. The
motives Were both humanitarian and strategic. This is clearly reflected ill separate speeches
given by Secretary of State Marshall.
Ifwe decide that the United States is unable or unwilling effectively to assist
in the reconstruction of Europe, we must accept the' consequences of its
collapse into the dictatorship of police states ...There is no doubt in my mind
that the whole world hangs in the balance. (Hamilton 1989: 215)
and
(the Marshall Plan is a program) not directed against any country or doctrine
but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. (Hamilton 1989: 215)
Bank efforts at facilitating private investment into Eastern Europe.
17
(; _, .'-
Following the Second World War, the United States determined that the proYlsio:Q.
of economic assistance would better ensure stability and U.S. economic interests than the
maintenance of amilitary presence in the region (Rossiter 1985; 15), The provision arU.S.
economic assistance was seen as a deterrent against communism, a concept that has largely
remained consistent throughout the life of U.S. foreign aid. The administration of the
Marshall Plan was undertaken under the guidance of businessmen rather than a specific
federal institution. This decision was based on the premise that political considerations
would impinge on the timely,transfer of inputs to the vital sectors of European industry
targeted for rehabilitation. Importantly, subsequent assistance programmes have been
administered witllirt numerous federal departments, primarily the Department of State. The
"
intertwining of humanitarian, sfrategic, security, diplomatic and developmental interests under
the rubric offoreign assistance was concretised during this era.
The cost of the Marshall Plan, between the years 1946·.1951, was US$181.2 billion
(in constant 1989 dollars). Ofthis total, US$149.9 billion was allocated to Europe, US$30.0
billion to A$i~ and US$1.3 billion to Asia, Africa and Latin America (Heginbotham 1988:
CRS-16). The assistance was in the form of lidoliar credits for imports of industrial goods
and services from the United States" (Rossiter 1985: 16). The majority of the assistance
consisted of a wide range of commodities aimed at rehabilitating Europe's industrial and
agricultural sectors and infrastructure. A small but important part of Marshall Plan
assistance to Europe was in the form of military aid. TIns was primarily aimed at rebuilding
allied forces to preserve the uneasy East-West deadlock manifest in Europe. The assistance
to Asia was largely concentrated on the Philippines, South Korea and mainland China until
the assumption of power by Mao Tse-Tung in 1949. This aid was used as "direct financial
commodity support for anti-leftist governments" (Rossiter 1985: 16). The aid to the Middle
"
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East, Africa and Latin America was largely directed towards infrastructure projects.
United States support to Africa was extremely limited during the 19505. The
overriding concern was to support infrastructure projects but not to undermine the colonial
powers that still operated throughout Mica at this time. In 1953, the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Africa stated "Let us be frank in recognizing our stake in the strength
and stability of certain European nations which exercise influence in the dependent areas ...
We cannot blitldly disregard their side of the colonial question without injury to our own
security It (cited in Clough 199.2b: 5). The Assistant Secretary of State for the sub-region
noted in 1955 "the~American lnterests in Africa were 'real but limited" (cited in Herbst
1992: 3).
Foreign assistance was however changing. In 1951, the Mutual Security Act was
passed signalling a dramatic shift in Official Development Assistance (ODA) away from
Western European countries to East and West Asia. The genesis of the Act was President
Truman's "Point Four Program" speech of 1949. The programme envisioned technological
transfers to the Third World to facilitate economic growth and development.' The overriding
concern. remained political. The Mutual Security Agency (MSA) WaS created to respond to
"the deteriorating political situation in the Far East (Hellinger et: at. 1988: IS), The annual
levels ofODA was halved, from US$14.8 billion, at the end of the Marshall Plan programme,
to US$7.6 billion. The countries targeted for assistance were, on the one hand, pursuing the
development of their industrial and agricultural sectors. On the other, recipients were viewed
as critical buffers against further communist advancement. The links between development
and security were consequently preserved. Four programmes that were institutionalized in
2 For an important critique of the success of technology transfer to the countries ofthe
South. see S\!t1illie1991.
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the foreign assistance process at this stage remain today: security assistance, food and
military aid, and development assistance.
First, the Economic Support Fund (ESF) feUunder the rubric of security assistance.
ESF has historically been used lito advance important security and political objectives"
(Nowels 1988: CRS-2). Policy makers still consider ESF to be a flexible programme that can
be rapidly employed to address a pressing national security concern. One must recognize the
distinction between ESF and military assistance however. Although ESF is considered
security assistance, this programme does not entail the transfer of military equipment or
personnel to,n particular host country. Rather, ESF includes "financing for non-military
imports, ,.general budget .support, cash transfers, and project aid to support long-term
JI
!\
developfuta~ efforts" (Nowels 1988: CRS-2).
During the 1950s, security assistance was concentrated almost solely on South Korea,
South Vietnam, and Taiwan. Security assistance combined the construction of infrastructure
with efforts to maintain loyal governments.
The purchasing power of Security Assistance was used in South Korea and
Taiwan to stimulate industrialization and extend infrastructure and services
to the agricultural sector. In South Viet Nam, where the government was
faced with a threat which was primarily internal rather than external, Security
Assistance was used more directly to attempt to increase the control and
popularity of the government, (Rossiter 1985: 18)
Food aid became a hallmark of the U. S. foreign aid programme with the passage of
Public Law 480, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, The
Food-for ..Peace programme, as it is labelled, facilitated the disposal of United States
agricultural surpluses "accumulated by the federal government under a program of price
support" (Rossiter 1985: 19) while at the same time remaining consistent with the broad
goals of U.S. diplomatic initiatives and humanitarian impulses, In many respects, the
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formalizing of a government-directed food programme was also indicative of the success of
the Marshall Plan. European fanners, severely handicapped following the Second World War
had reasserted themselves on the international market. P.L. 480, therefore, also served to
increase U.S. access to foreign markets by providing countries with an alternative to
European foodstuffs. As the International Trade and Development Education Foundation
(1985: 5) states, the multifaceted purposes ofP.L .:480 food aid remains to
expand international trade among the United States and friendly nations, to
facilitate the convertibility of currency, to dispose of surplus U.S. agricultural
commodities, to promote the economic stability of U.S. agriculture, to
encourage economic developmcntJn developing nations, and to promote the
foreign policy of the United States.))
The primaryrecipient ofP.L. 480 entitlements during the 1950s was India. India 11~4
emerged as the leading voice of Third World discontent over U.S. policy in Indochina. In
an effort to lessen the criticism voiced from the world's largest democracy at the time, the
U'S. increased the.amount offood aid grants to the Indian state. This programme was easily
justified as conditions of abject squalor and pervasive hunger became familiar to the world
as a whole. The channelling of aid through the Indian state also helped to lessen the severity
of their pllb~;cattacks on U.S. foreign policy. As will be shown below, a similar strategy was
applied by the United States to the Frontline States during the Zimbabwean liberation
struggle.
Direct military aid "has been relatively constant and has been the largest aid category
during much of the post-war period." (Heginbotham 1988: eRS-II). The primary recipients
of military aid during the 19505 were Greece, Taiwan and South Korea. Military aid
allocations peaked in the early 1970s because of Vietnam, and again in 1985 following the
successful efforts by the Reagan administration to make military aid a greater part of the
assistance pie.
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Finally, the emergence of development assistance to developing countries was
institutionalized during this era. The main thrust of the programme was targeted at technical
and commodity support for the construction of national infrastructure and for agricultural
production. Somebasic research was also conducted under this programme. The emphasis
oftlle programme remained political. The U.S. sought to maintain economic and pofiticel
security in a world that was perceived to be slowly moving towards the Sovlet sphere .of
influence as nationalist movements began'to emei ge throughout the colonized world.
Thefuajormot~ve of United States development forays into these uncharted
waters inthe 1950$ and 1960s remained anti-communism, a belief that if the
standards of living were improved ln i'..Sia and Latin America, communism
would be a less attractive alternative.' ..There was also an assumption that
American aid should be contingent upon the recipient countries' own good
faith efforts to foster economic development, (USAIO 1989: 18)~
This final point is si:uiliicant. It highlights an approach to development illustrated in
the Zimbabwean context that Iarge!yrelied Ujr\on the recipient state's development efforts and
accountability to its people. It is also impi1rtantto note that development assistance and ES1;'
overlapped, Both programs had been administered by USAro since 1961. Both
development ~I1dESP projects were operaticnalized in a similar manner, based upon a
particular development approach employed by USAID. The biggest difference between the
two programs was that development assistance could be "raided", where funds could be
shifted from one country to another without Congressional approval. Security assistance
remained concentrated upon countries of immediate strategic and diplomatic importance. It
was therefore far more difficult to disrupt the allocation of this type of aid once it bad been
allocated.
As former European colonies began to gain their formal independence curing the
-----------.- ,"-
3. Notev\'')rthy is the absence of Africa from this strategy.
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1960s~a re-exam~·;tltionofforeign assistance occurred which served to reshape the direction
oru.s. bilateral assistance for the next two decades. The Senate Special Committee to Study
lC( \
1\
"the Foreign AidProgramme commissioned a study byWalter Rostow and Max MJlken. The
study, entitled "Ihe Objectives of U.S. Economic Assistance Programs", a.gued that a policy
of deterrence against the Soviet Union was, by itself: inadequate to "achieve a world
environment favorable to the United States" (Gakii 1988~ CRS ..l1). What was necessary,
according to the authors of this study, was the formulation of a comprehensive assistance
programme that, if isolated from foreign policy considerations, would facilitate economic
growth and constitute an important alternative to communism. While U.S. Policy makers had
consistently used such logic to justify the foreign aid programme, its administration was
haphazardly organized. What Rostow and Milken were proposing, therefore, was the clearer
direction and administration of the foreign aid programme. As Hellinger et. at (1988: 15)
argue, "its authors' top-down development approach and cold war fixation have undoubtedly
influenced subsequent legislation to this day". Legislative action on these recommendations,
broadly supported by other studies, occurred In 1961
With the inauguration of President Kennedy came "the first major attempt to define
the functions of mui and economic assistance to the Third World" (Rossiter 1985: 15).
The Foreign As,,,.allce Ac~ of 1961 formed the cornerstone of the U.S. foreign aid
programme, The Agency for International Development was created and served as the
principal institution used by the United States to administer development and security
assistance throughout the world, even in the 19905.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 19h! directed USAID to "encourage ...the utilization
of engineering and professional services of United States firms ...In connection with capital
projects finance j by funds authorized under the ...Act" (Hellinger et; al. 198.8. 17), It ful~.her
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authorized that USAlD money should be concentrated within the United States Private
.Joluntary Organisation (PVO) community rather than soliciting the assistance of Third
World Non-Governmental Organisations lNGOs). This mandate, with its emphasis on U.S.
private and public sector intervention in developing regions, facilitated the rise of the "aid
lobby' which puts pressure on the federal government for the realization of their specific
programmes.
Security assistance durh'jg the 1960s was used primarily to support U.S. strategic
interests in Indochina. With the oulminatlen of the Korean War, U. S. concern shifted to
Vietnam, which had recently gained its independence from France. USAID personnel
"fanned out over areas controlled by the government and implemented a wide variety of
projects designed to improve living conditions and, hence, loyalty to the government"
(Rossiter 1985: 20). In addition, the United States used the proceeds from PL, 480 food aid
to pay the South Vietnamese army, the first use of food aid for military purposes.
Development assistance during the Kennedy administration continued to be utilized
inAfiica and Latin America to counter perceived communist threats. Development projects
were initiated throughout these regions on the continued belief that
American know-how rather than American purchasing power wasthe key to
solving the Third World's problems ...Itmanifest itself in institutions as diverse
as the Peace Corps and the "Green Berets", (T11<;: Kennedy administration)
also held most strongly to the truism that development per se in the Third
World was important to America's long-term economic and strategic self-
interest. (Hoben 1989: 255)
USAlD's development mandate increased throughout the 1960s as did its interest in
Africa during the early part of the decade, Programmes developed under President Kennedy
mixed goo-strategic and humanitarian interests, During the 1960 election campaign, Kennedy
argued that America had "lost ground in Africa because we have neglected and ignored the
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needs and aspirations of the Afifeanpeople" (cited in Clough 1992b: 7). Aid to the continent
increased from US$110 million to US$S19 million between 1958 - 1962 and accounted 19r
eight percent oftotal U.S. foreign aid (Clough 1992b: 7). In addition, programmes such as
the Peace Corps were initiated. The Peace Corps. was designed to'counter perceived Soviet
advances in the Third World and personified the continued linkage of strategic and
development strategies ofU .S. foreign policy and aid.'"
Policy makers continued to view export-led agricultural production and research,
infrastructure construction, foreign investment and education as prerequisites to the
successful alleviation of poverty and misery that televlsion wits instrumental in bringing home
to millions of Americans on a regular basis. Development programmes were initiated and
optimism ran high as many believed that the conditions of poverty endemic in the Third
World would soon be eradicated. As Herbst (1992: 7) argues, there existed Ita raltly direct
causal relationship between the total level of capital investment ill a developing country and
its overall development", It was believed that transfers of capital and expertise were
required. Little attention was paid to the strengthening of human capital during this precess.
More significant was that programmes with a focus on poverty alleviation were absent
(Herbst 1992: 7).
The optimism of the early 1960s was shattered during the Vietnam era however. As
the war escalated, it became clear to many that U.S. development and security aid had neither
increased the standards of Jiving of'the Vietnamese people nor popularized the government.
Questions emerged regarding the nature of the U.S. bilateral aid programme as increased
transfers ofcnpitai and resources had n.ot alleviated the tenuous condition of the aftected
-------------------
4 For an overview and assessment of the Peace Corps programme in Cameroon, see Amin
1992.
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region. In ~any respects, the condition of the Third World deteriorated while "leftist"
influences were perceived to be increasingly accepted throughout the world. A number of
reports surfaced which brought into question U.S. development policy ~s a result of the
\'.,1
growing uncertainty over the effectiveness of'theU.S. foreign aid programme,
The Kerry Report, published in 1966, had a particularly strong im,act on USAlD
operations in Africa. It argued that the Africa programmes were a
scatteration, that is to say~ our involvement in hundreds (}fproj~cts dealius
with almost every conceivable activity related to development and at ItJ!1nj::
levels ...in 33 countries. (Hoben 1989: 255) ,
I>_i ~...,
Another critic of USAID W(tS Senator Frank Church (1971) WhOS3 inslghts lPtQi ,4ure
offoreign aid were significant.
Never yet, ..have We considered in full measure the possibility that the failul0
of aid is not technical and administrative but conceptual and
political...(RWLctionaryregimes) value aid from the United States as a meaos
of maintaining, not of abolishing, inequalities of wealth and power ...America! .
economic aid is commonly used to promote indu/)'trialization programs which
generate a high level of consumption for the privileged and little, if any,
trickle-down benefits for the dispossessed.
Combined with this critique of the effectiveness of United States fbroign assistance was the
growing recognition that the United States had. overestimated the Soviet threat in Africa, and
that the "economic and cultural ties binding the continent's fledgling states to Europe proved
far more powerful than anything Moscow Or Beijing (which also displayed an interest in
Africa during the 19(08) could offer" (Clough 1992b: 7).
A new terminology began to emerge in development circles during the latter half of
the 1960s. "Rural development", "basic human needs", "growth ..with-equity" and
"redistribution with growth" aU gained credence in development circles, although the impact
on development institutions like USAlD was initially limited. As Hellinger et: al. (1988: 21)
argue, "donors still determined what those needs were and the poor remained the 'targets'
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of their aid". The approach remained versed in export-led strategies, free trade,
infrastructure development and the increased accessibility of foreign investment as the means
to developmental ends.
It became apparent to Congress during the early 19708 that the, programmes
supported by USAID had not had the desired effect. As a result, Congress overhauled the
U.S. foreign aid programme. The "New Directions" legislation under the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1973 emerged and became the foundation for foreign assistance for the remainder of
the decade. Congress stipulated that USAID's development efforts had to be more
organized. Future aid programmes were placed under distinct functional accounts. These
accounts were: Food anJ Nutrition; Population Planning and Health; Education and Human
Resourcea; and Select Development Projects. Congress also increased Its: oversight of the
development process through "functional accounting, earmarking, and additional reporting
requirements subject(illg) the agency and its missions to micromanagement" (Hoben 1988:
255. Also see Sincere 1990: 52-55). The result of such oversight was considered by many
involved with USAI.. to be devastating from a. developmental standpoint.
Their (USAlD's) incentive to understand and address the distinctive, long ...
term developmental needs of the host country was reduced, as was their
incentive to focus on project implementation. In sum, mission staff had to
devote an increased amount of their attention to solving USAlD's own
problems. In this sense, the locus of decision making tor development sh:t1ed
from host country institutions to USAID itself. (Hoben 1988: 256)
The growth of special interests, and their influence over Congressional oversight into
the development industry grew substantially following the enactment of the "New Directions"
legislation. Aid"tying increased and U.S. businesses used their influence over Congressional
leaders to assist them in the procurement process. Projects were designed based on criteria
designed ill Washington.
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Project advocacy.'..not only fostered such distortions but also created strong
incenti~es for field staff to "transform" the host countries problems,
capabilities and commitments so that they would conform to the current
'Washington policy climate and review criteria ...For this reason, it is not
surprising that much of the sensitivity to cultural, social and institutional
issues found inUSAID Project Papers is filtered out as they are transformed
into contracts by Washington-based contract officers. (Hoben 1988: 260-261)
The period also saw a shift inUSAID policy towards rural development and training,
as stipulated in the New Directions legislation. As will be demonstrated below and in later
chapters, this did not necessarily mean that the poor became the direct recipients of aid.
Rather, the emphasis on "trickle-down'! approaches continued to be pursued. "Progreselve"
forces within the recipient community remained the primary targets of'foreign assistance as
they continued to be seen as the dynamic force in the development process.
By the end of the 1970s, Security Assistance allocations had dramatically increased
'\
while a subsequent reduction in overall ODA allocations occurred. Israel and Egypt e.llorged
as the largest recipients of U.S. assistance,
By 1979, when Egypt and Israel were receiving US$1.8 billion in Security
Assistance, bilateral Development Assistance programming had fallen to
US$l billion, its lowest level, in real terms, under the Foreign Assistance Act.
The ambitious (New Directions) Mandate, it appears, was not receiving
comparably ambitious funding. (Rossiter 1985: 23)
The decline in the levels offoreign assistance Was the direct result of the termination of the
U.S. programme in Indochina, the decline in assistance to Pakistan and India) and the
decrease in concern over Cuban influence in the South and Central American regions
(Rossiter 1985: 23). The allocation of assistance to countries that represented important
foreign policy considerations however increased. This was evident not only in Israel' and
Egypt, but also in southern Afiicil, where events following the Portuguese coup in 1974 and
the perceived reality of Soviet expansion ill the sub-region caused great alarm in the United
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States.
Foreign assistance was seen as a significant political tool by the Reagan administration
(1980 ..88) during the 1980$. During the initial years of the Reagan presidency, bilateral
foreign assistance and defense spending were high budget priorities. In fact, Reagan shifted
American funds away from multilateral development institutions, as it was felt that U.S.
interests were better served at the bilateral level. Foreign assistance allocations became
concentrated on fewer nations as the emphasis during the Reagan administration was on
security and military assistance. By the Fiscal Year 1985 foreign assistance appropriations
attained levels in excess of US$19 billion. Seventy-five percent of foreign assistance was
allocated to Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, £1 Salvador, Greece and the Philippines.~ The
Reagan administration also maintained high aid levels to Kenya, Somalia and the Sudan
during the early 19805 due to their value as way stations for American troops required in the
Middle East.G Yet, despite the fact that foreign aid had grown by 88 percent under Reagan,
the bulk of this increase came from dramatic increases to security related programmes.
Military and ESF assistance were increased by 8S percent and 189 percent respectively
(Nowells 1989: CRS~3). During the period 1985~1988>the levels of'forelgn assistance to
Africa actually declined by 55 percent. This decrease in funding levels reflected the limited
importance Africa played in the overall U.S. global hierarchy despite the perceived need of
the continent's populace. It also reflects the limited nature of U.S. - African relations.
S It is important to stress that Egypt is considered part of the Middle East by U. S. policy
makers. Africa is subdivided into three regions ..North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South
Africa.
<i The importance of these countries was actually solidified as part of the "Carter
Doctrine". In short, President Carter believed that the United States should use military means
to protect American interests overseas. This doctrine was applied in the failed attempt to rescue
the American hostares itt Iran.
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The Reagan administration's position was also driven partially by the fact that
Africa was becoming less important to the United States. Indeed, although
U.S. trade. wI.:. Africa was always low, it actually declined further in the
1980s. U.S. exports to Africa amounted to 2.7 percent of total U,S. exports
and imports from Africa accounted for 5.5 percent of total imports By 1979,
exports to Africa accounted for only 1.4 percent of total American exports
and imports from Africa tor only 3.0 percent of the total value of goods the
United States purchased from the rest of the world ... Similarly, U.S.
investment in Africa is extremely lew. In 1990) only .46 percent of total U. S.
direct investment abroad was in sub-Saharan Africa, (Herbst 1992: 10-11)
A significant shift in the nature of foreign aid occurred under the Reagan
administration however. Following on the heel of the "Berg Report" (World Bank 1981),
the United States began to see the problems in Africa in terms of'the excessive involvement
in the economy of the African state and the limited role and impact of the private sector ill
the development process. Aid efforts slowly shifted from programme activities into the. realm
or policy reform. The argument was simple ~ if one did not get the policy right then
development programmes would fail.7 Reform programmes were still seen in geo-strategic
terms, with Reagan's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker arguing
that "promoting the abandonment of statist and anti-market policies would constitute a major
American success and a significant defeat for our adversaries' influence in the third world',"
(cited in Herbst 1992: 10). As we shall see below, the United States' programme in
Zimbabwe increasingly shifted from marketing expansion to marketing reform.
What came to be known as the "Four Pillars" of development assistance under
Reagan materialized in the latter 19805. 'These included:
1. Policy Dialogue and Reform
7 While there is little doubt that "getting the policy right" is extremely complicated, there
is merit in the argument that policy reform is important. For instance, the value of a health
intervention can be completely undermined by the failure to promote a cadre of skilled health
practitioners in the country, the inability to provide the necessary medical supplies to health points
throughout the country and a clear policy en uSer fees (targeted or un-targeted),
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2. Institutional Development - with a focus on decentralizing institutions
and encouraging reliance on private and voluntary, rather than public
institutions;
3. Technical Transfers .. especially in the areas of biomedical research,
agriculture and family planning; and
4.i-, Private Sector Focus."
During the later years offhe Reagan administration the Development Fund for Africa
(DFA) was created. USAID's Africa Desk had argued that African development programmes
needed greater flexibility than offered under the functional accounting system developed
during the 1970s and modified in the early 19805 (Galdi 1988: CRS..21 and Herbst 1992: 13).
According to the enabling legislation, the DFA was designed to help the poor majo1ity of
men and women in sub-Saharan Africa to participate ill the process oflong-term development
through economic growth that is equitable, participatory, environmentally sustainable, and
self-reliant (cited in Herbst 1992: 15),
The DFA removed sub..Saharan Africa from the competition over stagnant security
and ESF funding debates. Instead, a lump sum was given to USAID/Africa for "any
economic development assistance activities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961"
(Heginbotham 1988: CRS-17), although the programme had a strong policy reform
component.
Many of the components of the United States' foreign aid programme were
subsequently sustained under the Bush administratlon (1988-92), although the United States
began to withdraw SUPPQlt for its n ~ditiollal allies whose human rights records were no
longer so easily tolerated following the demise of'the Soviet Union. In what Clough (1992a)
refers to as "cynical disengagement", the United States watched as former allies like Somalia,
8 See Galdi 1('88: eRS-11.
31
Liberia and Zaire imploded. As Clough (1992a.: 193) states,
the United States (has 'become) thc; only superpower in the world, This has
caused Africa .., to look to Washington for direction, encouragement, and
support." Unfortunately, there is no evidence that President Bush or any of
his senior advisors intend to take up the mantle of leadership in Africa.
2.3 The United States in Southern Africa
On 25 April 1974, the Portuguese Movimento das Forcas Armadas (AJt'M) ended
J:
S"lazar's tole. General Spinola assumed control of Portugal and the repercussions were felt
throughout the world. While the members of the military junta. "broadly subscribed to
Spinola's vision of autonomous colonies within the broader framework of a greater
"Lusltanla, U it readily became apparent that Portugal was no longer able to support its colonial
empire (Tamarkin 1990: 10). By July 1974, Spinola agreed to nationalist independence
aspirations. .Mozambique gained independence in July 1975 while Angola gained its
independence later that same year.
Prior to April 1974, the United States' southern Africa policy was based upon
l{issingers National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSl\I139). NSSM 39 stipulated that
U.S. interests were best served through the maintenance of the white minority regimes of
southern Africa (South Africa, Rhodesia and Portuguese-controlled Angola and
Mozambique). The United States would thus condemn the racist regimes in diplomatic
settings but materially support them ifit was deemed necessary for their survival (EI..Khawar
et. al. 1976), A number of policy changes were invoked, allowing the United States to
bypass current restrictions on trade with minority regimes in the sub-region. In the case of
South Attica, *te United States Export-Import Bank
extended loans to South African parastatals and removed a number of
programming checks. Sates of small aircraft were permitted under private
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contract despite clear evidence that these "dual-purpose" exports were being
used for counter-insurgency border patrol by "civilian" groups with
government approval, (Rossiter 1985: 49)
Portugal's importance to U.S. security was based upon its role in NATO and U.S.
access to the Azores air and naval base. The U.S. supplied Portugal with U8$100 million
in Security Assistance during the final three years of the Salazar regime. Defoliants,
helicopters and jumbo jet airlines were purchased by the Portuguese state as "civilian
transactions". The Portuguese government ...vitiated these justifications (civilian transactions)
by pointing in public statements to the usefulness of the jets as troop carders" (Rossiter 1985:
51).
The clearest manifestation of material support for the Smith regime in Rhodesia WaS
the passage of the "Byrd Amendment" which maintained the chromite trade between the U.S.
and Rhodesia. Advocates of this amendment contended that U.S. national security was in
jeonardy as the only other suppliers of chr-unite products were Eastern Bloc nations. The
Arnerviment was in clear violation of United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia,"
Following the events inLisbon, however, U. S. diplomatic and developmental actions
in the sub-region changed. In 1975, Kissinger countered Soviet support for the Movimento
Popular da Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) in Angola by 1';0,,1 :t~ct financial and
military support for both the Front for the National Liberation (~r:?I7\~Ola;{~NLA)and the
, ;
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Uniao para a Independencla Total de Angola (tJNITA) through ZaIre' and South Afdca. The
support was in the forms of military assistance and cash grants of US$5 million to the
Mobutu regime in ZaIre. 'IheU, S. Department of Defense supplied weapons to the armies
------------~-----
9 For a detailed study of the events that led to the passage of the "Byrd Amendment", see
Lake 1976. Lake later became responsible for U.S. policy towards Rhodesia during the Carter
Presidency and is currently President Clinton's National Security Advisor.
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of the FNLA, UNlTA:, Zai're and South Africa. As Rossiter (1985: 53) argues,
His (Kissinger's) motivation was more to demonstrate U.S."resoive to the
Soviets in the wake of defeat in Indochina than to place a U.S.~backed
government inpower inLuanda, On its face absurd, this explanation for U.S.
involvement in the Angolan civil war and the Zatrian and South African
invasions in the autumn of 1975 is supported by nearly very source close to
U.S. policy making during the Angolan debacle.
The United States' Angolan policy came under attack from members of Congress and the
',/
SouthAfrican state following Cuba's successful attacks on the U.S. supported armies. South
Africa claimed that jhe United States had betrayed them while Congress ended the policy in
1976.
These defeats brought about a change in Kissinger's regional tactics. At Lusaka in
1976,Kissinger openly pledged U.S. support for majority rule in Zimbabwe. Kissinger stated
that the United States would exert greater pressure on the Smith government through greater
diplomatic efforts and would call for the repeal of the Byrd Amendment. Further, he
proposed the establishmentofa Zimbabwe Development Fund ofUS$l billion, to which the
United States would be the major contributor, The "Kissinger Billion"
was to be used to compensate white farmers during land reform and to aid in
the reconstruction in the new nation, As an "inducement" to the front-line
states suffering frcm the economic and military consequence of the
ZimbabweanWar, he pledged substantial economic assistance and diplomatic
support to them in exchange for their cooperation with his efforts to negotiate
a settler ..nt. (Rossiter 1985: 55)
Assistance to the Frontline states from 1976~1980 reflected this promise, although the
envisioned US$l billion never materialized in Zimbabwe.
The shift in policy initiated under Kissinger and subtly modified uUtler Carter was the
result of numerous factors. First, U.S. actions in Angola largely resulted from a failed
Iudl -;binaprogramme and the fear that the Southern African region could fall within the orbit
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of the Soviet sphere of influence. Angola, Mozambique, and the l?t::$t orientations olthe
Zimbabwean guerrilla movements added credence to this belief. Following the Angolan
debacle, however, the U.S. began to appreciate tho noticeable erosion of "U.S. influence in
the region".10 U.S. regional support would grow, it was argued, through a pd:;.6y that called
for self-determination in Zimbabwe and economic assistance to the Frontline States. The
United States determined that Zambia was the critiral link in the entire process. l'his is
clearly evident when one examines the dramatic r.se in foreign assistance to Zambia during
the latter 19705.
Before proceeding with an analysis of'the nature and levels of foreign assistance to
the sub-region during the latter 1970s, a brie~'examination of the broader policy departures
initiated under the Carter administration (1976-80) Is necessary. Carter) in eontrast to
Kissinger, believed that the primary obstacle to a stable Southern African sub-region was
South Africa, not the Soviet Union. Carter'S appointments of Andrew Young to the United
Ndtiol.£ arid \VilliamBowder as Ambassador to South Africa strained relations between the
t "0 states. 1:oung was an outspoken critic of South Africa in the Intemationai arena.
Bowder initiated "inter ..racial living and social practices at the U.S. embassy that clearly
violated South African law" (Rossiter 1985: 61). Furthermore, he led a high ..level delegation
to the funeral of Steven Biko. Carter also refused to accept a partial solution to the
Zimbabwean situation, as he resisted pressure from Congressional leaders to acknowledge
the Zimbabwe ..Rhodesian settlement between Bishop Muzorewa and Smith.
10 Tl~s information is contained in the Congressional Research Service's Annual
"Congress and Foreign Policy Brief" of 197fl, It was hoped that the assistance proposed at
Lusaka would limit Soviet influence in the region, identify the United States with Afri~ai1
aspirations and encourage the development of a moderate Zimbabwean solution compatible with
Western economic and strategic interests. See Congressional Research Service 1976: 179.
This did not result in a shift in regional economic assistance policy however. U.S.
assistance to the sub-region, administered by USAlD, dramatically escalated from the end
of the Kissinger era through the Carter years. In 1976, prior to the Lusaka announcement,
U.S. assistance to the sub-region totalled 11S$28,9 million. This figure rose to US$63.2
million in 1917, US$143.2 million in 1978, and concluding, in 1980, at US$102.7 million.
The largest recipient was Zambia. U.S. assistance to the region was largely In the form of
goods and services transfers under security and development programs, and humanitarian aid.
Angola received no security or development assistance from 'USAID due to the
[)~:tra\nednature of relations between the U.S. and the MPLA. Disaster assistance, in the form
ofP.t. 480 Food Aid was administered through "various western and multilateral agencies
18 the needs of Angolan citizens in the aftermath of the civil war in 197G't (Rossiter
1985: ,80). .The total amount of the food aid programme, from 19i7-1981, was US$13.4
million (see USAlD 4itl TaMes).
Mozambique's role in the Zimbabwean liberation struggle was significant. President
Samora Machel repeatedly reiterated that the Zimbabwean and Mozarablcan struggles were
one and the same, The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELlMO) believed that
an independent Zimbabwe was critical of Mozambique's efforts towards dismantling neo-
colonlallinkeges, Mozambique suffered great economic and human losses during the war
however. The closing of its Rhodesian border during the 1970s dramatically decreased
revenue earned from Mozambique'S ports. Zimbabwe Mclean National Liberation Army
(ZANLA) buses in Mozarubique were attacked by Rhodesian forces, causing the loss ofUfe
and increased disruptions to food production. The Portuguese exodus of the mid ..1970s
further devastated the economy. The United States, recognizing Machel's vulnerability,
increased levels offoreign asslsta.ice to Mozambique during the latter years of the war. In
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1976, U.S, aid to Mozambique amounted to US$1.1 million. By 1979, U.S. foreign
assistance levels reached US$16.8 million, peaking the following year at US$lS.9 million.
By 1982, U.S. aid to Mozambique had dropped dramatically to US$0.6 million, reflecting
U.S. attitudes tOWi:}.l,'.;iSMozambique's socialist orientation (USAID Aid Tables).
Assistance. to Botswana, which had always been considered a moderate state with
democratic structures by Western standards, received noticeable increases in foreign
assistance during the latter 1970s. Although Botswana's role as a Frontline State was more
supportive than material, U.S. aid to the country increased during the period as well. In
1976, USAID funding levels were U8$3.8 million. By 1980; U.S. foreign aid had risen to
US$19.4 milliondt.:5pite a small decrease between 1978 and 1979 (USAID Aid Tables), The
projects were primarily administered by USAID under the functional account of Rural
Development, but programs were also initiated to improve services in the agricultural, health
and governmental sectors.
Malawi and Lesotho received very little U.S. assistance. In the case of Malawi. the
decision was based on the large presence of other bilateral donor agency programs in the
country. Lesotho's main programme during this period was USAID1$ supervised construction
of the Soutnern Perimeter Road, and a number of greats to PVOs working in the country.
Swaziland's foreign aid levels rose dramatically during this period as money was provided to
agricultural research and extension projects within the multi-donor Rural Development Area
programme. The aim of'the programme was to purchase expatriate land to be converted to
small ..scale holdings.
The increase inU.S. assistance to Zambia was remarkable. Of all the Frontline States,
Zambia's economic condition was the most desperate during the latter years of the Rhodesian
war. The price of copper had plummeted during the 19705. Zambia'S. ability to maintain
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exports were severely curtailed by Mozambique's decision to close its border, to Rhodesia.
Tanzania's Dar es Salaam port was too small to absorb Zambia's exports. Shortages ensued
as Z~urlbiawas largely isolated. Zambia'S vulnerability to outside assistance was high. In
1976} Zambia received US$O.I million in U.S. foreign assistance. In 1977 however, the
Zambian government received US$2S.6 million under a elP programme; whose total cost
at the end of 1981 was US$145 million. Zambia'speak level of U.S. foreign aid was in 1980~
when it received US$46.4 million (USAlD Aitl Tables), The CIP programme was aimed at
increasing the agricultural productivity of Zambian farmers through the importation of
fertilizers from the United Srates. The government was allowed to use the 10c('I1currency
generated from this programme as it saw fit. This programme must also be Seen in the light
of other foreign aid programmes initiated by countries; such as Britain, who had a vested
interest ill reaching an acceptable settlement to the Zimbabwean conflict. Overall, Zambia
received US$1462.1 million from other overseas bilateral and multilateral agencies from the
years 1976 through 1980 (Rossit{)l' 1985: 100). Yet) in 1975, Zambia had received no
financial support ftcm these same sources.
What should be evident from the above discussion is the multi ..faceted nature of the
U.S. assistance programme. What is important to bighlight is that the nature of USAID
programmes followed a similar pattern even though the decisions on foreign assistance
funding were based 011 wider geo-political concerns. As will be shown below, USAID
programmes in Zill,t,abwe Were consistent with this model. US. allocation levels to
Zimbabwe dropped dramatlcailyafter 1985) as Table 2.1 demonstrates.
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1980 20,900,000
1981 27,800,000
1982 75,100,000
1983 64,100,000
1984 47,900,000
1985 50,700,000
1986 13,000,000
1987 5,700,000
1988 5,000,000
1989 5.000~00(.
1990 5,000,000
1991 5,000,000
Total 327 ~200,OOO
The significant decreases in assistance after 1985 are the result ofa relatively minor
incident Involving former President Carter and two events at the United Nations. One was
the Zimbabwean condemnation of the U.S. invasion of Grenada, and the other was the refusal
ofZirnbabwe to support a resolution rebuking the Soviet Union for its hostile actions against
Korean Airlines Flight 007. Following these events, USAlO funding was terminated for the
remainder of 198(t When a~kedwhy U.S. assiatance was revived in 1987, USAIO's officer
in charge of the Zimbabwe Mission replied "because they got nice"." The amount of
assistance never reached previous levels as illustrated in Table 2.1 above.
11 Interview, Kimberly Finan, USAlD Office of Southern African Affairs, Washington
D.C., 17 July 1990.
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2.4 Coneluslon
This section provided an overview of the evolution of United States development
assistance both internationally and in the southern African sub-region. It demonstrated that
i)
policy and programmes were shaped by a range of'geo ..strategic and humanitarian interests
that shifted over time and between Presidencies. The next chapter presents an overview of
Zitl1bapwewith a specific emphasis on the evolution of agriculture and maize marketing. The
intention is to begin linking USAlD's broader programmes and shifts, highlighted in this
chapter, with the realities of colonial and post-colonial Zimbabwe. We can then begin to
establish the specific nature and impact ofUSAID'$ programmes in the country.
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CHAPTER THREE
HIS'foruCAL OVERVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL
DEVELOPMENT AND MARI(ETING IN
ZIMBABWE
3.1 Introduction
Development programmes are implemented within a particular social, political,
economic and historical context. The Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector Assistance Programme
(ZASA) was located within a dynamic agricultural setting, shaped by years of struggle and
change. This chapter explores Zimbabwe's agricultural setting and thus establishes the
foundations tor an evaluation of the ZASAProgramme. m particular, the chapter explores
the evolution ,"f grain marketing In Zimbabwe as the USAID programme was primarily
designed to increase the agricultural contribution of smallholders to the national economy.
The method through which this would be accomplished was, as discussed earlier, to extend
the grain marketing system to areas of the country historically neglected by the previous
settler regimes.
:.~ Agricultural Transformations in Southern Rhodesia
Government control over marketing in Southern Rhodesia was initiated during the
Great Depression ofthe 1930s. While the events that precipitated the passage of the Maize
Control Act of1931 are beyond th; scope of this study, a brief historical overview provides
the context for understanding the evolution of maize marketing in Zimbabwe.'
------------------
1 The hlstoncal literature on Zimbabwe is vast. Of particular importance to this study are
Beach 1977; Cheater 1984; Iliffe 1990; Kosmin 1977; Mosley 1983; Moyana 1984;
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Settler agricultural expansion in Southern Rhodesia proceeded slowly as the colony's
initial concerns lay in the development of a "Second Rand", Interest in farming was nominal
among early settlers, and land was held as a speculative asset by different mining interests.
An the drsams ofa "Second Rand" diminished, however, settlers and the British South Africa
Company became more concerned with agricultural production. By 1921, the number of
whites engaged in farming exceeded that of any other productive or administrative
occupation in the colony (Phimister 1988: 100). African producers, who were primarily
responsible for the supply of food crops to the young colony, came to be perceived as a
threat to European settlers who began to engage actively in farming. Agricultural prices
were highly volatile, and calls to protect European agriculture from African competition
gained strength. 0" time, the foundations of Afiican production were eroded by the settler
state. Mechanisms employed against African cultivators included a plethora of taxes' and
increased efforts to move African producers into isolated Native Reserves." The ability of
African producers to maintain the "peasant option'" was increasingly undermined, forcing
Mumbengegwi 1986; Palmer 1977a and 1977b; Phimister 1977 and 1988; van Onselen 1976;
Weinrich 1975; and Yudelman 1964.
2 An abridged list of taxes and fees includes the Hut Tax (doubled in 1904); Poll Tax
(introduced in 1905); the Private Locations Ordinance of 1908; the Kaffir Beef Ordinance of
1912; numerous rents that had to be paid to the Chartered Company for those occupying
unalienated land; Grazing Fees (1912); a Dog Tax (1912); and compulsory dipping fees for cattle
(1914).
3 The first Native Reserves were established in 1894 by the British South Africa
Company. Initially located in remote and inhospitable areas ill north-west Matabeleland, the
Gwaai and Shangani Reserves were regarded by the Ndebele as "cemeteries not homes"
(phimister 1988: (5). The forced removal of Afi'icans from European ..designated land continued
into the 1970s, although the context for these removals differed from that of'the earlier removals
(see Riddell 1980: 7),
4 According to Ranger (1985), the peasant option refers to the ability of African
producers to sustain their agricultural livelihood as an alternative to being drawn into the larger
wage economies of 30uthem Africa. See also Hyden 1983 for a discussion on the "exit option"
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many to engage in the larger economy as migrant labourers.
The process of dislocation was by no means uniform, however. As many have
argued, these processes affected different African communities, and different strata within
those communities, in numerous ways (see Mosley 1983 j Phimister 1988; and Ranger 1985),
The white farming community was equally stratified, with small-scale fanners cultivating
holdings of between 80-160 hectares coexisting with larger individual and company holdings
orwell over 40.000 hectares (Phimister 1988: 125). These complex nod interactive forces
served to impede the process of African accumulation in Southern Rhodesia at the time of
the Great Depression. From 1923, the shift from Company to Responsible Government, 5
while increasingly influenced by the white agricultural community, had not immediately led
to the. direct involvement of the state in issues of agricultural production and marketing.
Afiican fanners still produced maize for the internal market, but the terms of these purchases,
and the state's role in both production and marketing were to change dramatically with the
onset of the Gh'~atDepression.
3.3 The Evolution of Grain ~1arketing in Rhodesia
The Maize Control Aot of 1931 was passed in response to the agricultural crisis
caused by the Great Depression. The Act dramatically increased the State's direct role in
Southern Rhodesia's agricultural system. The government could 110t withstand settler
pressure to engage directly in agricultural marketing and production as the export price of
-------------------
for peasants in rural Tanzania.
S Established ill 1923, "Responsible Government" involved the transfer of power within
the colony from the British South Africa Company to a Parliamentary system under the control
of the settler community and tied more closely to Great Britain.
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maize fell from l ls, per bag in 1930 to 3s.4d. by A~rfl1931 (Ilifte 1990: 84; and Palm....l
1977b: 240). Production in the colony exceeded local demand which in turn served to
further depress prices.
The Maize Control Board, established under the Act, became the sole buying and
export agent in the colony, although the Board's original Jurisdiction was limited to
Mashonaland and theMidlands. Maize was transferred from Control Boards to urban centres
for proccf!.s~'g. At one level, the Act and the 1C • 4 Amendments to the original legislation,
ensured the survival of the white agricultural community by guaranteeing high producer
prices for their maize. It accomplished this through centralised marketing, which provided
white farmers with a guaranteed market and high producer price for their agricultural goods.
At another, more important level, the legislation served to strengthen local capital, in the
form of small-scale white fanners, vis-a-vis both large ..scale and African producers (see
Phimister 1988: 174; end Yudelman 1964: 179): The overt subsldization of local capital was
accomplished through the establishment of a two ..tiered pricing and quota system.
Maize purchased under the newly established Maize Control Board wan priced under
either a "local pool" or an "export pool", The forme!' was 30 ...50 percent higher than the
world price, while maize purchased under the "export pool" was considerably lower
(yudelm8111964: 179), Quotas for marketed maize were established in order to administer
the pricing scheme. Individual European small-scale farmers were allocated a quota of 80
percent of their marketed maize under the "local pool" in order to bolster their vulnerable
j
I
condition. Large-scale European interests received a quota. of 20 percent of their maize
under tpe "local pool", the remaining 80 percent being priced under the "export pool",
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African producers who could deliver their maize tlirectly to the Control Board would receive
the: higher "local pool" price on 20 percent of their maize, the remaining 80 percent being
':::" .
priced under the "export pool", Th~!majority of African farmers whQ had, in the end, to sell
their maize to approved buycrs'in-themoraisolated regions of Mash anal and and Midlands
only received the "e,..-port1l price for their maize.
The effect ofthis legislation on African producers was significant although uneven.
Of greatest consequence to most African producers were new restrictions on trade
promulgated under the Acts. Afiican producers who had previously sold their surplus crops
at the highest price offered in city centres" On outlying farms and at mines Were now
restricted under the new law. Surplus stocks had to be sold either to the Maize Control
Board or to approved traders. Traders subtracted transport fees, the costs of maize bags, and
a handling fee from the guaranteed price. The final price received by African producers, once
all these factors were accounted for, was nominal. African cultivators became more
dependent on local traders as the latter solidified their position as the primary source of cash
end credit in outlying areas, although many traders preferred to trade in kind rather than in
cash. Many African producers were forced to sell their maize to traders in order to meet the
numerous cash needs of the household. Often, maize supplies earmarked for household
consumption would be sold, only to be repurchased at the end of the year as household
supplies were exhausted..Naturally, traders resold their maize stocks at inflated prices. The
Native Commissioner of'Ndanga noted that traders were purchasing maize at 55. after the
maize had been harvested and reselling it at the end of the year for 178. as households
finished their stocks (Iliffe 1990: 86), As Mosley (1983: 44) puts it, the Act "not only
reduced the price they received but also increased their vulnerability to sharp commercial
practices", Between 1934 ana 1939, producer prices paid to African maize growers
vacillated between ls.6d. and 6s.6d.+while the European farming sector received prices that
averaged over 8$. per bag (Phimister i988: 185).
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An important point to stress pertains to the role of Mriean maize producers ill the
larger Southern Rhodesian economy after the passage of the Maize Control Acts. The ability
of the state to subeidise small-scale white farmers, through the quota and pricing scheme
established under the Acts, was contingent upon the continued delivery of AfriCal.l produced
maize to Maize Control Board depots. One way to ensure continued deliveries of AfiiCa11
maize to Board depots was to allow for a small percentage of those deliveries to be classified
under the higher priced "local pool". Without this supply ofm~ize, the government would
have been unable to subsidise white farmers without incurring losses) and Southern
Rhodesia's ability to export maize would have become less certain over time, As Ranger
(1985: 67) argues, the state had "to ensure that the tattered goose that laid the go}den egg
of subsidy for white fanning was not killed off in the process",
While it is undeniable that these measures fundamentally undermined the ability of
African cultivators to reproduce themselves, it is equally apparent that some African growers
were able to sustain themselves under this discriminatory system. Differentiation among
African smallholders accelerated as those who could deliver directly to the Maize Control
Board received higher prices for their maize and did 110thave to bear the direct costs
associated with selling to isolated traders. Those who could secure direct access to Maize
Control Board depots were able to sustain their livelihoods to a far greater dee"~c;. than those
who were more dependent on approved buyers. Farmers in the more isolated regions of the
country) like Gokwe in the mid4960s and 1970s, continued to sell through official U1~kctin~
channels, even though the costs associated with such sales m..~,}Obigh. The ccmtrlbution of
African producers to Southern Rhodesia's overall stockpile c.f muiz~ r~ms,ined small
compared to that contributed by white farmers however. Much of this related to Maize
Control Board access, low prices, and transport costs, but an equally important reason was
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that roan) AfriCat1 producers activated and maintained a wider marketing network, especlally
in regions neglected by the officIal marketing system.
Between the late 1930$ 'and the period of Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of
Independence (UDI) from Great Britain in 1965, other important changes occurred in the
Southern Rhodesian countryside. A number of modifications to the ]VfaizeControl Acts were
passed." The two-tiered pricing system was officially amalgamated in 1944. In 1949~ a ten
percent Afiicrui Hevelapment Fund levy on the value of all graln sales from African areas was
imposed, further undermining the viability of the more vulnera151eAfric:an producers and
effectively re-established a two-tiered pricing system. The Grain Marketing Board (GMB)
assumed the responsibilities of the Maize Control Board in 1950. In addition to maize, the
OMB became responsible for the marketing of a wider variety of crops including beans,
rapoko, sorghum, millet and, a year later, grouudnuts (Republic of Zimbabwe 1988: 9), In
1957 the GMS expanded its coverage to include Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, but this
dissolved with the Central Mrican Federation in 1963.
Rhodesia's 001 from Great Britain further modified the agricultural marketing
structure of the economy. Sanctions initiated against Rhodesia. though imperfect (see Lake
1976), forced the economy to become more inward-oriented. State control over the
economy increased in an effort to mitigate the effects of Rhode Sid'S growing isolation. Food
crops that could be produced in the country were favoured while export commodities such
as tobacco were discouraged. In 1965, 57.2 percent of the total value of European
agricultural output was concentrater.In tobacco production, with small percentages behg
() The Maize Control Act of 1940 was replaced by the Grain Marketing Act of 1950,
which was subsequently replaced by the Gr"', Marketing Act of 1957. These Acts merely
transferred control ofm~!rketing between variou. ~overmnent bodies but did not dramatically alter
the na.ture of marketing 111 Southern Rhodesia.
47
registered for maize and sugar. Production of crops such as wheat, cotton, soya-beans and
coffee were negligible 13y 1979, white agricultural production was mere evenly distributed
between all these crops, although tobacco remained the most important commodity (Shopo
1987: 198).
In 1966, the Grain Marketing Act was passed, and significantly, the Act remains in
operation today. The legislation subdivided the country into two categories, ZOllC A ace1
Zone B. The former included urban centres, commercial farms ami some Purchase Areas (If
Rhodesia? Controlled products grown in Zone A areas had to be sold to the Grain Marketing
Board, and could not be transported out of the designate, area without the CO!1Sent ,~fthe
GMB. Farmers residing in the Tribal Trust Lands' were subsumed under the Zone B
category. Zone B farmers could sell their agricultural commodities within these areas
without restriction, but could not transport their crops into or through a Zone A area. Crops
that entered a Zone A area would have to be sold to the OMB (Republic of Zimbabwe 1988:
10). As before, gra.o::,~"'td to the OMB were transported to.srban centres for processing.
The processed foods were'then resold in cities and within the immediate vicinity, The cost
ofurban-refined foodstuffs was, despite subsidies, significantly greater than the original price
procured by rural farmers (Mosley 1987).
The principal effect of the Act was to reinforce the role of centralised marketing in
...... _---,
7 PU1'f", .•, I Areas were created under the Land Apportionment Act of 1931. Free'iold
leases were df', Ired to African farmers who wished to move out of the increasingly crowded
Reserves. rt P' 'intention was to officlallv j rohibit the sale of European designated land to
Africans, thus i, ompleting, at least Iegiclattvely, the segregationist aspirations of many Southern
Rhodesians. Purchase Areas were often desig11ated as a buffer zone between Reserves and
European areas in order to protect the latter from potential encroachments on their farms.
rul chase Area farmers largely constitute the small-scale commercial farming community in
Zimbabwe.
8 Reserves were renamed Tribal Trust Lands in 1963.
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the Rhodesian economy. The Agricultural Marketing Authority (AMA), created, in 1967,
assumed overall responsibility for the pricing and marketing of all controlled pro ducts The
various marketing boards were thereafter required to purchase all produce delivered to them,
thereby ensuring a buyer for the commercial farming sector. Prior to DDI, the total" --lae of
agricuhural output procured through statutory marketing authorlties was approximately 35
percent; by 1973 the figure had increasedto approximately 77 percent ~t1os1ey 1987: 215;
Shope 1987: 20J~4),
As indicated above, wealthier African producers who resided ill close proximity to
the n~wly eStablished matketing depots continued to sell surplus stocks of maize, and later,
l othar agliclIltural.commodities) to the statutory bodies. For fanners who were neglected and
remote from marketing depots and areas where grain depots were later, afre!"1980, funded
by USAlD, matters were somewhat different. Between the passage of the Mai~e Control
Acts and independence, wealthier African producers in these more isolated Tribal Tmst
Lands continued to activate marketing arrangements that enabled many farmers to better
maintain the peasant option," The principal market for many surplus producers were deficit
households, missions aed shop OWners (Riddell 1981: 36), While the GMB served only as a
secondary market fer most farmers in more isolated regions of the country. Excess stocks
above local market requitemeuts were sold to statutory authorities despite the barriers
instituted against Afiican fart'lers. This has led some, like ltlffe to suggest that a greater
degree offond security was apparent in the past.
9 Master farmers were designated by the state in order to promote a class of advanced
fanners within the Reserves, These farmers received technlcal training, tended to have huger land
holdings than their neighhours and received preferential access to loans and water facilities, As
a result, agricultural output far outstripped their neighbours in the Reserves and contributed to
further (~iffcrentiatiort within these areas.
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Whereas ('.Jtrly colonial famines centred where the European impact was least,
later colonial scarcity concentrated where the European impact was greatest.
(nIife 1990: 79)
Iliffe contends that pre-capitalist dearth was replaced by capitalist scarcity in Rhodesia,
concluding that the threat of starvation was reduced "because the European economy had
acquired greater capacity to relieve stress, thanks to surplus grain production, controlled
marketing and better transport" (1990: 88).
Anothe.!;_jmpottantreason why the threat of absolute starvation in more remote areas
could have been less than in areas more directly affected by official marketing structures,
overlooked by Iliffe, is that the overwhelming proportion of isolated regions' agricaltural
crops remained ill those particular areas. Centralised marketing and the sale of urban-
relined foodstuffs occurred within a relatively small portion of Rhodesia. Gokwe, for
instance; was inaccessible during much of the year because of impassable roads. Surplus
households sold their agricultural goods locaUybecause markets for agricultural commodities
were clearly available; only afterwards were grains and oilseeds sold to the GMB and private
interests outside the area," In the process, wealthier farmers were able to accumulate, mills
were established to process food grains and differentiation within these areas occurred.
This is not 'to argue that food security was always ensured in areas neglected by the
official marketing system. Outright crop failure due to drought continued to " reaten the
survival of those in the more isolated areas of pre- independent Zimbabwe. For example, food
had to be imported into the Sabi Valley region during the 1930s due to crop failures, forcing
Afiican producers to cull their herds in order to purchase maize meal (Moyana 1984: 117).
Instead, consumers residing in areas with limited official marketing opportunities were able
10 Most of this information was gleaned from informal interviews with elders from Njelele
and during discussions with AGRITEX officials.
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to' survive periods of reduced output through jntel'~housebold exchange arrangements that
had been secured in those regions over time. In contrast, consumers who lived in regions
that were more involved in the official marketing system became more dependent on higher
'.1
priced urban-refined meal to meet household food requirements
Evidence to support these claims begin with Yudelman's (1964) study of African
production in. Southern Rhodesia. Between 1948-58, enormous disparities between-Afrlcar,
production. and sales to statutory bodies existed according to tk~GMa'srecords, reproduced
in the Table 3.1 on the following page. The data demonstrates that only a small percentage
of African maize was being sold to the Grain Marketing Board during this 14 year period.
111195617, 34 per cent of the estimated maize produced by African farmers was sold to the
GMB, but this was~t'mewhat unusual. The range of sales fluctuated between 16..25 per cent
\,
during this period, with the 195617 year being an anomaly," Despite, the potential
inaccuracies in Southern Rhodesian calculations of Africaro' production, the figures are telling
...the overwhelming majol~ityof maize produced by African cultivators was not sold to the
GMB.
11 African production estimates were not recorded in official GMB publications after
196213, as the government no longer supplied data 011 the sales of grains to the statutory body
for political and strategic reasons. The declining trend ill Mrican maize sales to the GMB is
nevertheless clear.
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1948 1,671,000
1949 1,487,000 121,000
1950 1,835,000 124,000
1951 1,278,000 203,000
1952 1,973~000 688,000
1953 2,787,000 898~000
1954 3,129,000 875,000
1955 2.796,000 70v,OOO
1956 3,926,000 1,385,000
1957 3,363,000 933,000
1958 2,847,000 533,000
During the last ten years of the civil war (1965-1979) the percentage of maize sales
to the OMS by Afiican producers declined significantly because of'the disruptions caused by
the war and the withholding of grains from official marketing facilitir~$by large segments of
the African community (see A. Thompson 1988: 192..5). Given the degree of differentiation
apparent within the broader African community, it can be assumed that wealthier farmers
were predominantly responsible for the greatest share ofboth production and sale figures.
The data contained in the Grail! il;f{ll'keting ]Jon"l Annual Bepott«, and reproduced by
Yudelman, fails to show what was happening to the unaccounted surpluses. This is the
subject to which we now turn,
Despite efforts by the state to limit the marketing opportunities available to African
cultivators, trade within and between designated Tribal Trust Lands occurred. African
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farmers, especially master farmers who consistently achieved grain surpluses above the
immediate requirements of the household, preferred to sell their surplus stocks in the
immediate vicinity rather than to the GMB, although, again, sales through official marketing
channels r!;tt v'cur. Yudelman (1964: 181..4) discusses th.e development of a "second
market" in Tribal Trust Lands, concluding that the increased incide."l.ceof "illegal" sales
resulted from the differential prices received by Africans under the discriminatory marketing
system. As a result of such discrimination, alternative marketing channels continued to be
activated.
Missions offered a viable market for African produce as they required a regular supply
of grains in order to feed their boarders (Cheater 1984. Yudelman 1964 and Weinrich 1975).
As will be demonstrated below, the retail price for maize increased dramatically after the
imposition of centralised marketing. By purchasing directly from African farmers, misslons
could mltigate the increasing cost of'purchased food. The benefit to African farmers was also
apparent. In isolated areas, the price received for grains traded through buyers was
extremely low due to transport costs, handling and bag fees and the Mrican Development
Fund levy. Missions paid higher prices to African producers than both local traders or
approved buyers, Further, the levy on African-produced grains, imposed in 1949 and not
removed unti11979, could be avoided.
Another market tor African producers were white farmers themselves. Under
pressure from the white community, the pre-UDI state liberalized its trading scheme to allow
African producers to sell directly to white farmer-consumers, although the latter subsequently
paid a "rake-orr' tax to the OMS (Mosley 1983: 46). This allowed white farmers to
purchase lower cost maize for their labour force from Mrican cultivators while
slmuitaneously selling their maize. at higher prices to the OMS (Phimister 1988: 187),
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As Weinrich (1975: 102..4) demonstrates, the most common market for African were
deficit African households, In Karangaland
Of'all surplus millet produced 92.1 per cent is sold directly to the people, and
so is 71.4 per cent of allmaize, 66.7 per cent of all ground beans, 60 per cent
of groundnuts and 21.4 per cent of all sorghum. (Weinrich 1975: 103)l2
Purchase Area farmers sold approximately 38 percent of their crops to deficit communities
within Tribal Trust Lands as well. despite the restrictions 041 such trade promulgated under
the Grain Marketing Act of 1966 (Weinrich 1975: 193). During the 1960s,PurchaseArea
fanners inMsengezi utilized alternative marketing arrangements with other farmers, as well
as shops and schools. By 1973, one Purchase Area household was selling 300 gallons of
peanut butter, pl;pduced from damaged groundnuts, to two boarding schools In the region,
guaranteeing the family $630 per annum (Cheater 1984: 43). Another household Was able
to sell approximately one-th' Jf their crops and cattle on the "internal market" (Cheater
1984: 102).
Farmers who sold their surplus crops to households within the immediate vicinity
benefitted from selllng.later in the year as deficit households terminated their stocks prior to
the forthcoming harvest. Prices offered through either approved buyers. cooperatives 01' a
central depot were unifo.m throughout the year," In contrast, farmers could secure larger
profits if they withheld their stocks and sold to households in the area when shortages
12 Karangaland was one of the most populous regions in Rhodesia, situated in the
administrative districts of Midlands and Victoria.
!3 African producers received the same basic price for their grains, depending on grade,
once the "local" and "export" pools were officially amalgamated in 1944. The final price received
from approved buyers differed after 1955 when the traders' handling margins were made flexible
based upon the distance to a central depot (Mosley 1983: (1), Farmers often complained that
their grains were graded at the lowest posslote standard which increased their distrust of traders
operating on behalf of the official marketing body (Phimister 1988: 188). See Yudelman (1964:
187M9) for a discussion of cooperatives, which were confined to the Purchase Areas.
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increased. Internal trade between surplus producers and food deficit households contributed
to growing d~sparities between classes within'the Tribal Trust Lands. Many master farmers
reinveste~;their earnings into improved agricultural inputs, such as ploughs and to a lesser
degree fertilisers. Grinding mills were purchased and some diversified their agricultural base
by opening local stores. Surpluses were also used to further political .tims within the Tribal
Trust Lands.
The extensive sale of surplus crops within Tribal Trust Lands has created
fixed selling and buying patterns. Some subcheifdoms or neighbourhoods sell
their surpluses of one crop to members of ancther subcheifdom or
neigbbourhood who lack this particular crop, and poorer communities depend
all the surpluses of richer communities.., most master farmers have a
permanent clientele and trading patterns that cut across political allegiances.
(Weinrich 1975: 104)
During periods of scarcity, the importa- "e of surplus .stocks remaining ill the area was
magnified. In Shirl.Ngara and Shoko, the decline in agricultural outputduring drought years
was dramatic. During an average year, 40 percent of the crops cultivated by master farmers
were sold to missions and deficit households within the Tribal Trust Lands. Poorer
cultivators sold 1'1percent of their output in the area as well. Productivity for both groups
declined during the 1966-7 drought, but master farmers were stili able to so1114.1 percent
of their total output, while other cultivators sold 5.9 percent ortheir crops in the urea. Ten
out of the 19 master farmers surveyed in these areas purchased food, while 106 of the
remaining 144 poor households needed to purchase food. Food secured from within the area
enabled deficit households to survive at a cost significantly lower than if they had been
required to purchase urban ..refined meal HI.•~;:ghh'~,.'.ftn'i5t;f~(Weinrich 1975: 98,,101).
Poorer households secured food from surplus growers ill a number of ways. Men and
women wbo earned wages in town, on mines or European farms could use their incomes to
S5
purchase food from surplus households inthe Tribal Trust Lands." Many poorer households
would provide labour during planting or harvesting periods in return for food at later dates
(Cheater 1984: 63~79). Many poorer families also became indebted to wealthier households
in order to secure access to food during deficit periods.
In Gokwe, inforrnal interviews with AGRITEX officials and elders indicates that food
secudtY W('!S also better ensured through exchanges between surplus and deficit households.
Surplus producers had a viable market in the local area as many families were unable to
consistently produce enough food for household consumption. Cash transactions and labour
exchanges were the principal means by which deficit households were able to secure food
during periods of shortfaIl. Poorer households could assist surplus families in the harvesting
of maize, sunflower, groundnuts and cotton in exchange for food. These families received
2..3 bag's ofmaize per hectare, depending upon the crop harvested. Once the local options
were exhausted, surplus producers would transport their remaining stocks to Kadoma or'
KweKwe for sale to the GMB. Another im~ortant source of income for Gokwe cultivators
were direct sales of sunflower to Lever Brothers of Harare and United Soap in Bulawayo,
Sales to these private companies, as well as cash transactions in the area and remittances
from family members engaged in the wider political economy of southern Africa, were critical
sources of accumulation for fanners in Gokwe, This income enabled some to diversify their
economic activities into arc las SUch as transport and milling. Although USAlD was later to
assume the contrary, these transactions demonstrate that producers in neglected areas were
14 Weittrich (1975: (0) demonstrates that 14 percent of all women in the Karangaland
survey area were regularly absent f)'om the Tribal Trust Land. They either accompanied their
husband or secured employment on European farms or as domestic servants. For a discussion of
the degree and importance of female wage labour in the post ..independent Zimbabwean household
economy, see Adams 1991.
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involved in a wider pre-independence Zimbabwean economy. Importantly, no interviewee.
inGokwe who was consistently unable to produce enough food for the family could identifY
a year in which the household lacked adequate food prior to independence, a point that will
be elaborated upon in later Chapters."
The sale of surplus agricultural commodities outside official marketing channels
helped offset the costs associated with the purchase of urban-processed foodstuffs as the
retail price fat maize increased dramatically after the imposition at' centralized marketing.
Grain delivered to the GMB ' taS sold to the millers, who in turn resold the maize at an
increased cost. AsMosley (1987: 218) demonstrates in Table 3.2 on the following page, the
price received by African producers for theit unprocessed maize was between 24~43 percent
below the final selling price, depending on whether an African producer was able to deliver
directly to the OMB or not. By purchasing directly from African farmers, missions, deflcit
households and white farmers could mitigate the increasing cost of purchased food.
Mosley (1987) argues that the excessive costs associated with the purchase of maize
meal contributed to food insecurity in urban areas such as Salisbury, He concludes that this
evidence suggests that Bates's (1981) argument that African governments maintain low
consumer prices in order to appease urban constituents is inaccurate in the
Rhodesian/Zimbabwean context. In fact, Mosley argues that the opposite is more accurate
as producers continue to be effectively subsidised at the expense of urban consumers.
Skalnes (1989) concurs with Mosley, arguing that workers and urban consumers bore the
jrunt of'Zimbabwe's bias towards producers.
IS Archival material from Gokwe, following the eradication of tsetse fly from the area, is
not presently available. The author is therefore dependent upon oral testimony.
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s,d s.d
1.) Guaranteed price tc African producer selling to trader 12,0
in Reserve
3,0Margin (maximum permissable)3.) Trader's
4.) Guaranteed price to African producer delivering direct
to the GMS (1+2+3)
22,0
5.) African Development Fund Levy
6.) Guaranteed price to European producer (4+5)
7.)GMB
of grain to miller
3,0
25,0
16,9
41,9
9.) Millerls permissible margin 5,10
10.) Price ofa bag of maize meal to retailer «8+9)
11.) Retailer's permissible margin 2,9
12.) Gross retail price of a bag of maize meal (10 11) 50,4
13.) Subsidy on retail price 4,0
of maize meal (12 .. 13)
47,7
What both Skalnes and Mosley fail to recognize is that Zimbabwean smallholders
were also net purchasers of food. It must be remembered that grains have historically been
siphoned out of rural areas into the major urban centres through the GMB. The introduction
of a unidirectional marketing system that exported grains from rural areas to urban centres
was particularly damaging if alternative sources of'food were not available 01' the processed
goods that re-entered the area were beyond the means of vulnerable households. By
increasing the scope and operations of the OMB under a system that continued to extract
grains from rural areas without ensuring that these areas were capable of securing food at a
I~I S8
reasonable cost; USAID and the government directly increased the vulnerability of deficit
households living in areas of US AID-funded depots, As will be shown in the following
chapter, the result of this intervention was especially devastating in 1992 as maize supplied
to this depot had been removed from the area at a time when alternative supplies were simply
not available.
3.4 Grain Marketing in Post ..Independence Zimbabwe
At independence, the Zimbabwean government inherited a marketing system that had
been overwhelmingly geared tqiwards the proteccon and support of the white farming sector.
African producers were subjected to numerous e", .es and restrictions used by the state to
support this sector, Although small segments of the African farming populace were able to
minimise the losses incurred under such a system, it is clear that the discriminatory as!)ccts
of Rhodesian society hindered the majority's ability to accumulate adequate resources to
enhance their condition vis-a-vis their white counterparts. The government thus embarked
on a grain marketing depot extension programme with the financial support of USAID. The
African Development Fund levy was terminated, and the producer price of maize increased
by 41 percent immediately after inuependence (Mlambo 1989: 246). The response was
overwhelming as African producers began selling their grains to the statutory body,
Numerous factors contributed to the dramatic increases in MilCM sales to statutory
marketing bodies, in addition to greater access to depots and higher producer prices. Areas
previously ravaged by Waf) like Gokwe, benefitted frot',}the stability oftnoJ new order. Crops
could be planted without the fear of these crops being de~troyed in the cross ..fire of the civil
war. Households in areas such as Mangwende and Chibi established new holdings and
replanted previously abandoned fields (Rohrbach 1938: 311). Seed and fertilizer packages
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were distributed free of charge to resettlement farmers) while improved seed varieties were
made readily available to farmers in outlying areas. Agricultural extension agents began
concentrating their efforts on Cottiplunal Areas," Sunflower and millet, crops predominantly
/f
grown by African farmers, were included as controlled crops in 1983 and 1984 respectiv £y.17
Th~ improved prices offered were further incentive to sell, and the initial two years of
independence were characterised by above average rains. Areas which produced small
surpluses contributed to the Communal Area aggregate total, although the principal
beneficraries of the expanded depot network continued to be;}farmers located in Mashonaland
Central. Another important point to stress is that, after independence, it was initially cheaper
for farmers to sell their maize to the GMB and purchase subsidized urban-refined meal than
to withhold stocks for household consumption and pay local grinding fees (see 'fable 3.3 011
the following page). Stamling and Muir estimate that close to 200 rural grinding mills closed
during this period resulting from the proliferation of subsidized meal in many areas of rural
Zimbabwe (cited in Blackie 1987).
Important aspects ofthe marketing structure did not change after the final Grain
Marketing Act passed under the Smith regime. Grains purchased by the GMB or inued to
filter out of rural areas to the urban centres of Zimbabwe. The overwhelming majority of
grains purchased by the GMB continued to be transported to urban centres and sold to large-
scale private millers. For example) in 1988/9, commercial millers in urban areas received
543,000 tons of grain from the GMB out ora total of676,OOOtons procured by the statutory
body (Grain Marketing Board AmlU(11 Re,(Jort 1989: 6). The remaining grain is delivered
~-----------------
16 Tribal Trust Lands were renamed Communal Areas in 1982.
17 M;llet (mhunga and rapoko) were decontrolled by the Southern Rhodesian authorities
in 1963.
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Pruducer Price--
Maize* 5,,50 7,13 I 10,90 10,90 10,90 12,73 16,37 16,37 1 16,37 17,70 19,55 I 20,45 1 20,45 55,00
455 1 .. S05 -Sunflower - - - 255 285 320 "A..... I ")1"'11"'1 11'20 580 995- .:J'"t1.J .3'7" -r_,.", .~_L.;..:-
SeedCotton 36 50 I 50 50 55,50 65,50 73,50 73,5(} I 78,50 86 I 110.5 ····1 135 262 :262
Grain Marketing Board Selling Price (Z$/~1kg bag)
67,00Maize**
Controlled Retail Price (Z$/90 kgbag)*"'*
Roller Meal 1 7,36 7,92 7,92 12,77 18,30 21.98 !. 27,99 J1,.91 31,91 31,91 45,55@ 45.55 55,30 99,53@
Straight-Run 7,79 10,64 15,37 17,82 20,27 22,76 30,20 30,70 30)70 30,70 34,li@ 38,74 50,36 137,65@
Sup-Refined - - I_ - __I 25,18 28,74 32,50 , 40,57 I41,37 41,37 41,37 49,30@ 65,55 75,00 202.:5~@
Notes: a= I April 191Q- 31 March 1980; * ..Maize == Z${91 kg bag, Sunflower is Grade AA 3.t.. Seed Cotton is Grade B~ cents'kg; ** .. selling price
cbfu;£ ~!d~Jrinh.he year in 1980, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1988 and 1989. The higher price is indicated in thetable; *** ..Only Straight-Run
Meal, 1he purchased in a 90 kg bag. Roller Meal and Super-Refined Meal prices were based on the purchase of one 50 kg bag and two 20
.L{g bags) @ - ffidicr,J.~sL11at the controlled prices changed during the year. The last price is therefore giver; as this price was most relevant to
deficit households
to the Department of Social Wp.lfare,stockfeeders, poultry producers, brewers and Christian
Care who are also located in the urban centres of Zimbabwe. 18
The assumption that African cultivators produced enough maize to feed the
household remained pervasive in the,Zimbabwean psyche, but, as demonstrated above, it was
somewhat misguided. In addition, the government had maintained the inherited policies of
pan-seasonal and pan ..territorial pricing. Pan-seasonal pricing meant that farmers received
the same price at depots for their commodities throughoi.t the agricultural year. The main
effect of this policy was to discourage farmers from storing their surplus agricultural
j
I
. I
I
commodities, and subsequently passes storage costs onto the respective marketing boolf.
Pan-territorial pricing referred to the practice ofofi'ering a single depot price to producers
throughout Zimbabwe, regardless of distance from the depot to the centre of the marketing I
I
r ]
Isystem, Farmers in more remote regions of the country were effectively subsidised by more
centrally ..located pr6ducers, as the latter bore the transport costs of the former.
An important change to the overall marketing system deserves mention however. In
1976..77 the Rhodesian government had introduced pre-planting prices In an effort to
increase agricultural output during what turned out to be the final phases of th ' liberation
war. At independence, the Zimbabwean government reverted back to the traditional practice
of settlng prices after producers had planted crops for that year (Republic of Zimbabwe
1988: 78). Pre ..harvest prices) usually announced as late as April, remained the norm until
1993, despite tni,.) Government's assertion that "the timing of announcement of producer
prices [will be] early enough to influence production in the year in which they operate"
18 See 6rt/in MOfketilJg Board Anmutl Report 1991, page 26, Figure One, for a
breakdown of GMB sales between 1980 ..91.
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(Republic of Zimbabwe 1982: 69).l9
The government's rationale for pre-harvest as opposed to pre-planting prices was
clear. With the extension of depots and their role as residual purchaser, the government was
vulnerable to large influxes of grains. The government preferred to assess potential
production levels before announcing the price it would guarantee in order to protect itself
from large pay-outs to grain producers. Prices were therefore partially determined by what
the government believed it could afford to pay. This policy limited the flexibility available
to farmers) especially those in the Communal Areas who remained undercapitalized and
unable to alter their productive base in any given year. As a result, decisions on production
in areas well served by commercially-refined foodstuffs were based more often on labour
availability than producer price as the latter were not announced until five months after
farmers had planted their crops. In contrast, production decisions in areas poorly served by
urban-relined foodstuffs were often based on perceived household food requirements rather
than on what would secure the highest return.
In his study of state autonomy in Zimbabwe, Herbst (1990) demonstrated that the
state enjoyed a large degree of autonomy in the setting of agricultural prices The
government was lobbied by different agricultural interests, such as the Commercial Farmers
Union and the (then) Zimbabwe National Fanners Union, but its pricing decisions were
consistently made independently of these interests. Herbst argues that the effect of lobbying
campaigns in relation to the setting of producer prices was significantly enhanced if issues
related to "peasant welfare" were emphasized, and that the state had demonstrated its
responsiveness to African smallholders by setting high producer prices for predomlnautly
19 Fanners begin planting crops such as maize inNovember or six months before the price
tor maize will be.set. Wheat, which is a winter crop, is not affected.
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African-grown mhunga, rapoko and sorghum.
Herbst's study does not go far enough in analysing the effects of government
decisions on peasant welfare. In particular, the impact of controlled retail prices of urban-
processed meal on rural households needs analysis. .The perception that rural households'
food security was ensured was wholly inaccurate, In fact, for many deficit households in
semi-arid regions of the country, the producer price was irrelevant as they were consistently
unable to sell to the.GMB. Instead, the retail price ofmaiz.e was offar greater significance.
Additionally, because maw areas of the country were poorly served by urban ..refined meal,
cropping decisions Were often based upon perceived household food needs, Households in
more vulnerable regions, such as parts of Gokwe, devoted disproportionately large areas of
their },andto maize, instead of cotton, sunflower and groundnut, which were higher ..valued
cash cropsruld wore suited to the environment, because of'the limited availability of urban ..
refined foodstuffs in the area. Survey data from Njclele found that 91 percent of the
respondents devoted more land to food crops, due to the distributional problems evident in
Zimbabwe) than to higher-valued crops. This was especially detrimental to poorer
households who) though they possess adequate labour .for higher-valued crops, instead
decided for good reasons to grow high-risk food crops. It also meant that$t.ecause maize
was both a cash crop and a food crop, poorer maize-producing households would often sell
their limited maize supplies to meet short-term cash needs at the expense of household food
security.
This was the setting for USAlD's ZASA programme in the early 1980s. Instead of
encouraging farmers to diversify their productlve bases, USAID developed a programme
that, in effect, reduced marketing options and exacerbated the outflow ......f maize from grain
deficit regions of the country. USAID also demonstrated an interest in the producer prices
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established by the Zifubabwean government. It was shown in previous chapters that the
United States viewed the construction of depots under ZASA as an important entry point into
the Zimbabwean policy decision ..making process. C. Thompson (1991.: 117..28) documents
numerous examples ofUSAlD efforts to reduce maize output in Zimbabwe on the premise
that a democratic South Africa should be seen as the primary source of food for the sub-
region. USAID therefore believed that producer prices should be reduced in order to
dissuade farmers from producing maize. The impact of such pressure on Zimbabwean pricing
decisions is uncertain given Herbst's findings. Moreover, these pronouncements occurred
as the United States terminated its jid programme to Zimbabwe, thus reducing the United
States' leverage over Zimbabwean policy.20What such pros sure does suggest is, at the vet'y
least, a lack of coordination with the ZASA development effort to enhance smallholder
incomes thrt<USAID had been funding for the Ji !ievious five years.
_\ '
As a result of these numerous tensions, the initial euphoria over high producer prices
after independence waned as the Government's ability to maintain such prices diminished.
Producer prices were stagnant between 1981 and 1984, and again between 1985 and 1988
(see Table 3.3). Furthermore, the real value of maize declined precipitously from the early
1980s (Mlambo ct. al. 1991: (4). As a result, farmers with greater financial, productive and
land resources shifted their productive base away from maize into export crops such as
tobacco and horticulture." More importantly, as Tc-1ble3.3 indicates, the disparity between
20 The United States suspended its assistance programmes to Zimbabwe in 1986 due to
the famed "Carter incident" and certain objectionab1e votes in the United Nations against U.S.
positions.
21 In 1986, the government established a two-tiered pricing structure that discriminated
against commercial farmers similar to the one established by the Southern Rhodesian government
fol)owlng the passage of the Maize Control Act of 1931. This system was eventually modified
hut the action furtbe~,underlUined large-scale commercial farmers' confidence in the state and
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producer prices, QrvfB selling prices and controlled retail prices rose dramatically from the
early 19805. Since 1985, controlled retail prices of maize meal were 80-200 percent greater
than producer prices although rural households rarely purchased basic commodities at the
o
government ..established price. Household vulnerability to food shortages was therefore
exacerbated by both high prices and the extraction of food crops from recently established
depots in <outlying areas of ~he country. Surplus grains that historically remained. in the
vicinity were instea 1 '..,1d to the GMB ~nan effort by farmers to meet short ..term cash needs
it
brought about by changes in tIm wider political economy of Zimbabwe. Noteworthy in this
respect was the extension of health facilities and schools to outlying areas, which clearly
increased the cash requirements ofthe hOl.rleholdat a time when rea! agricultural prices were
declinin~~d oft'Mfarm income was decreasing, Other important costs included those related
/1
to agricUltural production, such as seed, fertilizer, end transport, As a result of these' changes
and the extraction offood from rural areas, the abh'ty of rural consumers to ensure access
to low-cost foodstuffs became more tenuous.
Increased dependence on urban-refined foods('ufftl by rural consumers since
independence became apparent. Chisvo et al. (1990: 122) estin'l\tr:d that 50 percent of
households "nNatural Regions IV and V were net purchasers of grain, and evidence suggests
that the percentages of commerclally-reflned meal purchases increased as the year
progressed, Over 100,000 tonnes of commercially-processed maize was 110W consumed, per
annum, in rural areas (Chisvo et. al; 1990: 122). Research carried out in Mberengwa, Rnnde
and Shurugwe during 1990 found that 38 percent of households surveyed depleted their
stocks by December 1989. As a result, they were forced to purchase urban-manufactured
further strengthened their desire to diversify into uncontrolled crops such as tobacco and
horticultural products.
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maize meal and accept drought relief as local maize was unavailable in the area (Jayne at:' al,
1990: 43). According to the Grain Marketing Board, 211,663 bags of maize (91 kgs) were
removed from the three depots "sed by farmers in these areas - Charandura, Gweru and
Tongogara - during this period. aoth Charandura and Tongogara are USAID-funded grain
depots, constructed in 1988.
Food Distribution Network
'" 0",11>,""" "ot"or'
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Despite the llicreasing importance of subsidizedmeal in the household diet, the supply
of ...ummercially ...refined maize is uncertain in the more isolated regions of Zhnbabw&;
especially during periods ofcountry ...wide scarcity. Outlying areas are often neglected despite
the fact that much of the grin processed by commercial millers originated in these particular
areas. As the map above illustrates. the COUtltt~/~food distribution network is limited to
accessible areas on main roads and in towns. The decline in the availabiHty of locally
produced foodstuffi had a particularly damaging imp. ct on defi1households jntbeseare~
who had historically secured food through inter-houseliold netwdrks established prior to the
'I
construction of th~ lOC1f depot.
, It
outlying districts. '\
'"\' '\\
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One such area in which this occurred is Gokwe and Its
//
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CHAPTER FO'UR
USAID AND THE .A.GRICULTURAL SECTOR or
ZIMBABWE [;
4.1 Introduction
The linkage between land and agricultural development in Zimbabwe is apparent yet
politically explosive. At independence, the new government inherited an agricultural sector
that had been overwhelmingly geared towards the advancement of the white farming
community, largely at the expense of the black farming population. White farmers had
forcibly secured access to approximately half 9fthe agriculturally productive land during the
colonial era though they were small in nUrll(jers. Black farmers were forced into more
marginal and increasingly overpopulated Reserves. Landlessness in the Tribal Trust Lands
had reached crisisproportions by 1980 (see Riddell 1981: 58), and agricultural feasibility for
many smallholders was tenuous. The liberation war offered the hope that the pressing
questions of uneven access to land and, relatedly, agricultural viability would be rectified.
The negotiated settlement to the "Rhodesian problem II at Lancaster House in 1979
deadlocked over the question of land reform and compensation. Tensions surrounded this
issue from the start of'the negotiations. The Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led
by Robert Mugabe, and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People'sUnion (ZAPU) had
largely rallied support for their challenge to the government of'Ian Smith on the issue of land
redistribution. White Rhodesians were understandably concerned about a new dispensation
that would facilitate the transfer of white-controlled land to the black population. The
question of compensation remained at the forefront of negotiations, despite the pledge of
financial support for ZANU and ZAPD's land redistribution plans by Great Britain. The
69'
stalled negotiations were given a timely lifeline by the United States. While the U.S.
commitment towards the financin~ I)fland redistribution was vague, it nonetheless served to
pacizy concerns on both sides. As Nkomo stated, "if the U.S. had not stepped in it would
have been. very difficult to move on this question", concluding that the U.S. and British
pledges towards financial SUPPOlt for compensation "go a long way in allaying the great
concern we have over the whole land question" (cited in Davidow 1990; 65).
Unfortunately, the United States' pledge towards financing Zimbabwe's land
redistribution initiativesnever materialized. As Kinsey (1983: 104) notes, Great Britain's "aid
programme is the only existing one with a land..purchase component. .. and other donors seem
unenthusiastic about buying out white farmers". This was confirmed by USMl)'s former
Agricultural and Natural Resources Development Officer/ and USAJD's Chief Project
Development and Implementation Support Officer in Zimbabwe, who argued in a
correspondence to the author that U.S. support for Zimbabwean land redistribution was
"news to [her]"? Instead, the United States Agency for International Development initiated
a developlnent programme in 1982 designed to revive the agricultural sector of Zimbabwe.
USAJD's strategy was predicated upon a particular interpretation of the nature, history and
problems affectingthe agricultural sector of Zimbabwe which established the parameters for
the designed development intervention. This chapter provides an overview of USAID's
I
strategy. The chapter will also offer an initial analysis of the implications of' USAlD's
intervention, concentrating upon the Commodit~~ Import Programme (CIP) which facilitated
the importation of agricultural. machinery targeted at the large-scale commercial farming
1 Interview, Mr. J. Mushauri, 28 October 1992.
2 Interview, Ms. P. Buckles, 19 August 1992, and subsequent correspondence.
70
sector. The following chapter will examine USAIDis Zimbabwe Agricultural Sector
Assistance (ZASA) programme, which was directed primarily at Zimbabwean smallholders
through funds generated from the CW.
As will be demonstrated below, the ramifications of the eIP were profound.
USAID's programme served to exacerbate the racial differences that characterized the pre-
independent Zimbabwean condition. Instead of meeting its financial obligations towards land
reform, the United States designed a programme which recapitalized white commercial
farmers. This occurred at a time when tM Zimbabwean government was not only trying to
redress the land question but also attempting to rectifYthe agricultural differences that served
as thefoundarion ofZitnbnbwe's agricultural inheritrnce, Equally important, however, was
that USAID's efforts tolnfhtence Zimbabwe's development path through the importation of
agricultural machinerybackfired. By recapitalizing large-scale commercial farmers, USAID's
intervention enhanced the sector's options. The unintended consr (i~nCe of the programme
was that, instead of'malntalnlng their contribution to the nation's food supply, white farmers
re-engaged in tobacco production which allowed Zimbabwe to overtake the United States
in unprocessed tobacco exports. This, as will be shown below, was fundamentally
antithetical to USAID's intentions in Zimbabwe.
4.2 USAID and the Agriculfu.ral Sector of Zintbabwe
Development interventions are shaped by numerous factors. As discussed earlier,
bilateral development institutions such as USAlD must design programmes that meet certain
political. economic and bumanitarfan criteria established by powerful interests at home. 'Ihis
can include the geo-strategic interests of the state, the financial concerns of domestic
manufacturers, and the humanitarian considerations of'the populace, At times, these interests
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can conflict, as in the case of relief efforts to Ethiopia in th~ .m';1" 19801). At other times) they
may seemingly converge, as in the case of Somalia in 1993.
At another level) however, development programmes must be legitimized within the
recipient country, as Ferguson (1990) has demonstrated in the case of Lesotho. The complex
dynamics that serve to shape d~fvelopment interventions at a broad level are in turn fused into
policy and activated iIi' the recipient country, despite the potential contradictions that may
emerge. The language employed by donors is therefore critical. The condition of a country,
and the problems to be addressed, are articulated bydoners in an effort to justify the terms
orthe!r proposed engagement. Questions may be raised about-a development programme
once an effort is made to contextualize how a donor constructs a particular situation into
which it w111intervene.
United States.Jnterests in Zimbabwe stemmed from the perception that a secure
\,\ Zimbabwe WaS essential for regional economic and political stability. Zimbabwe's geo-
strategic importance to the U.S. is limited, as the country has no strategic deep sea ports or
,raw materials required by u.s. industry. Zimbabwe's non-aligned policy served, in the early
1980s, to placate fears that another liberation movement in southern Africa had fallen into
the "Soviet orbit". Despite this, the U.S. was concerned about Zimbabwe's professed
socialist agenda.'
But economic, as well as political, considerations did playa role in USAID's regional
strategy. An examination of US AID southern African regional documents, conducted by
Hanlon (1991) revealed the underlying goals ofO.S. development interventions in the region.
The United States was primarily concerned with maintaining U.S. access to southern ~ica's
3 see Hanlon (1991) for a discussion of U.S. efforts to move Mozambique away from its
professed socialist agenda.
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raw material base while emphasizing private sector' development. Moreover, USAID
believed that southern Africa "offers a largely untapped market for U.S. goods and services"
(cited in Hanlon 1991: 49),4 Consistent with USAID policy elsewhere, U.S. domestic
considerations augmented the controversial political agenda of the United States on the sub-
continent. These goats were broadly pursued through the Four Pillars of development policy
institutionalized under the Reagan adminlstratlon. USAID interventions, under the Four
Pillars framework, would concentrate on policy dialogue and reform; development efforts
designed to decelltralize institutions and encourage greater reliance 011 private and voluntary
organizations rather than the public sector; technical transfers; and a focus on private sector
developme~t (Galdi 1988: CRS-I7). As will be shown below, USAID's agricultural
programme inZimbabwe initially adhered to many) but not all, of the' Four Pillars principles.
United States o~iectives in Zimbabwe are defined in USAID's Counfly Developl111.mt
Strategy Statement (1985: 44) in compassionate terms:
With its pivotal geographic position in southern Africa, its extensive
infrastructure. and largely private productive capacity, its proven ability to
produce food surpluses and its fragile multi-racial socio-political structure,
continued and significant U,S. assistance is justi]fied, The overriding U.S.
objective is to see Zimbabwe work - to see the country succeed.
The United States' development strategy in Zimbabwe adhered to three specific
principles. First, U.S. development efforts were designed with the intention of maintaining
the productive base of the country, which offered the best opportunity for "long-term growth,
employment and social development". Second, the United States hoped to "guide Zimbabwe
towards a successful post-independence model" by influencing the structure of Zimb"~we's
mixed economy. Finally, Zimbabwe was perceived to be a "successful multi-racial political
4 For a similar breakdown of U.S. political and economic objectives in Zaire, see Grall
(1983: 63).
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model" that had particular relevance to South Africa. The country offered "an alternative to
failed Marxist economies in Africa" and an example of a successful agricultural model that
"can set policy examples for Zimbabwe's neighbours and also assist general food security
throughouLthe southern tier of the continent" (USAID 1985: 44).
The underlying premise guiding USAID's development programme was the belief that
the Zirnhabwean economy was characterized by a sharp dualism. The dual economy model,
as articulated by USAID (1982a and 1932b) in their Program Assistance Approw/l
Document (pAAD), posited the existence of two separate, unequal and non-interactive sub ..
sectors within the larger national economy, According to GSAID, the "modern economy"
contributed overwhelmingly to Zimbabwe's economic viability, producing "95 percent of
GDP, probably 98 percent of domestic savings, probably 95 percent or more of tax revenues,
and 97 percent of export earnings" (USAID 19~'2b:D..2). This sector waS! 'diversified,
utilized modern technology and was characterised by a high degree oflabour specidization.
The foundation for the "r:i· dern economy" was the commercial farming community,
Even though Zimbabwean agriculture followed manufacturing in its overall contribution to
national GDP, its importance to the economy is. essential. Zimbabwe'S domestic food
requirements were largely secured from commercial fanners. The commercial farming sector
contributed disproportionately to the overall economy's health, accounting "for nearly all the
wage employment (in the agricultural sector) and producjing] about 70 percent of total
[sectoral] output and 90 percent of marketed production" (USAID 1982b: 10..11). The
sector was characterized by high yields, a sound infrastructure and was governed by capitalist
principles. Commercial farms were privately ..owned, efficient and mechanized. Production
figures varied, but commercial fanners "produce at levels comparable to those achieved in
North America" (USAID I982b: A ..I).
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Coexisting with this sector was the "traditional economy", concentrated in
agriculture, infonnat manufacturing and service activities (USAID 1982b: D~2). Traditional
agriculture, practised in the Purchase Areas and Communal Lands was "generally
characterized by low yields, low levels of technology. low levels cf purchased inputs and a
deterioratint~ natural resource base" (USAID 1982b: 11). The poverty of this sector
stemmed from inadequate inputs, poorer land and limited marketing opportmities available
to smallholders. As USAID (1982b: 8) maintained, lito remove the causes of poverty is to
enlarge agricultural productivity". Differences between the defined sub-sectors were "based
on land holdings and tenure system" (USAID 1982b: A-I), while th~ "two economies are as
different as the tractor and the hoe" (USAIO 1982b: 0 ...2).
Importantly, USAIO did recognize that differences within the defined sub..sectors
were evident. Contrary to the perception ora homogenous commercial sector portrayed in
the original Program Assistance Approval Document's body, USAID indicated in the
Appendices that less than 30 percent of commercial farmers contributed approximately 80
percent of the productive sector's output (USAID 1982b: A..l), "Traditional" producers
were equally stratified. While acknowledging the complexity ofZimhabwe's soclo-economic
situation, USAID simplified its model as a basis for its intervention.
While each of these different areas has some unique and distinct features, and
probably deserves separate treatment, to reduce complexity this description
generally uses only smallholder and commercial categories, the slnaUholder
category including both the African Purchase farmers and the communal land
farmers (USAID 1982b: A~l).
USAID maintained that an appropriate strategy must seek to redress the disparity
between the two sub-sectors. Zimbabwe's agricultural successes largely resulted from the
dynamic nature of tile commercial sector that had to be sustained While subsistence-based
smallholders needed to be more fully integrated into the national economy. Efforts to
7S
enhance smallholder output and increase on-farm income "does not require major policy
changes but only refinements and resources" (USAID 1982b: 2). Consequently, a strategy
was devised that sought to improvr the condition of smallholders while maintaining the
vibrancy of the commercial sector.
An expansion in both sub..sectors, and the more efficient-use of currently
under-utilized land and labor resources leading to higher productivity, is a
cornerstone and requisite of the (government's) "growth with equity"
objective. The issue is how to continue supporting and encouraging output
from the large"sCPJlecommercial sector while also stimulating increased
output and productivity in the densely populated smallholder areas. The
pragmatic answer is to expand existing institutions and. as needed, to develop
new institutions in order to enable reasonable access to required inputs and
services by both commercial and communal fanners (USAID 1982b: 11).
The programmes designed by USAIO to address the perceived constraints to
agricultural development ill Zimbabwean were the CIP and ZASA. The Zimbabwean eIP
was aimed at infusing the "productive private sector" with the necessary inputs "to provide
a firm basis for sustained poverty alleviation, development and growth", Consistent with
Zimbabwean aspirations, {o;1 ichinputs would "preserve and maintain the productive structure
and general infrastruC\ture of the Zimbabwean economy". The decision to allocate
agricultural equipment to commercial fanners was well-founded according to USAID, as the
"target group. however, has historically been the larger, private commercial fanner whose
interest has been in achieving high production output" (USMD 1982b: 8). ZASA·was
designed to assist Government of Zimbabwe initiatives targeted primarily, but not exclusively,
at smallholders in the neglected areas of the country (USAID 1982b: 11..12). The principal
goals of ZASA ~ . to increase smallholder output, incomes, and resource management
through improved access to agricultural inputs and markets. USAID argued that such an
approach w{...Jd serve to reduce the gap between commercial farmers and smallholders
(Cohen et. al: 1986: 3), The cost of the joint programme was set at US$62 million.
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The U.S. initiative operated in two phases. First, US$37 million worth of tractors,
combine harvesters, spare parts and other U.S, manufactured goods were imported into
Zimbabwe from the United States. TIns initial intervention accounted for the CIP component
ofUSA1D's agricultural strategy. Operationally, a CIP consisted of the transfer offoreign
exchange from the donor to the recipientgovernment in the form of a loan or grants. The
Zimbabwe CIP was in the form of a grant. The foreign exchange was then used to purchase
pre-determined commodities from tbe donor country. Afterwards, the goods were allocated
to retail outlets which were responsible for the sale of these commodities to specific buyers
within a pre-defined target group. As stipulated in the Zimbabwean CIP arrangement, "a
minimum of80 percent ofthe funds had to be channelled through the private sector" (US1UD
1982b: 5-6), III the case of Zimbabwe, the agricultural machinery wa$,\~armarked for
established retailers and subsequently targeted at large-scale commercial food producers.
Second, the local currency generated from eIP sales was used by the recipient
government to finance other, pre-arranged, development initiatives. The counterpart ~•mds
generated from the sales of agricultural equipment under the CIP were subsequently used to
fund ZASA, which "ia effi.'Ct,enabled each USAID dollar to work twice" (Odell et. al. 1991:
2). Seven constraint areas identified by the Zimbabwean government and USAID were
targeted fot' assistance. These were agricultural research, extension, credit, marketing and
input supply, land and water use, agricultural manpower training, and policy planning. U.S.
financial aid was used to construct grain, cotton and dairy marketing points in areas
previously neglected by former governments. Irrigation schemes were financed, agricultural
research and extension efforts supported, credit schemes for cotton producers devised, and
fhndingfor human resource development, through the University of Zimbabwe, subsidized.
Nine conditions were attached to ZASA, inclu~.ng a provision pertaining to land resettlement
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(USAID 1982a: 2). USAID (1982b: 20) maintained that a comprehensive resettlement
programme would "deprive the communal lands of needed investment"." The Agency
therefore clarifled its position on land redistribution.
It is suggested that any USAID support in the resettlement area be primarily
indirect via budget support to the constraint areas previously identified ...
Beyond indirect support, very limited budgetary support might be allocated
for training and study tours aimed at improving staff capability to plan and
evaluate settlement activities (JJSAID 1982b: 20-21).
A number of important procedural differences between ZASA and the CIP are
evldent, In sharp contrast to the CIP, ZASA initiatives were widely distributed as opposed
to directly allocated to a specific constituency 01' target group. As USAIO's Impact
£1'01"a(1011 stated, development efforts financed by ZASA
went to a total of 84 sub-projects sponsored by 18 different agencies from the
ministries and individual agencies responsible for finance, agriculture,
resettlement, cooperatives, education, environment, water resources,
education. forestry, and facilitated the production and marketing of grain,
cotton, coffee, livestock, and dairy products (Odell et. al.: 6),
Another important difference is that ZASA funds were channelled through the
government as opposed to the transfer ofCIP goods through the private sector. Finally, eIP
funds were dispersed first. As a result, agricultural efforts funded by ZASA had to wait until
the CIP equipment was purchased in Zimbabwe and the counterpart funds transferred to the
government through the Federal Reserve; This caused delays in the implementa.ron of
ZASA.
By August 1983 approximately US$7.4 million in CIP funds had been
allocated, yet only about Z$l million in local currency has been generated,
5While this is undoubtedly true. it could also be argued that the ability of smallholders to
enhance their condition is contingent upon access to better land which was forcibly taken from
the them during the pre-independence era. Rectifying this historical policy was, again, the
cornerstone of the liberation struggle, Moyo (1986: 181) cogently argues that the construction
of marketing facilities in Communal Areas by USAID was done to defuse the "land question",
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since local currency payments are not made until the commodities are shipped
(Odell et.•.01. 1991: 46).
As stated earlier', a complicated series of economic and political factors shaped the
dynamics of USAID interventions. Consistent with U.S. development mandates and
restrictions, USAID development efforts were designed to further U.S. domestic concerns.
Support (:(U' the United States economy occurred at a number of levels. More generally,
. ( 'i' ."."
/»
Con~~r(issLbnallegislation certified that United States gOQJS must be transported on U.S.
vessels, that restrictions on procurement ofU.S. goods must be ensured, and that "ifPL-480
wheat is imported, recipient-country exports of com and rice are prohibited" (Riddell 1987:
209).
More tangibly, and in the specific context of Zimbabwe, the benefits accruing to U.S.
agricultural manufacturers were clear, as the CIP procurement "will be restricted to the U. S.
only" (USAID 1982a: 2). The procurement of goods under the ClP had to be restricted to
the United States because,
Iffree-sourcing were allowed, importers' bargaining power would be greater
and a substantial part of the new machinery would be imported from sources
other than the United States (Odell et; ((1. 1991: 47),
The wisdom of the restriction on procurement was readily apparent as the programme
"financed 75 percent ofD.S. imports in Zimbabwe" (USAID 1987a: 3). "Aid tying" does
come at a price to recipients, however, as they are obligated to purchase goods that may be
more expensive than if free-sourcing were allowed. Riddell (1987: 209) found that the
United States elF to Zimbabwe was 10"20 percent more costly than if buyers had the
freedom to choose less expensive options. The United States also used the CIP t1 gain
access to the Zimbabwean agricultural equipment market, whieh was dominated by European
interests, and to rescue faltering U.S. mannfscturers. A large portioi, of elP-procured
79
agricultural machines were produced by Allis-Chalmers, an American company that was
facing significant financialtrouble during the early~19805. As the Managing Director of'Bain
Farm Equipment Company (BFEC), a private retail company in Zimbabwe targeted for CIP
assistance, related,
USAID provided BFEC with Allis-Chalmers tractors and combine harvesters
in an effort to save the company in the United States. We did not even need
the tractors as we had a good relationship with Fiat. One clay a USAlD
representative came in and told us that we could no longer sell Fiat tractors
if we wanted to retain our relationship with the United States. We refused
as Fiat tractors are better suited to the environment here and trade between
Italy and Zimbabwe is well established and more efflcienr."
In the end, Allis-Chalmerswas not salvaa~'" e '{ U. S. foreign assistance and the company was
eventually purchased by Deutz of West Germany,
While the intention to assist U.S. manufacturers through foreign aid to Zimbabwe was
clearly evident, ZASA and the CIP were also designed to assist the Zimbabwean agricultural
community without threatening U.S. agricultural interests. ZASA was conceived as a
"controlled resource transfer" which stipulated that U.S. interventlons could in no way assist
the recipient state or sector to challenge United States trade in that particular field. As stated
in a USAID Authorization Document (1988: 4), USAlD's programme in Zimbabwe
will not have a demonstrable impact on agricultural exports that might
compete with U.S. exports, much less cause harm to U.S. exporters in
contravention of restrictions contained ill the FY 1988 Continuing
Resolution.
USAID assessed Zimbabwe's agricultural capabilities and juxtaposed their findings
with the United States' agricultural base to determine what initiatives could, and could not,
be funded. Development efforts to enhance the output of cotton, through the expansion of
agricultural extension, credit and marketing facilities, was allowed 2S there were "qualitative
(i Interview, Mr, R.O. Hampton, 13 August 1992.
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differences between u.s. and Zimbabwean cotton" (USAID 1988: 29). Likewise,
Zimbabwe's white maize and ollseeds did not constitute a threat to American farmers.
Tobacco would not be supported however. As USAI!) clearly states, "the only crop which
competes directly Wii;h the U.S. international markets at a significant level is tobacco.
USAlD will not support the production of this crop" (USAID 1988: 30). Consequently, CIP
agricultural equipment was targeted at commercial food producers so that they could
maintain their contributions to the national food supply without threatening U,S. domestic
interests.
In clahning success for this intervention, USAID was able to demonstrate that U.S.
foreign assistance was used towards the purchase ofAmerican goods and services through
the CIP. The Agency also contended that the funding for development initiatives in
Zimbabwe did not threaten U.S. economic interests. Finally}the U.S. drew upon the notion
of "mutual interest" by illustrating how the CIP made critical contributions to Zimbabwe, the
private sector and the United States by maximizing "trade advantages for the U.S. while
responding fully to the requirements of the Zimbabwean economy" (Odell ct. al; 1991: 38).
USAID assessments asserted that the eIP was critically important to both Zimbabwe
and the country's private sector. Many private firms in Zimbabwe would have gone bankrupt
had it not been for the u.s. eIP. Zimbabwean "firms stated during the course of'the survey
that their productive levels wrukl have dropped 30 to 50 percent if they had not received
allocations under the CIP" (USAID 1987: 3). During the height of the CIP in 1984, the
programme WI)S "reoponsible for 3.8 percent of GDP and approximately 5 percent of total
employment". The ending of this programme, due to the termination of foreign assistance
to Zimbabwe in 1986, "will result in a 0.5 percent reduction in GDP and an additional
reduction inpfOullctive employment for 8 thousand people", while "[w]ithout the CW, U.S.
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exports to Zimbabwe will decline" (Cohen et. al. 1986: ii, own emphasis).
Despite delays in procurement and shipping, the impo; tation of CIP .agricultural
equipment had a profound impact on the commercial farming community, according to
USAJD's impact Evaluation of the eIP and ZASA (Oden et. al. 1991: 37~57). The
.equipment served a critical need as the age or agricultural machinery in the country would
havebeen well beyond their normal economic life-span without the CIP. Commercial.
farmers, protected under the LancasterHouse Constitution, were given added security by the
United States through the ClP (USAlD 1982b: 7). Minimum wage legislation and
restrictions on firing redundant labour) promulgated under the hew Administration, created
a greater demand for capital-intensive, as opposed to labour ..intensive, technologies." The
CIP met this demand, The ClP also allowed commercial farmers to bring underutilized land
into production.
By breaking bottlenecks and putting repaired and new equipment in the field,
[the CIP] has increased the area, aUother things being equal, that commercial
farmers are able to dedicate to crop production and more intensive livestock
activities such as dairy operations. (Odell et; al. 1991: 50).
Finally. USAID recognized that agricultural employment in the commercial farming
community had fallen by 20 percent since independence. While the importation of capital-
intensive equipment would appear to have exacerbated this situation, Odell et. al. (1991: 50)
claim that USAlD's programme had a positive effect on employment.
The CIP program has worked against this trend and has had ..3 positive impact
on employment despite the highly mechanized and capital-intensive nature of
commercial agriculture... Because of the strong linkages of commercial
agriculture with the industrial, and processing sectors, increased production
7The 1980 Minih1um Wages Act established higher standardized wages for employees in
all sectors of the economy. The Employment Act of 1980 addressed the issues of collective
bargaining and the rights of workers in the country. In addition, farmers had to petition the
Ministry of Agriculture for exemptions from firing agricultural employees.
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generates further employment in these sectors.
USAlD also claimed that ZASA had been. a resounding success, despite snia!!
problems of implementation. The combination oreIP-procured combines and funding for
irrigation \lnderZASA ensured that "more than 90 percent of'the nation's demand for wheat"
was met (Odell et, al. 1991: 107, SO), The programme "contributed to this extension of
[marketing facilities] to the communal areas and was, in part, responsible for th~ substantial
increase in maize production and to the phenomenal increase in cotton production among
communal area farmers" (Odell et. al; 1991: 51).8 Heartwater research, funded by ZASA
through t~e University of Floridr, "has almost achieved the development of a vaccine for
control!ing one of the most seriousticlc-borne diseases" (Odell et; al, 1991: 62). Despite
minorproblems; USAlD and the programme's evaluators considered ZASA and the CIP to
be effective ways of disbursing U,S. foreign aid.'
4.3 Questions about Design and Implementation
Inevaluating the impact of'the CIP and ZASA, one must examine the programme at
a number oflevels. First, an analysis of the conceptual framework that serves to justifY the
intervention is required. This is necessary in order to understand the shortcomings in the
design of'the programme and its outcome. Second, one must critically assess the impact this
intervention has had on Zimbabwe. How far did USAID address the inherent problems faced
by the agricultural sector? What changes were effected and what impact did they have? Can
one argue, as USA1D did, that the gap between "commercial" producers and "traditional"
fanners was reduced with the assistance of ZASA and the elP? These questions are
11 These claims will be more thoroughly addressed in the following chapter.
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explored here and in the following chapter.
USAro's intervention was premised on the assumption that the direct allocation of
U.S. equipment to the more productive sector of the Zimbabwean economy would yield the
greatest developmerlta!:_r@~ults. This policy, consistent with the basic tenets ofthe Reagan
Administration's "trickle down" approach to economic development, is controversial. Critics
QfUSAID often argued that the development agency's interventions Setve~to sharpen class
distHrctions to the detriment of poorer segments of the population, as programmes weret,
targeted at wealthy members of a partic~tar community (see Horowitz 1986; Mosley 1986;
and Rau 1991). Thompson's (1991) study of agricultural production in southern Africa
claimed that USA.I1) p.elicy in Zimbabwe had, among other things, sought to create a class
of master fanners at the expense of Allican peasants in the country. This policy was pursued,
she argues, by targeting support at better-endowed farmers whose production techniques
"yleld per acre, not per cost input" (1991: 118), Output may have increased, but the
problems of access to food experienced by vulnerable members of society could be
exacerbated. This policy required large tracts of land, improved seeds and secure tenure.
In addition, such an approach could be of significant importance to U. S. manufacturers as
farmers in Africa became dependent upon U.S. inputs for agricultural production."
Whether one agrees with trickle down economics or the theory's critics, there is a
significant philosophical issue that must be addressed in the context of Zimbabwe. Many
observers of Zimbabwe characterised the Zimbabwean condition in terms of its inherited
dualism (Mumbengegwi 1986; Parsons et: al. 1977; Stoneman 1981; Zinyama 1992), Like
USAID, the Zimbabwean government's 1982 Tr(msJtional National DevelojJme"t Pltln
!)Thompson's hypothesis, based upon USAlD policy positions, could have been sharpened
by an analysis of USAiD's elP in Zimbabwe.
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(TNDP) and "Growth with Equity" (198J) document also employed a dual economy model.
Few would contradict USAID·s assessment of'the importance of the commercial sector in the
national economy. Yet> in sharp contrast to USAID's characterization of a non-interactive
socio-ecenomic condition inZimbabwe, observers of Zimbabwe as well as the state saw the
two economic systems as interdependent. Indeed, the success of the one was seen as causing
the poverty of the other (see Republic of Zimbabwe 1981a and 1982). In "Growth with
Equityll (Republic of Zimbabwe 1981a) it was maintained that the disparities apparent in the
Zimbabwean economy were the result of the racist policies of former Rhodesian
governments, and that the prlvileged.socio-economic condition of whites in the country was
the direct result of such policies. President Mugabe argued in the "Forward" 'to the TNDP
that the ;'wealth, education, health, skills and welfare of the bourgeois clasi, by antithesis,
translates themselves into the poverty, ignorance, disease, absence of skills and welfare, on
the part of the peasants and workers" (Republic of Zimbabwe 1982; i), The TNDP claimed
that, while the gap between the two sub-sectors facilitated a "modern" and "peasant" sector,
the two were linked.
The two sectors, however, are not functionally separate and of particular
importance is that the one, the modern sector, has historically fed on the
other. This exploitation has resulted in gross income and wealth (particularly
land) inequalities, especially between the black majority and the white
minority (Republic of Zimbabwe 1982: 17).
Aspects of the Government's argument were exaggerated, but it would be extremely
difficult to deny that the policies pursued by the Rhodesians were not overtly discriminatory.
Rhodesian history is replete with evidence that demonstrates how Rhodesian policy served
to enhance the condition of the whites While simultaneously attempting to undermine the
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position of the African populace." The ~ffe~tsof these policies, especially in relation to land,
agriculture, housing, credit, education and labour, often had unintended consequences and
were by .no means implemented evenly across the African spectrum, as previously
demonstrated, Some Africans were able to accumulate despite the restrictions placed upol1
them by the Rhodesian state (see, for example, Cheater 1984; and Phimister 1988b), Yet
policies were consistently pursued with the expressed intention of promoting the small
population, of whitt's over the African majority, regardless of'the inconsistencies and the
examples of Af-ricanaccumulation in Rhodesia. The substance of Zimbabwe's contemporary
problems, where the creation of an dual economy which tried to impose race rather than class
as its distinguishing criteria, was the legacyi~fthe Rhodesian past. To alter this relation.5hil'>
required a substantial transformation. In this context, USAID's Interventions exacerBated
some of the dualistic aspects of Zimbabwe.
USAIP attempted to introduce a statically conceptualized programme into a dynamic
and contradictory situation. Zimbabwe's "dual economy" was the product of a historical
process which, in the final analysis, USA1D reinforced through the targeting of agricultural
machinery at those who benefitted from the previous system. Even Mr. David Hasluck,
Director of the Commercial Fanners' Union and the recipient of a United States CIP"ftmded
tractor, believed that "politically, this is a. very questionable programme" Y
USAID's analysis of'the Zimbabwean agricultural sector was made in such a way as
to disguise its racial underpinnings. The issue of ra, ~continues to define the Zimbabwean
condition, yet was noticeably disguised inUSAIO's originalProject Authorization Document.
-----------------~.
)0 see, for example, Mosley 1983; Moyana 1984; Palmer 1987a; Phimister 1988b; Ranger
1~85; Shope 1987; C. Thompson 1991; Weiner et. ai. 1985 and Weinrich 1975.
11 Interview, 20 August 1992.
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USAID used the terms "commercial" and "traditional" or "smallholder" to set the parameters
of their intervention rather than "black" and "white". USAID's analysis of the historical
endowment of Zimbabwe masked these complications and was, at the very least,
disingenuous. When USAID used racial terms in the PMD, they were applied passively, as
in "African Purchase Lands", "black farmer", or "African majority" although the latter was
neverlinked to any concept of a white minority which dominated the "productive" sector.
Indeed, the term "white" was applied only once, in relation to fears about a new politiclli'
dispensation (USAID 1982b: 7). USAlD simply alluded to the racial situation in Zimbabwe,
through concepts such as "multi-racial", but preferred a race-free paradigm to justify their
intervention. USAID's programme could, in effect, have been applied to any African country
characterized by highly skewed income differentials. Such a.model evades a consideration
of the racially structured basis of the Zimbabwean economy. To argue, as USAID did, that
the principal difference betwe-« "commercial" producers and "traditional" farmers was based
on dtffering tenure systems and land holdings was tf "legate the history of a racially. exclusive
settler economy. Most significantly, agricultural machinery targeted at "commercial"
producers in the early 19808 could only serve to further entrench the white fat ',t:ng
community's position in the Zimbabwean economy, \1t a time when the government was trying
to redress this historka"y specific imbalance. In effect, USAID reinforced a historic.al pattern
of support for white farmers over black in Zimbabwe.
There appear to be two possible ways to interpret the decision by the United States
to recapitalize the white farming community at independence. On the one hand, critics could
argue that the U.S. had historically supported white regimes in the sub-region, Former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's early initiatives in southern Africa were based upon the
belief that U.S. interests were best served through the maintenance of the white regimes of
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Rhodesia, South Africa and Portuguese-controlled Mozambique and Angola (see El-Khawar
et. al, 1976; and Rossiter 1985). The policy of "Constructive Engagement" was largely
perceived by activists and lobbying groups around the world as evidence of U.S. support for
the apartheid regime of South Mrica.12 Critics could also point to U,S. development policy
towards land and the CIP inZim.babwe. Figures on underutilized land among white farmers
at independence varied, but there was little doubt that a gocd deal of land was available for
resettlement in 1980.13 It could therefore be argued that the decision to protect white
landowners in Zimbabwe, through constitutional proposals enshrined at the Lancaster House
Conference, coupled with the U.S. programme to recapitalize white farmers instead of
meeting its previous pledges towards land redistribution, offers another example of racism
in U.S. policy.
But US}..lti programmes based upon the importation of agricultural equipment were
not unique to Zimbabwe. Neighbouring Mozambique was the recipient of United States
manufactured tractors under aUSAID programme, although Hanlon (1991: 94) argues. that
this undermined the production of'farm equipment by Mozambique's AS' ~Alfa. Nor is the
United States the only donor that imported agricultural machinery to Zimbabwe. The former
Minlster of Planning and D J -nent, Bernard Chidzer», highlighted Zimbabwe's need for
tractors at ZIMCORD b~ i.mg that
12 Perhaps the most vocal critic ot'U.S. policy towards South Africa was TransAfrica in
the United States.
13 Research conducted by Moyo and Weiner found that only 34 percent of commercial
land in the Mashonaland Provinces was productively used by white commercial farmers (cited in
Moyo 1986: 173). The University of Rhodesia, in conjunction with the Rhodesian Ministry of
Agriculture and the Agricultural Development Authority, estimated that approximately 60 percent
of white farm land was not fully utilized (cited in Riddell 1980: 5), A 1986 World Bank study
found that only 549,000 out of3.S million hectares of arable large-scale commercial farm land
was in production (cited in Loewenso111992: 59).
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Our agriculture ensures food self ..sufficiency and is an important source of
foreign exchange, but faces some problems in terms of replacement of
_,rauipment (Republic of Zimbabwe 1981b: 50).
France pledged tractors atZIMCORD (Republic of Zimbabwe 1981b; 69) while the Swedish
Co-Operative Centre donated 30 tractors to the Zimbabwe Co-Operative Drought
Rehabilitation Programme in 1992 (Tlte Daily Gll~ette,1.2December 1992). Africa is
predominantly agriculturally based, and agricultural equipment is therefore necessary. Such
an argume11t enhanced the United ~~atesl belief in "mutual interest", as American
manufacturers a~d African producers were both assisted through USAID1s programmes.
USAIP.'g pUrPose was to exploit these potential opportunities for U.s. manufacturers,
regardless of the limitations of the Agency's assessment of the situation into which it would
intervene. Finally, USAlO could assert that, in the case of Zimbabwe, "traditional" farmers
were unable to use such machinery effectively; as their land holdings were too small and their
production techniques too rudimentary to efficiently utilize mechanized equipment. Support
for this argument was found at the Bain Farm Bquipment Company, where the Managtng
Director stated emphatically that only white farmers could receive CIP equipment. He
concluded by stating that "OUf natives do not know how to operate them (tractors and
This latter argument was SPUriOllS however, and could only be sustained through
USAID's simplistic dual economy model. "Traditional" smallholders had been using
mechanized agricultural equipment, and had engaged in capitalist agricultural production, for
decades. Investments in agricultural machinery, such as tractors, featured prominently in
studies of black fanning in pre-independent Zimbabwe (see, for example Cheater 1984;
141nterview, Mr. R.G. Hampton, 13 August 1992.
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Weinrich 1975; and Yudelman 19(j4). In a study of Karangaland conducted during the
19608,Weinrich (1975: 81) argued that no master farmer in the Tribal Trust Land owned a
tractor, "but some progressive master fanners hired a tractor from neatby missions". In the
19705, wealthy farmers in Gokwe invested in tractors and one farmer leesed his tractor in
1992'to households in the area and the local Village Development Committee (VIDeO). 15
The primary "constraint" faced by most smallholders was limited access to credit for eapital
investments. The ofierrtenuous condition of smallholders was exacerbated during the-war,
as many wealthier African farmers had their agricultural equipment destroyed. The Riddell
Commission (1981: 58) found that some communities had lost 70 percent of'their draught
power during the Iiberatiol'i struggle. Households that depended upon'cattle for draught
power were further handicapped at independence due JO the poor condition of their
remaining herds. Delays in planting were inevitable. Tractors could have contributed to th~
alleviation of this significant problem.
The demand for mechanized equipment was especially evident among Purchase Area
farmers, As discussedin the previous chapter, Purchase Areas were estabhshed under the
Land Apportionment Act of 1930. The Act sub-divided the country into European, Native
and Unreserved Areas, although the latter was quite small. European ..controlled areas, while
disproportionately large given the community'si relative population, consisted of the best
agricultural land in the country. Africans were forced into the Native Reserves, which at
independenc> had an estimated carrying capacity of 325,000 farming families but a
population of approximately 180,000 (Riddell 1;)81: 147). Following the passage of the
Land Apportionment Act, a small section of Afrlcan..designated lands were classified as
-------------,~~~-
15 Interview 17, 19 May 1992.
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Purchase Areas. Originally designed as a. buffet between "European" and "African" land,
Purchase Areas evolved into a viable alternative for wealthier black fanners who wished to
leave the increasingly overcrowded Reserves. In the end) black farmers could acquire title
to land instead ofremaining under communal tenure arrangements in the Reserves. Purchase
Areas were dissolved under the Land Tenure Amendment Act of 1977, although "each of the
66 former Purchase Lands has in fact retained its own territorial boundaries, name and social
identity" (Cheater 1984: x).
The Riddell Commission (1981: 149-50) argued that Purchase Area fal1Uf!fS were
generally more inefficient than peasant producers. Cheater disagreed, clainhtlg that if
numerically small Purchase Area farmers soeounted for one ..third of the goods mark ...t..,(J -Vy
Afiican producers. She concluded that
It is therefore quite clear that Purchase Land farmers use their resources on
average some thirty times more productively than communal producers use
theirs and these figures refute the implication that the majority of Purchase
Land fanners are little better than communal cultivators (Cheater 1984: 11).
Weinrich, who conducted extensive research on African farmers during the 19608, asserted
that Purchase Area farmers did not utilize land a$-efficiently as many Tribal Trust Land
farmers due to labour shortages on the former. Significantly,
Labour shortage could often be overcome by mechanization. Tractor
ploughing could overcome the bottleneck at the ploughing season, and
combine harvesters could reduce labour requirements at harvesting time. AU
around mechanization, however, requires a great deal of capital. At present,
no individual peasant farmer is capable of raising so much money, nor have
any of them sufficient ~andto make fhll use of such machinery. Yet if several
fanner owners clubbed together, more machinery might be bought (Weinrich
1975: 202).
By the 1970$, numerous Purchase Area farmers had acquired sufficient land for mechanized
expansion. Cheater'e (1984) study of'Msengezl Purchase Area demonstrated how farmers
who adhered to the "modem idiom ofaCCUIllUitltion" had not only diversified their productive
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base but had also begun to mechanize ticir production processes. Fifty-four farmers in
Msengezi, or 16 percent ofthe total community population, owned tractors and disc ..ploughs,
while three farmers owned more than one tractor (Cheater 1984: 82). Her case study of "Mr.
Mandhla" demonstrates how some farmers had become more dependent upon capital-
intensive production, not only for their own farms, but also as an important source of
i)
accumulation through leasing this equipment to other farmers illthe area (Cheater 1984: 106 ..
1).
,r ,.furchase Area farmers were generally under-funded however, and, as mentioned
egrlier, had limited access to credit for capital equipment due to restrictions placed on them
by the Rhodesian authorities. African farmers had acquired agricultural machinery, and
tractors, although the demand for such inputs remained high. Cheater (1984: 178) contended
that minimum wage legislation would adversely affect Purchase Area farmers unless they
secured access to agricultural machinery to replace the labour they would inevitably lose,
stemming from their inability ,·0 sustain an adequate labour force at a minimum wage. She
concluded that Purchase i\,~'~afarmers were caught between peasants, who received
preferential treatment from the post-independent Zimbabwean:government, and commercial
producers who were able to .mstaln themselves given their stronger economic foundations.
Consequently, U.S. interests itt blunting Zimbabwe'S rhetorical leanings towards
socialism, as well as the land question, could have been better served through an agricultural
machinery programme that targeted African freeholders i',steall of commercial producers.
USAlD had a well known preference for titled landholders, andwas, in the 1990s, advocating
ownership orland over communally ..based forms of tenure in many parts of Africa. Purchase
Area farmers would therefore appear to have been prime targets for USAID's CIP in
Zimbabwe, as they were titled landholders, under-capitalized and threatened by recently ..
92
enacted minimum wage legislation. African farmers who had purchased land in former
European-designated areas, which was legalized in 1979. faced significant difficulties during
the early 19805. These farmers were especially vulnerable at independence as squatters and
former liberation fighters increasingly encroached on tenured farms (Phlmister 1988a: 12).
Riddell (1980: 12) argued that Uover'90 percent of registered African fanners were facing
bankruptcy and some hundreds of African Purchase Land farms lay vacant". By directly
assisting a viable class of tenured farmers, whose interests regarding land and agricultural
production would in many respects have coincided with USAIO's conception of "advanced
farmers.", USAID could have furthered its agenda while assisting a sector of the black
community that desperately required the services of agricultural machinery.
As demonstrated above, USAID was aware of the existence of Purchase Area
farmers, although the Agency decided to subsume them under the broad category of
"traditional" farmers. The recognition of these differences did 110t serveto alter USAJD's
programme however. The development programme was guided and sustained by USAIO's
oversimplified dual economy model despite evidence which suggests that this model was
inappropriate, and that sections of the "traditional" community could have utilized CIP
equipment. USAID's former Agricultural and Natural Resources Development Officer
believed that the inability of African producers to acquire U,S ...funded equipment was the
biggest problem with the CIP.16 No mechanisms were established to allow capital ..poor black
fanners access to this equipment despite the obvious demand and USAlDls awareness that
'traditional" producers could not gain access to the medium and long-term loans necessary
for mechanized expansion (USAlD 1982b: 19). III the end, only one black farmer was able
16 Interview, Mr. J. Mushauri, 28 October 1992.
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to purchase a elF tractor - GaryMagadzire, Chairman of the Zimbabwe Farmers Unlot, and
an extremely influential individual in Zimbabwe's farming community. One could argue that
the outcome of USAlD programmes recapitalized white fanners at the expense of a
potentially successful smallholder farming class. USAID might respond that Congressional
regulations were partially to blame, as the Agency needed rapidly to disperse its allotted
funds in order to confirm its ability to spend the designated monies in a short time-frame,
The AgenQYcould also have claimed that the ability to fund ZASA was contingent upon the
quick sale of ClF equipment. Agricultural machinery allocated to black farmers through
cumbersome credit procedures would have further delayed the implementation of ZASA.
Either way, significant reservations regarding programme design and implementation are
warranted.
Before proceeding with an assessment of the CIP. important questions remain in
relation to USAID's emphasis on the private sector. USAID alleged that U.S. and
Government of Zimbabwe objectives, as articulated through the CIP) were in harmony. The
Govemment's first priority, according to USAID, was to maintain "economic prosperity by
stimulating the private sector to expand production, create additional employment and
increase exports" (USAID 1982b: 7). USAID then claimed that,
In the neat! term, the Government of Zimbabwe must instill a feeling of
confidence in two separate constituencies: the commercial and business
community, both domestic and forelgn, and the African majority, both small-
holders and wage earners (USAID 1982b: D-7-8).
There is little evidence to support this view, which misrepresented Zimbabwe's
priorities. In fact, the newly-elected government thought the complete opposite.
Rhetorically) Zimbabwe professed a socialist ideology that advocated the primacy of the state
over the private sector in the economy. Members of government saw the state's role as
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primarily trRnsformative, viewing the private sector with great suspicion. This stemmed from
the pervasive influence of'fbreign (especially South African) interests within the private
sector, the perception that the state could redress past grievances inherited from the
Rhodesian authorities, and from concerns over the absence of any real African representation
in the private sector. By 1987, the government of Zimbabwe's reservations did not appear
to have influenced USAID.
Established businesses were familiar with the syst ...m and thus able to easily
take advantage of the CIP. The historical basis upon which foreign exchange
~ocations arc awarded doe» discourage new cmtrants to the system. Since
the primary objective of the eIP was to facilitate the rehabilitation and
reconstruction of the economy, the decision to work. the program tl,rouglt
the e:cisting s),stem was well taken (USAID 1987: 4, emphasis added).
USAlD's 1992 structural adjustment effort seemed to recognize this) as the Agency
highlight<. ,J with concern the "negative perception of the private sector" held by the
Zimbabwean government (USAID 1991: 50).
4.4 Impact of the elF'
As was shown earlier, USAID~fimded agricultural machinery was targeted at, and
received by, large-scale commercial farmers in Zimbabwe. Tractors and combines eHhance\~
the confidence ofwhite farmers at a time when they felt threatened by the settlement achi\7vid
at Lancaster House. The agricultural machinery was intended to be used by commercial grain
producers ill order to maintain the nation's food supply, United States interests were
therefore served through the allocation of tractors to grain producers. It was believed that
this would limit Zimbabwe's expansion into tobacco production.
Ironically, this aspect of USAID's strategy appears to have failed, as USAID-funded
tractors were overwhelmingly allocated to tobacco farmers. This occurred because USA11)
9S
had little control over the sale of agricultural equipment by the private sector. Commercial
retailers enjoyed much more flexibility in the allocation of goods than the government. As
Odell et. al. (1991: 40) state, "[t]here were very few restrictions on what the CIP funds could
be used forti, This was corroborated by the Managing Director ofBFEC who admitted that,
although the tractors were provided for sale to large-scale food producers, all of the tractors
had been sold to farmers who primarily produced tobacco."
The post ..independence era in Zimbabwe saw a dramatic transformation in the role
played by white commercial farmers in the national economy. It appears that the U.S.~funded
elF assisted white farmers In this process of change. In many respects, white farmers
reverted back to the export-oriented production practices more characteristic of the pre ..
Unilateral Declaration of Independence CUDI) era than either the DD! (l965~79) or the initial
post-independent periods. Sanctions initiated against Rhodesia following UDI, though
imperfect, had forced the economy to become more Inward-oriented. State control over the
economy increased in an effort to mitigate the effects of Rhodesia's growing isolation. Crops
that could be produced, utilized and processed in the country were favoured while export
commodities, such as tobacco, were discouraged. This shift in production was secured.
through a. combination of incentives and disincentives offered to the fanning community.
Price incentives for maize, wheat, cotton and soya beans were complemented by generous
credit schemes for commercial producers (see Stoneman 1981: 139). In contrast, marketing
quotas and restrictions on the total amount of land that could be devoted to tobacco
production were enforced by the Rhodesian al.~horities. Tobacco, which accounted for 80
17 Interview, Mr. R.O. Hampton, 13 August 1992. It should be noted that commercial
fanners in Zimbabwe produce a wide variety of crops. The point being made is that commercial
farmers whose primary productive activity is tobacco received the U.S ...funded tractors despite
U.S. concerns over Zimbabwean tobacco exports.
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percent of the value of comme :i...;agricultural output in 1965, declined to only 28 percent
by 1969 (Mumbengegwi 1986: 206-7). By the end ofUDI, only 11.1 percent of white farm
land was devoted to tobacco, while 39.6 percent was allocated to maize and 13 percent to
cotton (Moyo 1986: 179).
Changes in agricultural production forced on commercial farmers by the exigencies
of a war economy were, since independence, relieved. Despite early incentives to maize
producers, and adequate rains during the initial years of independence, the lure of food
production waned. Th~ government of Zimbabwe froze the producer price offered for maize
between 1982 and 1984, and again between 1985 and 1988. These measures, while
consistent with Zimbabwe's stablllsationprogramme of 1982/3 (Friedmann 1992: 381), were
on the surface lnconsistent with USAID's conditions pertaining to price stimuli under ZASA,
Yet USAlD policy towards maize producer prices had changed in the mid·1980s. As
'Thompson (1991: 117-28) demonstrates, USAID exerted pressure on the government to
lower the producer price of maize in an effort to reduce maize output in Zimbabwe. The
policy was premised on the notion that a democratic South Aftica should be responsible for
the maize supplies in the sub-region. USAlD (1985: 46) maintained that policy dialogue with
the government had been effective in relation to producer prices, a point which would add
credence to Thompson's claims. The actual impact of'If.S, pressure on Zimbabwean pricing
decisions is uncertain however, despite the decline In the real maize producer price
throughout the 1980s. United States leverage OVer Zimbabwe was reduced during this
period due to the termination of USAIl) assistance to the country in 1986. Furthermore,
Herbst's (1990) findings in relation to state autonomy and agricultural producer prices merits
added caution with regard to the assertion that donor pressure necessarily translates into
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actual policy," Zimbabwe's decision to freeze producer prices would also be attributed to
the state's fears of large pay-outs to food producers during periods when financial resources
were limited. What USAID producer price policy does suggest, at the very least, is a lack
of coherence with earlier ZASA efforts designed to increase smallholder incomes.
With escalating casts of agricultural inputs, and a stagnant maize producer price
remaining despite inflation, farmers with adequate land holdings and equipment in the country
beg ...1 to look at alternatives to food crop production. Large ..scale commercial grain
producers were further dissuaded from maintaining their productive food base through the
establishment of a two-tiered pricing structure in 1986 which overtly discriminatory against
white fanners. While the measures were eventually modified, the initiative served to
undermine commercial farmers' confidence in state-controlled commodities, fuelling further
diversification into tobacco, soya beans and, more recently, horticulture and game ranches.
The combination of poor producer prices, increasing costs associated with food production
and the introduction of minimum wage legislation i'1creased the demand for labour-saving
agricultural J:Y'lchineryat the time of the United States CIP. As the Director of the CPU
asserted.
The ability of commercial farmers to diversicy their productive base, and to
cultivate row crops, has been significantly enhanced by the U.S.~sponrnred
CIP.1!)
The shift away from low-valued State-controlled crops to higher pril:;MJ I'lgn"ultural
\\
commodities by large ..scale commercial farmers since independence was '110teworthy as
illustrated in Figure 1. Maize production by large-scale commercial farmers precipitously
111For a study of this in relation to the World Bank, see Mosley et: al. (1991a and 1991b).
19 Interview> Mr. D. Hasluck, 20 August 1992. Mr. Hasluck is a tobacco fanner.
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during the 19805. By 1991., large-scale commercial farmers were producing more tobacco
and soya beans, combined, than maize. Tobacco production levelled off as large-scale
commercial farmers attempted to consolidate their holdings. The two most important factors
for successful tobacco production was adequate storage and curing facilities, and mechanized
equipment.'" The former needed to be expanded before tobacco production could increase
further. The Operations Director of the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association argued that
investments in storage and curing facilities by commercial tobacco producers had been
significant since 1990 and that the industry was poised to dramatically increase production
by 1994.21
Figure I: Large-Scale Cornrnercial Farm Production
(In Thousartcs of Tons)~--------------,--- ------
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
Source: Commercial Farmers' Union
20 Interview, Mr. R. Walton, 30 July 1992.
21 Interview, Mr. R. Stenson, 27 January 1993.
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Sachikonye (1992: 90) bas shown that this process of diversification out of maize
production accelerated in 1992. The large-scale commercial sector had only ph~ited 78,000
hectares of maize as opposed to 1257000 the previous year. While part of the reason for this
could have resulted from cropping decisions based upon predictions of drought) it needs to
be stressed that large-scale commercial farmers had good irrigation systems. As the l:'nect
of'the 1992 drought became apparent, large-scale fanners offered to put their irrigated land
under maize production in an effort to reduce the government's dependence upon imported
maize. The offer was viciously manipulated by some government officials who felt that this
was further evidence of the white agricultural community blackmailing the country. The
incident indicated that white fanners had the capability to grow far more maize for the
,(
/1
country than WAs currently being produced by th~ sector. The commercial sector's» . ~
,~/
diversification away from food crops was especially important as Zimbabwe's ability to
remain .sc1{:.sufficientin food was increasingly dependent upon Communal Area farmers in
the more vulnerable regions of the country,
The s!'; away from maize production was accompanied by declining sales to the
GramMarketing Boan' lit'omwhite commercial farmers. Much of their remaining maize was
being traded between households and retained as stockfeed. This trend accelerated in 1993,
despite the attractive pre-planting producer price of Z$900 per tonne. The shortage of
stockfeed in 1992 had a devastating impact on cattle and dairy production, while food
scarcity resulted in a vibrant informal market for maize between large farms. As one
commercial farmer related, "[maize] will be worth far more than Z$900",'J-2The large-scale
commercial fanning community's contribution to the country's wheat slltJQlyincreased, This
22 Interview, lY.it.:d. Hasluck, 20 August 1992.
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could be partially attributed to the importation of combines under the CD? although it cannot
be proven. It appears that C1P~procured equipment was not used to sustain the large ...scale
;;yommercial farming community's contribution +) national food supplies} as envisioned by
USAID.
This is not to argue that white farmer- in Zimbabwe did not contribute to the national
economy. In fact, the opposite is more accurate despite the reduced levels oifood that were
produced 011 commercial farms. Tobacco was an extremely important, and regular, foreign
exchange earner. In 1992~ tobacco was one of the few sources offoreign exchange for the
cdiintzy outsjQe offoreign aid. The crop was sold for U.S. dollars at the Tobacco Auction,
' ..-,.'
even though tobacco farmers received Zhllbabwe dollars for their crop. The foreign currency
se by tobacco farmers was a critical source of hard currency for a country, and
government, with limited foreign reserves. Zimbabwe'S ability to procure food on the
international market, at US$1500 per ton, during the 1992 drought, was certainly enhanced
by tobacco fanners' contribution to the nation's foreign reserves. At one level, export-led
growth was promoted by USAID. In the case of Zimbabwe, however, USAID attempted to
prevent such an outcome in relation to tobacco by targeting agricultural equipment at
commercial food producers. Ironically, USAlD's attempts to undermine Zlmbabwean maize
production (whether successful or not) invariably pushed commercial food producers into
other, more valuable crops such as tobacco. that could compete with the United States. This
highlights, once again, the unintended contradictions which emerged from US development
policy.
Mechanized equipment also allowed the commercial farming sector to bring
previously underutilized land into production and increased the productivity of commercial
farm workers. Increased productivitJ' masked a fundamental shift in the nature of commercial
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agricultural employment however, Permanent employment was replaced by an increased
emphasis on non-permanent labour." By 1989~fewer permanent workers were employed
on large-scale commercial farms than non-permanent labourers. Moreover, the increased
productivity ofwol'~(:ts was accompanied by a decline in the ratio of workers to cropped
area, from 0.41 to 0,37 (Loewenson 1992: 50).
The link between increased mechanization and changes in employment status are
suggested inFigure II. Loewenson's (1992) study of plantation agriculture in Zimbabwe
highlights how mechaniz~ti(ln exacerbated the already vulnerable condition of commercial
farm workers as their contracts were subsequently shortened. Wages in Zimbabwe's
agricultural sector stagnated, and there were indications that women were increasingly
engaging in prostitution to augment family incomes on commercial farms. In addition,
It appeal's that one of the side-effects of the trend towards increasing the
capital-intensity of production has been that it has enabled employers to
counter some post ..independence socio ..economic fnrervent.ons, This is
exemplified in the extent to which the setting of minimum wages has
contributed to the displacement of labour by capltal, The increasing resort
by employers to non-permanent forms of labour has facilitated employers
attempts to increase their control over labour, while rising input costs have
been used to justify the lack of expenditure on social and environmental
improvements on farms (Loewenson 1992: 64),
The reason for tlds insecurity stemmed from the disproportionate amount of income
that poor households spent on food. The average wage of farm workers was simply not
sufficiently adequate to meet household needs. Despite the government of Zimbabwe's
professed support for workers, real wages in the country had not increased since 1982, nor
had they kept pace with inflation (see Mlambo et. al. 1991: 56), Significantly,
23 Non-permanent labour in Zimbabwe was classified under five broad categories ..
seasonal, contractual, casual, special and part-time. For a discussion of the terms of these
contracts, see Loewenson 1992: 50, Table 4.1.
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Minimum subsistence food needs were valued in 1983 at Z$65.89 when
agricultural minimum wages were only 76 per cent of this amount. Frdm the
1986 surveys. the total monthly food value consumed by households
(including grown and foraged foods) did not reach more than three-quarters
ofthe estimated average minimum subsistence food needs of2$97.98 in any
household at any time ill the year (Loewenson 1992: 74).
While some commercial farms did offer higher wages to their workers. these were largely
offset by Increases in consumer prices and the costs associated with school fees and health
care.
Fjgur~ II: Employment In the Large-Scale Commercial Farming Sector.
workers (in Ihous:m6t;)
_.--------
50
__.permanent
-1-' seasonaliOO
, .
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Source: World Bank 199t: 52
Health conditions on commercial farms were a further cause for concern in relation
to the w?lfare of'farm workers. While the Riddell Commission had argued that there was a
great deal of disparity between the conditions of commercial farm employees on different
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farms, the Commission's overall findings were that the situation on commercial farms was
"below an acceptable standard of human decency" (Riddell 1981: 42). The Commission
noted that research conducted at flve of the better farms in Bindura found levels of
malnutrition and undernutrition among workers' children to be between 50-99 percent
(Riddell 1981: 42). This situation had not changed since independence when Loewenson
(1992: 75-6) found, more than a decade later, that the incidence of malnutrition and
undernutrition were greater on commercial farms than in any other sector of the economy.
These findings were reinforced by Tagwireyi (1990: 63), 'who argued that commercial farm
workers Were the group most vulnerable to malnutrition and food insecurity in the country.
Worker vulnerability had, in the final analysis, been exacerbated by the dramatic
transformation of employment status on commercial farms. Traotora secured under the CIP
could have played an important role in facilitating this transformation.
These changes in the nature of employment in Zimbabwe's commercial farming
community cannot be blamed on USAID. Minimum wage legislatlon certainly had an impact.
The World Bank (1991: 52) estimated that between 58..74 thousand workers lost their jobs
as the result of these new laws. USAID did however assist large-scale. commercial fanners
through the CIP at a particular time when the demand for agricultural equipment could have
offset some of the losses resulting from these changes in legislation. Commercial farmers
were able to maintain their viability with the assistnnce of elF equipment, despite losses in
employment to black farm wa:~~ers and the resultant decline in household income.
But USAID also claimed that the losses in agricultural employment due to the
importation of]abour~displacing technologies were offset by employment gains in processing
industries. This assettlon appears somewhat dubious as illustrated in Figure III and cannot
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Figure III: Employment in Zimbabwe
(in Thousands) .--------------.------.----------.~-------
Source: First Merchant Bank
-- Agricultura, Forestry
-4- Manufacturing
be substa,ptiated from ZASA/CIP assessments." Zimbabwe's manufacturing sector saw a
slow increase in employment from Independence, although most notably after 1987. Soya
bean productionjs predominately an industrial crop, and could therefore account for some
of the increases in industrial sector employment. Such modest gains ill manufacturing
employment certainly do not j'.lstity Odell ct. ul.IS (199l: 50) assertion that losses in
agricultural labour were offset by gains in the industrial sector. In fact, there were important
indications that the contribution of white farmers to the deepening of linkages between
24 Riddell (1990a: 10) cogently argues that data from sub..Saharan Africn is not only
unreliable but that lithe degree of inaccuracy cannot easily be Judged", Data related to the
manufacturing sector is especially problematic given the inconsistencies in methodology employed
by international agencies. Statistics in relation to the manufacturing sector must therefore be used
with extreme caution.
lOS
agriculture and industry was decreasing.
Riddell (1990b: 338) argued that "over 50 [percent] of all manufacturing gross
output, value added, employment, capital stock and exports originates in just three-sub-
sectors: food~tuffs, chemicals and metal products". Other manufacturing ventures which
were dependent upon agricultural linkages included textiles, clothing and footwear, and
beverages and tobacco. The links between these industries and commercial farming in
Zimbabwe however diminished. The agro-lndustriel link between commercial milling and
food crops, such as maize, was significant in Zimbabwe yet, as demonstrated earlier, the
decline in large-scale commercial production of maize was notable. Increased wheat and
soya bean production has partially, but not completely, offset this decline. Ninety-eight
percent of tobacco was exported as an unprocessed commodity, which, though important to
the nation's foreign currency reserves, did not have a direct positive lmpect on Zimbabwe's
industrial potential." Likewise, horticultural exports added very little value to the
Zimbabwean economy, FinallY1 cotton production among large-scale commercial farmers
also declined. Agricultural SUPPOlt for Zimbabvle's textile industry was therefore being
buttressed by African producers as opposed to white farmers."
US AID was noticeably mute on the issue of'tobacco, although the reasons fot this
vere r ,.diiy apparent. As shown earlier, USAID programmes were designed with the
tn~(>ntionof balancing recipient needs with U.S. interests. USAID was specifically prohibited
from assisting tobacco fanners as this would increase competition between the United States
ZS Interview> Mr. R. Stenson, Operations Director, Zimbabwe Tobacco Assoclation, 27
January 1992. Also see Rlddell (l990b: 365).
26 Data from the Commercial Fanners' Union and the Grain Marketing Board confirm that
African production and subsequent sates of cotton to the Cotton Marketing Board was
significantly larger than the contribution made by large-scale commercial farmers.
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and Zimbabwe. A more comprehensive assessment of the CIP would have shown that
USAID failed to protect U.S. interests. USAID assessments therefore disguised this fact by
concentrating their analysis on other crops that were not a threat to u.s. farmers.
Communal farmers, lacking viable alternatives, remained in these crops
(1)'I.izeand cotton), but since the mid..1980s, commercial farmers increasingly
have focused their attention on profitable markets for products such as
flowers, fruit and vegetables air-freighted to Europe. They also have
concentrated their efforts on other high~valuecrops such as soyabeans, coffee
and nuts such as macadamia (Odell ct. al. 1991: 32).21
This, as demonstrated above, was misleading. USAJD staff in Harare were well
aware that the CIP equipment was instrumental in allowing commercial producers to re-
engage in tobacco production. As Mr. Mushauri comments, "of course the tractors have
,j
been used for tobacco production. These farmers are making a logical choice between
profitable and unpro able ventures"." Such an admission would have raised the ire of
powerful interests in the United States however, especially considering that Zimbabwe now
exported more unprocessed tobacco than the United States (see Figure IV).29 In fact, the
United States increased the amount of land that U.S. tobacco fanners were allowed to devote
to tobacco production in an effort to re-establish its export position a/lead of Zimbabwe.
Subsidies to American tobacco producers increased as well, The Operations Director at the
Zimbabwe Tobacco Association was unconcerned, however, as tobacco farmers investments
27 A reduction in the level of European soya bean subsidies, which raised concerns about
a "trade war" between the United States and Europe, had little effect on Zimbabwe. The level of
subsidy that will most likely remain in place following a settlement to the dispute will still
undermine Zimbabwean soya beans on the international market.
28 Interview, 28 October 1992,
29 The United States clearly exported a greater amount of tobacco, in the form of
processed cigarettes, than any other country ill the world. Nevertheless, the U.S. lost its position
as the second largest unprocessed tobacco exporter, behind Brazil, to Zimbabwe.
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in storage and curing facilities would ensure its export status behind Brazi1.3\)
Figure IV: U~processed Tobacco Exports
\In Thousands of Kiloprams)
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Source: Zimbabwe Tobacco Association
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The shift in commercial CI'Op production since the mid-1980s Indicates considerable
flexibility for mechanised farmers. They were, in the end, able to take advantage of emergent
marketlug ..opportunities. Yet, the expressed intention of aSAID's joint initiative was to
reduce the gap between commercial producers and the "neglected majorityll. Commercial
farmers were able to effectively alter their cropping patterns to take advantage of
___.~,~--------------------
3\) It~terview,Mr. R. Stenson, 27 January 1993.
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opportunities presented either by the government or thrQugh alternative avenues, as in the
, '
case of tobacco. Undercapitalized Communal Area farmers; and fanners in the former
Purchase Areas, did not el~oy this degree of flexibility. They were constrained by facto"~
such as land, access to machinery and food availability, which would have enabled them to
more effectively accumulate, Mechanized farmers were consequently able to accumulate
more effectively than fanners whose production decisions are constrained by factors such as
poor land or a limited capital base. It is hard to see how.a programme designed with the
expr ...ssed b1tention of educing the economic g",,# between "commercial" producers and
"traditional" "farmers could have achieved this objective given the degree of support the
fbrmer sector had received, not only historically, but through programmes such as USAJD's
eIP and ZASA.
Commodity Impart Programmes could play a useful role in meeting some of the
significant capital and financial needs of structurally weak developing economies. Africa's
manufacturing and agricultural prospects were in many ways constrained by outdated and
inefficient machinery. Development interventions designed to address such problems were
certainly required, especially if Africa's developmental potential was to be fully exploited.
But these programmes did not operate in a vacuum. As the evidence from Zimbabwe
suggests, issues of race and class could often be exaggerated, despite the pressing need to
redress such disparities in an economy which had been distorted by policies which
exacerbated these social divisions and tensions.
Despite praise f01' USAID's eIP in Agency evaluations, the programme failed within
the limited framework articulated even by USAlD. While U.S. agricultural machinery was
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II
procured, it was not enough to sa1' Allis-Chalmers from a fureis:bUY.OUI for instance.
Moreover, the machinery was i,?died used by recipients for tobacCl6production, which
I'
allowed Zimbabwe to displace th~United"Sfates as the second largest exporter of the
unprocessed cOIrunodity. 'The commercial sector's contribution to national food supplies
"
declined precipitouslyand the important linkages that previously existed between commercial
agriculture and industry were, in the process, eroded. Finally, the decision to assist the
private sector and commercial farmers through the CIP did not facilitate a reduction. in the
gap between the commercial and traditional sectors, but rather contributed to the growing
disparities between them. This is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FOOD INSECURITY AND GRAIN MARKETING IN
GOKWE
5.1 Introduction
This chapter "vlJl concentrate on the impact that a USAlD-1Ullded grain depot has had
on the residents of Gokwe, a vulnerable Communal Area inMidlands Province. Gokwe is
classified under agro-ecologlcal Natural Regions In and IV, and was specifically mentioned
by the Ridden Commission (1981: 36) as a priority area for marketing extension. Farmers
in the region had access to four USAlD-funded depots. Fcod shortages were a common
occurrence Households were predominantly male-dominated as most of the families who
had moved into Gokwe did so to engage in full-time agricultural production. Consequently,
Gokwe serves as a valuable case study because of the inhabitants' reliance upon agricultural
production for their livelihood. It is these fanners who were intended to be the principal
beneficiaries of the depot extension programme.
Research was conducted in Gokwe from February 1992 .. June 1993. Informal
interviev-s with local residents from different parts of Gokwe, as well as depot personnel,
government and AGRlTEX officials, Agricultural Finance Corporation employees, and store-
owners were augmented by 157 formal interviews conducted on a random ba.,is within the
Gwanyika Plateau region of Njelele Ward III. Njelele comprised approximately 800
households and lies between 50~70 kilometres from the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) rl\;;fjot
in Gokwe, This Chapter moves the study from the broad aspe6ii:l ()f ~;evel(>Pltl,entpoHcy to
focus on tl-e specific context ofNjelele in order to better understf~Qdbow exog'~l1busaid
interventions affect recipient communities.
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It will be suggested that, while smallholders throughout Zimbabwe wat1t~dbetter
access to markets following independence (see Bratton 1987), the problem was not simply
that of .marketing and output, as USAlD and the Zimbabwean government assumed.
Through its assistance programm~,USAID expanded the scope of the previously existing
marketing system into rural areas which historically enjoyed greater autonomy from
centralized authority. More importantly, the experiences in Njetete suggest that the extension
of marketing services, which had historically been developed to serve white commercial
farmers, was not nidcessarilyappropriate for all areas. The beneflts accruing to smallholders
from the construction of grain marketing depots, while registering impressive figures at the
national level, actually exacerbated the insecure condition of rural consumers infoad deficit
regions of Zimbabwe. Food insecurity in these areas was a constant feature of Zimbabwean
society despite the praise heaped upon the country for its agricultural achievements.
USAID's intervention was especially devastating during periods of drought such as 1992.
A major problem was that USAID and the government oversimplified the dynamics of rural
relations and agricultural marketing and ignored the underlying problems associated with
African poverty and insecurity. USAID's claims of impressive gains in agricultural
production must be reassessed in the light of increasing food insecurity experienced bymany
smallholders in areas of USAID-funded grain depots.
5.2 Success?
The marketing programme in Zimbabwe was judged a success by both the
government and USAID, In proclaiming the intervention a success for Zimbabwe, USAID
marshals some impressive national figures, Since independence, the relative contribution
made by smallholders to national agricultural output has increased dramatically, In 1982,
...12
USAID claimed that,
... in spite of the drought (1982-84), during which food grains had to be
imported, Zimbabwe'~:,policy to increase the levels of market participation by
smallholders has been sueeess'ul, This is shown most drama·,jenHyin the ever
increasing percentages, no-v 57% and 45% respectlvely, of the nation's
marketed maize and cotton crops which originate in the smallholder sector.
Comparative figures for 1978 were 9% and 19% respectively. (USAID 1982:
2)
These percentages rose after 1988. African farmers' marketed sales of maize and sunflower
to the OMB were 68 and 96-98 percent respectively for the 1990 ..91 season (Govereh at. al.
1990: 160). Smallholder contributions to national food supplles since independence bolstered
Zimbabwe's reputation as the agricultural success of Africa. Exports of foocJ to the sub..
region Were a consistent feature of the post-independence era, and donors suggested that
other countries had much to learn from the Zimbabwean-model.
Part of the explanation for the significant Increase in smallholder production related
to the greater marketing opportunities available to smallholders since independence.
Moreover, areas ravaged by war, such as Gokwe, benefitted from the stability of the new
order. C;(IPS could bl, \;,l~nted without fear of destruction (:h conditions of civil war,
; . \
\11\. "
Households in areas such as'Mangwende and Chibi established new huldings anr{replanted
previously abandoned fields (Rohrbach 1988: 311). Seed and fertilizer packages were
distributed free ofcbarge to resettlement farmers, while improved seed varieties were made
readU) available, to farmers in outlying areas, Agricultural extension agents began
concentrating t': ,/ 'efIbtts on Communal Areas. Sunflower and millet, crcps predominantly
grown by 4:/, ;{'.ll1fanners, were included as controlled crops in 1983 and 1984 respectively.
\
The impr~. Jd prices offered were fh: tner incentive to sell, and the first two years of
independence were characterised by above average rains. At first it was cheaper for farmers
to sell their maize to the OMB and purchase subsidized urban-refined meal than to withhold
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stocks fbr household consumption and pay local grinding fees.
An additional factor that should be stressed was that large-scale commercial farmers
diversified their prodsctive base away from poorly-priced food crops, such as maize, to
higher paying crops such as tobacco and soya beans as well as horticulture and garre
ranching. Rohrbach at at. (1990: 104) claimed that large ..scale commercial maize production
declined by more than 40 percent afterJ98S. Sachikonye (1992: 90) demonstrated that
II
div~l'sifi¢ation out of maize production accelerated in 1992 as the large-scaler.commercial
sector only iJianted 78,000 hectares of maize as opposed to 125,000 hectares the previous
year. The percentage of sales to the GMB by black farmers would naturally have risen given
the dramatic deolire in sales from large-scale commercial farmers. The diversification away
from grain crops was significant as Zimbabwe's ability to remain self~suffic1ent in food was
increasingly dependent upon Communal Area farmers iu the more vuMerable regions of tile
country.
Finally, u small sub-sector of African producers, largely concentrated in the better
farming regions 0.( Mashonaland Central, contributed disproportionately to the African
percentage of marketed maize and sunflower. According to Jayne et al. (1991: 16),
Mashonaland producers "have accounted for 80 percent of per capilli smallholder maize
deliveries to Gb-1Bsince 1980, even though they constitute only 22 percent of the smallholder
pov'.datiol1 and 25 percent vf the maize area planted in the smallholder sector" (also see
Mayo 1986: 187, and Weiner 1988: (9). Only two of the 24 US AID-funded depots were
constructed in Mashonaland Central ..Rushlnga and Kaehuta.
What the national figures disguised, in addition to the relatively small percentage of
African producers who bolstered Zimbabwe's production flgures, was that vast areas of
Zimbabwe were perlodicnU} unable to meet local food requirements. Six out ot'Zumbabwe's
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eight provincial districts were consistently deficient in food supplies (Jayne et. al. 1990; 49).
Chronic malnutrition, which afflicted 30 percent of Zimbabwean youth in 1990/91 was the
largest killer of children between the ages of two and five years (Rukuni 1990: 4-5; also see
Republic of Zimbabwe 1991: 17}.
....his point is not contentious despite Zimbabwe's agricultural "success", USAID.
among others, recognized that most Zimbabwe smallholders eshausted their household
supplies offood between September and December. even in a good year. 1 Deficit households
in vulnerable Natural Regions had to secure food through alternative channels once their
supplies of rood were finished. Food could be obtained through informal networks between
households, purchased directly from GMB depots and urban-refined meal procured from
local retailers, or a combination of these. The extension of depots to previously neglected
regions of Zimbabwe primarily affected smallholder food security in two ways. Pirst, in areas
closer to urban centres and better served by tarred roads, the extension of depots increased
rural consumers' dependence on high-priced commercially ...refined meal. This served as a
check on both househcld welfare and income as many vulnerable households spent a
disproportionate amount of their earnings all food. Second, in more isolated regions such
as Gokwe, food sold to the OMB was exported out of the area without mechanisms available
to ensure the re-importac on of reasonably-prlced foodstuffs. As a result of Zimbabwe's
",
imperfect l11~rketing system, many rural households were unable to secure food ut an
\\
affordable price from alternative sources once their household stocks were depleted.
This resulted in the paradoxical coexistence of overflowing silos and debilitating
hunger. The situation called fbr a reexamination of tho entire system and USAID's claim to
1 Interview, Mr. Ted Morse, USAID Mission Director, Harare, 8 Aprll1993.
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success. Previous chapters explored some of the implications that.a unidirectional mar1f6ting
system has on small-scale producers in food deficit regions of Zimbabwe. The argument was
that USAlD did not simply assist the Government in bringing neglected areas into the wider
Zimbabwean economy through the construction ofdepots. It also extended and strengthened
a specific marketing system which was detrimental to vulnerable households in food deficit
regions of the country The following section builds upon the earlier analysis of grain
marketing in post-independence Zimbabwe by concentrating on the Impact ofZASA on the
outlying districts of Gokwe.
5.3 USAID..Funded Grain Depots in Gokwe
In.Gokws and the surrounding area, ZASA funds were used to construct one Primary
Marketing Depot in Gokwe centre, two seasonal depots in Zhombe and Nembudziyu, and
a rural depot in Sanyatl as the map on the following page illustrates.
As mentioned earlier, GQkwe saw a large influx of people since the reduction of tsetse
fly ln the mid-1960s. Households from more crowded Communal Areas came to Gokwe and
increased the demand fur food in the area. A distinguishillg feature of Gokwe 'tS its multi...
cultural influx. An unusual mix of Shona, Ndebele and Tonga speakers became integrated
within the area. As a result, political and social relations in Gokwe were articulated in a
manner that differed from other parts cf'the ceuntry which were not as ethnically integrated.
t·airon ..c.l~elltrelations crossed ethnic boundaries in a manner that differed from other regions,
whd~ kinship networks were not as localised because many people who moved to Gokwe had
extended families in other regions of the country. An underground market in land was clearly
evident although rarely discussed, which added to the complexities apparent in Gokwe,
The FAO, which began a programme designed to assist AGRITEX in Njelcle Ward
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III estimated that en average, Njelele residents were able to achieve yields of 1.5 t011S of
maize per hectare, 0,6 tons of cotton pCI' hectare, m~d0.5 tons of sunflower per hectare.
Local AGRr:rEX officials claimed that the FAO figures were too high,Z Moreover,
disparities between households were critical. There was a 'wide range of soils evident in
N.jelele, but the plateau areas were extremely rocky and therefore difficult to cultivate, Water
resources were scare; and undeveloped.
GMB DEPOTS IN ZiMBABWE
• USAIO·!unded GMGdllpot
o GMSdepok
Sludy erea
~~------.-----------
Interview, Mr. Peter Maposa, 15 June 1993.
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Historically, deficit families in Gokwe survived through a variet1 of coping,'
.1
strategies.! Cash transactions and labour exchanges were thle principal means by which
deficit households were able to secure food during periods of shortfall prior to the
introductionof the GTvm to Gokwe, Poorer households as'sifitcdsurplus families in the
harvesting of 11fJze, sunfl.v...-er; groundnuts and cotton in exchange for feod, These families
received, 2...3 bags of maize pet hectare, depending upon the crop harvested. For surplus
producers; accumulation was secured in multiple ways. Once local markets were saturated,
surplus producers transported their remaining stocks to Kadorna 01' l<:weKwe for sale to the
OMS. Further sources of income were direct sales of sunflower to Lever Brothers of Harare
and United Soap in Bulawayo, In addition, cash transactions in the area and remittances
1.,1,
from family members engaged in employment outside Gokwe contributed to capital
accumulation for farmers in the area. This income enabled some to diversify their economic
activities into areas such as transport and milling. What these transactions and other research
discussed earlier suggest was that, despite USAIDlg assumptions about a stagnant economy,
producers in neglected areas were involved in the wider Zimbabwean economy.
Other crops grown in small quantities included sorghum, groundnuts and soya
beans. Yields were low according to the FAO. The overwhelming majority offatniIies
interviewed in GOJ':1-vesupplemented their diets and incomes with small vegetable gardens,
which were largely controlled by women. Fifty ...two households in the Gwanyika region .,
constructed fish ponds with the assistance of AGRlTEX during the early 1990s. These
ponds were used for the domestic consumption of bream, but many were planning to expand
3 Most oftha following information was gathered during informal discussions with elders
ancl.AORlTEX officials in the area. Further research would however be required to gain greater
insight into the nature of the following exchanges and armngements.
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their operations in order to market fish to the local community, Bee-keeping was another
I'l()trt. ....tial source of income, although only one Gwanyika households had directly engaged.
in this productive activity.
Social differentiation within Gokwe generally, and Njelele in particular} was clearly
evident. Two percent ofNjelele residents were considered by residents to be wealthy, 15
percent comprised a relative "middle class" in the area. while 68 percent were considered
poor or extremely poor. The remaining 15 percent were classified by Njelele residents as
simue households, which loosely transiates as "lazy". Wealthy farmers were well capitalized,
had access to greater resources and land than their neighbours, and usually engaged in
activities that mitigated their dependence upon agricultural sales, such as transport or the
ownership of a stor& "Middle class" households depended disproportionately upon
agricultural production for their livellhoods, and were generally surplus producers. Their
condition was however tenuous. Many expressed a desire +0 alter their dependence on
agriculture but were consistently unable to diverSifY. Poorer households occupied most of
the worst land in Njelele and were undercapitalized. T"'~ majority of these households were
consistently unable to meet their yearly food requirements.
Si.mbe households often had large holdings but their plots were rarely cultivated.
This included the kraal-head ot'Gwanyika. He occupied 13 hectares of land which remained
idle and his poverty was apparent. His role in community matters had declined in the 1980s
as decisions on land allocations, which historically lu~dfallen under his jurisdiction, were
increasingly decided through direct sales in the community or through the local Village
Development Committee (VIDeO). However, the kraal-head had attempted, with some
success, to reassert his authority Over land transactions in the area. This process was
strengthened by President Mugabe1s efforts to reactivate traditionalleadcl'srup in rural areas
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in order to buttress his flagging support. Many people supported the kraal-head's efforts and
were attempting to reactivate former relations that heralded a "better time"." Indeed, his
(\
children were surreptitiously fed by neighbours because Ui~ is not their fault that their father
is lazy",'
Remittances to Njelele declined dramatically during the late 1980s as urban costs rose
and household members outside ofNjelele were retrenched. Many people formerly employed
outside Njelele returned home as alternative employment opport> . 3 diminished, thur.
increasing th~ pressure 011 already limited food supplies. Families that historically used
\1 remittances to pay for local food were fundamentally affected by increased unemployment
in Zimbabwe.
Land inNjelele is of poor quality and, as indicated above, Iar'" ncentrated in the
hands of' more wealthy households. The poorer members of tile community quietly
~."
conteflcled that land needed to be redistributed there as well as within the wider Zimbabwean
context. Household plots ranged from one hectare to over 80 hectares, but the average was
between 4" 10 hectares.
Relations between the government and residents of isolated Communal Areas
followlnb~ independence were not static, A growing bureaucratic infrastructure in Gokwe.,
served to displace kraal ..heads and chiefs, although they were beginning to regain some of
their influence in 1992/3 in Njelele. A constant, but negative, reminder of the inffuence of
the government was the. extension of Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) agents to
isolated communities. The notorious Fifth Brigade was stationed in Gokwe following their
4 Interview 97,4 September 1992, Njelele.
5 Discussion with interpreter, who was one of those feeding the kraal-head's children, 1
September 1992, Njelele.
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activities in Matabeleland, reinforcing the coercive presence of the state inGokwe.
In important ways though, the Government was quite weak. Residents ofNjelele had
I;
little access to Government representatives. The local MP never' islted the region aI~9the
I~
administrative inirastructure established at Gokwe Growth Point had very little impact 0(: the
\
lives of1'ljelele farmers. There was, in fact, little dialogue between Government and rural
fanners. The most visible sign of the Government for most Gokwe farmers was AGRITEX,
which was understaffed and overextended. TIlls limited the amollp.t of agricultural extension
advice that was disseminated in the wider Gokwe region. NGO activity in Njelele was non-
existent until 1992, when an irrigation scheme was constructed by the District Development
Fund with funding from an unn~ned British donor. The scheme elicited a great deal of anger
within the commurlty as plots were allocated to the local councillors village only, Farmers
could not identity channels througlLwh~ch such grievances could be addressed. Credit was
simply unavailable, as the sub-branch Manager of Gokwe's Agricultural Finance Corporation
office confirmed in an interview. s Even if credit were available the interest rates deterred the
jf
1:
overwhelming majority of househclds in Njelele who said "(we) are afraid of'the interest","
One informant argued that "(there is) 110 profit from APC loans"," USAID's emphasis on
credit under ZASA had no demonstrable impact in Gwanyika. In fact, problems associated
with credit in the area had caused frustranon for fanners.
Njelele experienced numerous changes as a result of the introduction ofa centralized
marketing facility in the region' While fanners throughout the Communal Areas clearly
(j Interview, Mr. 1. Mangozho, 28 April 1992, Gokwe. There is an understandable
reluctance on the part of Gokwe farmers to discuss their debts.
'I Interview e2, 3 September 1992, Njelele.
a Interview 28~20 May 1992, Njelele.
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wanted better access to centralized markets at independence, the marketing S}'stemimposed
on Gokwe residents was experienced as harmful. Residents ofNjt,lele had a different
conception of markets and the causes of their poverty than either USAID or the Government.
While there was no single view to the question of what a market was, as one's socio ..
economic position in Njelele as well as one's age and gender clearly affected the response,
some general points were discernable, In relation to USAID's assumptions about
"traditional" farmers, there appeared to be a greater appreciation by respondents both of
consumption and output. As one respondent stated, "we sell [to the GMB], but there is
nothinKhere to buy",9 Women especially pointed out that the supply of basic commodities
(from foodstuffs such as beans, cooking oil and maize meal, to necessities such. as clothes)
were rarely, if ever, available in the wider Gokwe area. Family members had to travel to
Gokwe centre to secure these goods, ifthey were available. Such trips required a full day
because transport in the area was limited to one ZUPCO bus that left at approximately 6:30
AM and returned by 9 PM, at a cost l·a.~ging,in 1992) fromZ$2-3.71 each way, If the goods
required were unavailable in Gokwe the day had been wasted. The manager of Gokwe's
Farmers Co-Op cited numerous instances offarmers making the journey into town only to
find that seed, fertilizer or foodstuffs were unavailable.II> Njelele residents concurred. As one
farmer stated: "These occasions '..1.'0 aiot. We can't get maize at the shops [in Gokwe centre],
especially jn October when we usually run out of our maize" ,11 The trip had to be repeated
at great cost in both time and money.
There was also a sense among surplus producers who used to sell their excess
-------------------
1I Interview 97> 4 September 1992, NjeJele.
10 Interview, Mr. J. Chindove, 17 May 1992, Gokwe,
11 Interview 148, 5 January 1993, Njelele.
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produce within the local neighbourhood that they had lost control of their ~urpluses since the
imposition of a depot facility in the region. Previous marketing options were perceived to
be no longer available; .As one respondent argued) "we used to have a say in the sale of
maize, but fanners do not have a say now"P At one level, su ",\ comments reflected the
increased cash needs of local residents that necessitated the sale of crops through state-
controlled marketing channels rather than locally. With the increasing costs associated with
school fees. health care, agricultural production. and daily upkeep, households which
produced surpluses and historically sold locally inNjeleJe were instead selling to the GNIB
out of'necessity. "What choice do 1 have? Maize is our bank. Ira child becomes sick, or
school fees ate due and we need cash, we have to sell. 11)3
More significantly, farmers expressed anger over the Ioss of their sunflower market
to the GMB. Gokwe had consistently produced the largest volume of sunflower in the
country. Before the 1983/4 season) Gokwe residents sold their sunflower directly to
representatives of Lever Brothers and United Soap. Once the GMB became the sole buying
agent of'sunflower in.1983/4, this market disappeared. "We used to sell to [Leve r Brothers
or United SJap], but now there is only the GMB."14 Prices for sunflower were subsequently
determined in Harare rather than between private interests and Gokwe smallholders; farmers
lost an important marketing alternative. This suggests how bilateral development support
channelled through the government Was not neutral. The government was able to extend its
influence into outlyjng areas 'Withthe assistance of'bilateral donors as well as to subvert local
initiatives through the operation ofa particular development effort, in this case the local
12 Interview 31, 20 May 1992, Njelel~.
13 Interview 5, 19 May 1992, Njelele.
1<1 Interview SO,2 September 1992, Njelele.
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GMB depot.
Significantly, the extension of price controls, through the G:tvtB, to previously
uncontrolled crops such as sunflower, was a condition attached to ZASA by USAID. Unless
the conditions applied to ZASA were adhered to) the second and third tranche ofUSA1D
support would have been withheld (USAlD 1982: -3). Inan evaluation ofZASA, USAID
commended the government for the "addition of new smallholder crops to the list of
controlled commodities, which gives them a guaranteed market" (USAID 1988: 3). Yet
Gokwe farmers had previously had a secure market. Ironically, the former relationship
between Lever Brothers, United Soap, and Gokwe farmers exemplified what USAID
purported to endorse. Inthis case, USAID support un government-set producer prices was
actually inconsistent with Agency policy elsewhere. A 1.w pricing logic had been imposed
that was seen by residents as a cause of their economic problems .. Their ability to secure the
highest price for their sunflower, through interactions between Lever Brothers and pnited
SOltP, was undermined by the introduction of a grain depot in the area and sunflower
becoming a controlled crop.
Households which sold to the GMB were frustrated by their inability to accl.lmulat~
adequate resources to secure their family's economic and social foundations. The price
offered for maize did not keep pace with itl.1'" ion, the rising cost of living and the increased
expenses associated with agricultural production. As one respondent declared, "when [we]
sell to the GMS there is no money, illS whilst another reiterated, "there is no money at the
GMB ''',16 No household interviewed whose primary source of income was the G.MBbad
13 Interview 34,20 :tvfay1992, Njelele.
16 Interview 36,20 May 1992, Njelele.
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\\
bought an agricultural implement, such as a scotch cart or a plough, for over five years, even
ifthey identified the lack of such implements as a maier constraint on their ability to increase
production. In. fact, the more vulnerable households in the area had slowly sold their
productive assets, such as cattle and agricultural implements, in order to send their children
to school or to eat. Permanent, rectangular houses with tin roofs had last been constructed
in the 19708. The last automobile bought by a "middle class" producer in Njelele was
purchased in 1982. Accumulation in Njelele appeared to have been checked since the early
\\
1980s.
Finally, deficit households in NjeJele deady became more susceptible to food
shortages with the Introduction of the GMB depot in Gokwe. Prior to independence, food
deficit families had provided a more favourable market for surplus producers as the costs
associated with the sale of grains to the GMB in Kadoma or KweKwe were excessive. One
reason fQ, the increased vulnerability experienced within Gokwe generally and Njelele
specificallywas the slow erosion of inter-household links which were historically utilised to
better ensure local food security. The disintegration ofintec ..household trading networks was
the result of larger processes affecting farmers throughout Zimbabwe. Amin notes that the
implementation of the 1982/3 stabilization programme, under the stewardship of the W 'ld
Bank and lMF, had facilitated increased sales to the GMB from Communal smallholders as
a means to offset wage freezes and the increased cost of'food, The result was greater rood
insecurity in Communal Areas,"
It is critical to demonstrate who was selling to the GMB~ however, as evidence
presented above suggests that the number of households selling their surpluses within the
17 Cited.in Friedmann (1992: 381).
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local area had dramatically declined during the previous ten years. Of those farmers
interviewed, 32 claimed that they sold food crops withi» the area prior to the introduction
of the GMB depot in Go),(v.,-e.In 1y92~only three of the farmers who used to sell their
surplus siocks locally were consistently able to sell their food to deficit households in Njelele.
111 effect, deficit households saw their market for foodstuffs dramatically reduced.
Research indicflt~Cthat the "middle" and poor strata of producers, whose alternative
sources of income were -limited and who depended dlsproportisaately upon agricultural
:1
production for their yem:l;yincome, were primarily responsible for the Njelele contribution
to the Gokwe GMS. Efforts by farmers to improve their position by devoting mote land to
higher-valued cash crops.were Ct .J>lJistentlyfr.i;)t~tedby poor weather and inadequate access
to processed food. Seventy-seven percent ~fthosejntervie",ed who tried to increase the
amount oflanq devoted to sunflower, cotton -nd groundnuts over the previous t~reflyf'I,arS,
reverted back to low-value food crops followin« the 1992 drought. Some poor houselrolds
with little outside sour~~$of income sold to the GMB in order to meet short-term cash
requlrernems, even if these sales fundamentally threatened household food security.
Respondents contiriuously claimed that they had "no alternative" but to sell to the OMB.IS
Some households which produced nominal surpluses, or poor households with already
deficient supplies offood, sold grain :Jupp1iesin excess of'what would have been required to
sustain the family until the following harvest. Although such sales resulted in the household's
inability to meet its own requirements at the end of the season, many explained t!. ~ this was
unavoidable. Consequently, households either reduced food intake, berame dependent upon
erratic Government relief, or sold productive assets to acquire tood which further
18 Eleven surplus households stated they hod "no alternative" but to sell 11') the GlY1B. One
fanner (Interview 36, 20 May 1992, Njelele) stated that the "OMB is 0111' o l)~market".
126
undermined their future agricultural viability, "There is nothing we can do (about this), It one
farmer contended. "We have to sacrifice to get food."19 Decisions to forfeit food to send a
child to school occurred. This decision was based upon the perception that the sacrifice
would enhance the long-term prospects of the household. Such decisions had their own
consequences, The impact of reduced food on the educational potential of a child was one,
combined \'fith limited academic resources in the area. Up to 1993, no child from Gwanyika
has successfully passed their "0.11 levels," Fewer girls atte ded secondary school, and those
who did were often the first to be withdrawn from school if a household could no 101Jet
afford to pay fees for all their children.
The more vulnerable households in Njelele resorted to new strategies in order to
£''UsuUnthemselves. Many desperate familiesmanipulated traditional practices, such as lobola,
in order to secure resources necessary to sustain themselves. A Marondera resident recently
travelled to Gokwe ~11an effort to gain custody of his twelve year-old daughter. His wife's
family had demanded an additional payment of Z$4,OOO,despite the fact that he had paid
lobola 12 years earlier. \¥hen. he could not pay, the family "reclaimed" his wife, who was
remarried to a wealthy individual in another part oft,he country,'ll Some now belleved that
;1
they had been better \)ff prior to Independence. this was the context of their efforts to
reinvent tradition by re-actlvating networks and alliances with people such as the kraal-head.
In the tina} analysis, only a handful of producers in Njelele were able to withhold
grains from the OMB, and their ability to reproduce themt:p1~leswas made possible through
entrepreneurial activities outside of farming, One household head virtually monopolized
19 Interview 7) 19 May 1992, Njelele.
20 Interview, Headmaster of GWfinyika. Secondary School, 2 December 1992.
21 Discussion in Gokwe centre, 31 August 1992.
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activities financed his food storage capability. At the end of the season he was the primary
transport in the local area, a service that had been secured priorto independence, These
source offood for deficit households inNjdele Farmers in the community were compelled
to employ his services to transport maize and sunflower to Gokwe and cotton to Kadoma,
Transport fees ranged from Z$3~6 per bag for maize and sunflower and from Z$25~35 per
80 hectares had been procured by "buying people out. ;22 Resentment a.gainst his dominance
bale of cotton, depending on the locality of the homestead within Njelele. His plot of over
of the local economy was tempered by people's dependence on Gim for transport. He and
another wealthy farmer largely dictated VIDeo decisions in the area, and ensured that their
candidates were elected to important posts on the Committee. He was the only significant
r~ I
I
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source of employment in the area, hiring eight full-time employees and foul' seasonal
employees. Th.erest of the labour was supplied by members of two families who lived within
the homestead.
As more farmers were forced to sell to the GMB, the transporter's position was
further entrenched. His wealth, secured through local dependence on his transport services,
allowed him to sell grains to deficit households at a premium price. Food could be secured
through credit arrangements with him, which strengthened his position in the area. As a
result, he did not have to sell to the GMS at the established producer price. Rather, he was
able to wait until the end of the year and could charge higher prices for unprocessed maize,
In 1992 he sold maize at Z$105 per 91 kg bag while the GMB producer price was established
atZ$50.
Other sources of locel food included a former government official, who opened a
2Z Interview 17, 19May 1992, Njelele.
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bottle-store in the local township and invested in a grinding mill in 1991. Only one other
household surveyed consistently sold maize in the area, instead of to. the GMB, but his
supplies were generally quite law. The evidence suggests that there was greater competition
between surplus households in the area prior to. the introduction of the USAID-funded depot
as food supplies were initially sold in Njelele. With fewer farmers able to withhold surplus
stocks, the cost of'locally produced food had risen dramatically. Thus, the introduction of
a statutory marketing authority into. this rural area had undermined the local market as well
as food security. Equally important to. feed security was the loss of "mlddle class" surpluses
from the area, which excluded the handful of wealtl,/ farmers who continued to. sell ii'the
area.
The terms of exchange between surplus and defipit households were also
transformed, Namerous respondents from deficit households indicated their desire to work
for food, but were unable to. secure employment as the priorities of surplus households
shifted away from food to cash laboar-arrangements. As one poor farmer stated, "they
[limiddlell and wealthy farmers] no. longer hire us".'lJ Some surplus producing households
which had historically exchanged food for labour would have Iiked to. continue with such
practices, or to have sold to deficit households, but th~ir ability to r;ngage in this type of
Interaction had been constrained by their desire to meet short ..term cash requirements. A
stall..owner inGokwe centre/had indicated that he could not afford to wait until later in the
year to. collect what poorer households owed him. Food for labour agreements had short ..
term costs that many could not afford, The stall-owner instead sold.to the QMB despite his
23 Interview 68, 3 'September 1992, Njelele.
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This situation was compounded by the fact that commercially-refined meal was not
preference fer other alternatives." Another option available to deficit households had been
to become financially indebted to the handful of wealthier households, who could afford to
withhold their surplus stocks. Indebtedness tel local shop-owners also grew in order fnr
households to meet their food requirements at the end of the season.
availar'~ to Njelele store owners. National Foods and tne Midiunds Milling Company, the
principal suppliers of maize meal to Gokwe, only transported refined meal along the
Kw~Kwe to Gokwe road. No delivery was made directly to Njelele, according to local store
owners. Deficit households wricL" could not afford Jocal maize therefore had to travel to
Gokwe centre to purchase small quantities of urban-refined meal. The erratic supplies of
I
I
1
!. I
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urban meal brought into Gokwe centre were sold at extortionate prices during 1992, As is
evident elsewhere in Africa, few costumers actL.illy paid the controlled price established by
the government for basic commodities. In Zimbabwe, the official selling price for a 20 kg
bag of Roller Meal was Z$15.02 at the beginning of 1992. In Gokwe centre, the sellir.lg price
ranged from Z$24~30 during 1992/3; in Zhombe the price at local stores is Z$31.58. In
Nkayi, one store owner argued, "Do people think I run the U.N.? I must travel to Gweru to
buy maize meal. How can I sell it [at the controlled price]?"2S In effect, households which
sold 91 kg bags of maize to the GMS the previous season, at 2$24.55 if they could deliver
it directly without the services of the transport families, could not even purchase a 20 kg bag
of refined meal from the money they received. The staple was simply out of reach to the
most insecure households, By July 1993, the cost of a 20 kg bag of'Roller Meal exceeded
24 Discusaion.in Gokwe market, 24 Marclt 1992.
2S Discussion with store-owner, 30 November 1992, Nkayl.
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199.3 harvest,
Z$34, as consumer subsidies on maize meal were removed. Desperate households resorted
to eating roots, grass and dogs ill the larger Gokwe area during 1992.26 A teacher in
Nembudziya indicated that many familiesin,the area were adding grass to the limited amount
t:
of maize meal they had in order to add "substance" to their food.21 Many households in
Gokwe were forced to sell productive assets and reduce intake in order to survive until the
But some 'ncluding DSAT.D, might claim that these were forces beyond the
imfne.~iate purview of marketing. Surely USAID could not be held responsible forthe
changes in Zimbabwe that necessitated the sale of grains to depots at the expense of d\)ficit
••• 1·
, '-,
households in Gokwe or Njclole? In fact, (Li could be argued that the establishment of a depot
inthe area had been beneficial to local residents, beyond the obvious advantages it meant for
local transporters, and that the GMS became an important source of cash to members of the
merit to this argument. The OMS was indeed an important source of income for families
local community at a. time when alternative sources of income were limited. There is some
"
who needed to meet short-term cash requirements related to:sc11001fees, health care and
Government expropriated the sunflower market. But the arg~ment masks the larger issues
offood security in the country. As argued earlier, the grain marketing system was desigeed
general household expenses.
it should also be remembered, however, that one of the main reasons many Gokwe
"
farmers lacked alternative sources of income from agricultural production was that the
to channel maize out of rural areas to urban centres. Consequently, urban consumers were
16 Sunday Times, 17 May 1992.
17 Interview) Mr.O. Machingura, 17 May 1992) Nembudzlya.
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ff . "
fed with grains from deficit regions at the expense offood security in mral areq4~of
1,/
Zimbabwi'!:. White maize, secured from areas such as Gokwe, was available in Harare well
after reports began to circulate of Gokwe residents eating grass. Table 5.1 illustrates the
magnitude ofilie withdrawal of maize from the USAID~funded depots in the Gokwe area
since their construction after independence. The market for food that had historically been
available to deficit households had been eliminated as a result of the marketing extension
programme funded byUSAID. The problem was that the construction of GMB depots was
not combined with any programme related to distribution. Both USAlD and the government
were responsible for neglecting this crucial aspect bf supply and demand. In 1992. GMB
stocks Were transported and sold to urban Zimbabweans. Rural needs were not taken into
.".account.
The impact of USAIO's intervention was exacerbated as the effects of the 1992
drought were felt by households in Njelele. Agricultural output was a fraction of normal
production, andmany households in the area had depletedthelr meagre storks by September.
The few households which had sold surplus stocks within Njelele earlier in the year had
ceased to do so by October as their supplies became threatened, Maize was unavailable in
the area because it had been removed from the local USAID-randed grain depots in order to
feed urban consumers. As the fullmagnitude of the 1992 drought in southern Africa became
apparent, efforts to secure desperately needed maize increased. Depots that still had maize
were targeted by businesses, farmers in other regions, and entrepreneurs. The situation was,
so severe that stores ill the urban centres had to enlist the assis mce of riot police in order
" ""~"'.. ' '. ,........ r: ,~
Table $';1.: Maize lJ,l.takeand Outfi{)~T!'8~.•J992* "
. , 1;S2@ I 1983 I 1;84 1 1985 ( 1986 ~:
Gekwe.Depot
1981
?
1988 1989 19921990 1991
intake I 182,949 ..I 106,963
outflow I 182,949 106,'163
balance o i 0
._.,~
372,353 I 411,785 I 436A59 205,432 I 147A429,040 I 263,001 26,854 451,896
9,040 I 263,001 372,353 1 411,785 26,854 436,459 451,896 205,432 I 140,033
0 I 0 I 0 I ° <.c 0 0 0 0 I 7,389
.c,~~,';;:..~,r=c'.-=-
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n.a. t 39 56,288 104,004 2,871 20,810
n.a, I 0 0 0 0 0
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I intake
balance
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I
Zhombe
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0 i ° 0 0 I 0----
-e . .. ,_
50,896 I 912 I 6,635-
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to control hungry crowds. Gokwe was one of these depots, as the GMB was in the process
of transferring the maize to commercial millers. A large majority of the 7,389 bags of maize
listed under the 1992 "balance" (see Table 5. I above) was transported out of Gokwe. Spot
interviews with private lorries leaving the Gokwe depot indicated that the maize would be
going tl') areas as tar as Binga near Lake Kariba, Masvingo, Bulawayo, Harare and even
Namibia. Inaddition, Shirichena Milling Company, which had recently been established at
Gokwe Growth Point, was processing maize tor consumers in Gokwe centre> Bulawayo and
the Harare high-density suburb of Highfields." The marketing of 177,073 baas of maize
from the Gokwe area and the erratic supply and prohibitiv~ cost of replacement meal from
commercial millers exacerbated the tenuous condition of smallholders in the area.
In theory, individuals could have purchased bags of maize directly from GMB Primary
Depots, although it is important to stress that individuals co"ld not procure grains from rural
and seasonal depots such as Nernbudziya, Sanyati and Zhombe. Producers in those areas
travelled to the Pr'mary Depot to secure a bag of maize for household consumption. In
addition to the increased strain the loss of food from the area placed on poorer households,
it also elicited anger as members ofNjelele were aware that the GMB depot in Gokwe had
been "full" earlier in the year.2? In this way, respondents claimed that the maize they had
delivered to the GMB in 1991/2 was available for purchase at the beginning of the 1992/3
season. "I know it (maize) is no longer there because I tried to buy at the GMS (in April). ,,30
Ii
In an earlier interview, a local farmer expressed concern over the cost ofllocal maize from
28 Interview, Mr. R.H. Zemura, Director, Shirichena Milling Company (Pvt) Ltd., 8 April
1992, Gokwe.
29 Interview 40,21 May 1992, Njelele.
30 Interview 48,2 September 1992) Njelele.
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the transporter, He had decided it would be cheaper to buy from the OMB. Ina follow-up
interview, he explained that the GMB "had none [maize]" and that he had had to sell one bull
in order to buy maize from the transporter. 31
The problem was more than simply one of distribution. The extraction of food crops
from Gokwe had not been replaced by reasonably priced and readily available processed
foodstuffs. Significantly, if the issue of distribution had been rectified, and Njelele residents
could have secured access to foodstuffs at a reasonable price; and the OMS would effectively
'iave become 8. "white elephant". Njelele residents consistently expressed their preference for
growing cotton, groundnuts and sunflower) but did not engage in this productive activity for
reasons linked to the limited food available in the area, As one respondent claimed,
Selling maize, the price is not that satisfactory. The seasons are not suitable
fOl" maize. People here do not like to grow maize but we have to, I would
only grow sunflower and cotton if I could buy maize at a fair price in the
shops. Its far much better to grow crops that will generate income."
Data colleGtedfrom Gwanyika area appeared to confirm this statement. Eighty-eight
percent of the households interviewed would have shifted production away from maize to
higher-valued cotton. sunflower and groundnuts, if they could have been sure of procuring
aoequate foodstuffs from local shops." The inadequate distribution network affected poor
households most, as we have shown. Local producers spoke of the need to establish
I)
sunflower and grchndnut processing industries in the area, which could have significant
employment and income effects for Njelele residents. As one proponent of the scheme
3l Interview 41,21 May 1992 and 4 Septembel'1992, Njelele.
32 Interview 148, 5 January 1993, Njelel~.
33 Ninety-one percent of male headed households indicated that they would switch to
higher-valued CfOPS such as cotton, sunflower and groundnuts, while 80 percent of the female-
headed households, would change their productive practices.
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declared> "Why should we export our sunflower and groundnuts? We should be exporting
cooking oil and peanut butter Instead"." Some Njelo1e residents saw potential in
development projects which wout~ have required significant changes b marketint" state-
community relations, and the distributUn of food. The ability to engage in these rural
industrial projects would have required capital, which was not available in the area, as well
a-=adequate supplies offood. If an adequate distribution system were implemented, Njelele
farmers would begin to change their cropping patterns," This would have the potential to
improve smallholder income.
The government was in a difficult position. The private sector had proved unable to
distribute processed food to more vulnerable areas such as Njelele. Calls to deregulato retail
prices have pushed the cost of basic foodstuffs beyond the means of'most rl£rai consumers.
Redress would have required greater state involvement in the distribution process. It would
also have meant offering high producer prices to farmers in better ~naize producing areas so
as to ensure that these regions produced adequate food for the country. Such a policy would
\
have allowed farmers in vulnerable maize-growing regions to diversifY into hirher ..valued
agricultural production, better suited to their respective areas. The cost of food would have
had to be kept low, andzhe supply assured, in order for an effective shift to higher-valued
cash crops to occur in areas such as Gokwe, implying higher government subsidies and
transport costs. These ideas were fundamentally antithetical to the "free market solution"
advocated by influential institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and USAID however.
Moreover, it was contrary to the grain market reform programme USAID was trying to
34 Interview 111, 2 December 1'992, Njelele.
35 The cost of processed food in the area would have to be low enough to ensure that the
diversification into other crops was successful however.
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implement iuZimbabwe (USAlD 1991),
More importantly, the principal goal of surplus producers inNielele was to distallce
themselves from their reliance on the local depot. Most fanners believed that accumulation
would have been better ensured if they could have avoided the GMB. Most could not. The
few who were abl~to "exit\"the official marketing system dramatically increased the
'_ 'it- \;,
economic gap between themselves and the rest of the community. The more secure
households in..the area could only maintain their reproductive capability through the pursuit
"of activities in addition to farming, such as transport, informal milling, or ownership of a
store. Households almost solely dependent upon agricultural '~tQduction did not have this "
security, While no family was wholly dependent upon agricultural production in Njelele or
elsewhere, the point is that, for many families, alternative sources of income outside of
farming generally supplemente-' ..the household's yearly income rather than served as an
alternative avenue for div~r.sification. "Success" in Njelele ,yvas therefore defined as
diversifying one's' marketing base away from a reliance on the GMB, Farmers who were
..locked into the marketing system contended that they were unable to accomplish this goal
or provide a more solid foundation for their families due to their reliance upon the GMB.
The desire of surplus producers across the socio-economic spectrum in Njele[e to
"exit" the official marketing system was readily apparent. As one respondent claimed, "this
drought has taught us. We will never give the GMB our maize" .?-6 Another argued that "no
,I
farmer will ever sell to the GMB agaln"." In fact, few surplus producing households in
Njelele planned to sell to the GMB during the next season, regardless of the harvest and in
36 Interview 48, 2 September 1992, Njelele.
37 Interview 83,3 September 1992, Njelele.
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spite of the high pre-planting producer price offered by the government. Households wanted
to store two years worth of food crops; the remainder they wanted to resell in the area.
Many realized that it was better to withhold grains and resell in the area, CiS the condition of
vulnerable households heightened tensions between richer and poorer households in the
community. Farmers Were hoping to reactivate trading networks used prior to the
introduction of the Gokwe depot in 1982. As one "middle class" farmer explainer, "there
is a market here [inNjolelel, we have just forgotten about it",38
The ability of surplus producers, especially Njelele "middle class" and SOme poor
farmers, to exercise this option was limited. The "peasant option" (Ranger 1985) or "exit
option" (f~yden 1983) had always been romanticised. Small-scale producers' economk;
foundations remained weak and the OMS will continue to be an important source of income
for fanners despite producers' desire to distance themselves from the marketing institution.
Interestingly, women tended to highlight this point. As one respondent claimed, "He [her
husband] alw{'.yssays he does not want to sell to the G:rvm, but every year he does. We sell
to the G:MB, and we suffer".39
One important alternative suggests itself. Prior to the 1992 drought, Njelele;stores
began purchasing maize from surplus producers. The maize was then resold) and milled in
the area, although at a high price. Store-owners could become a more important source of
income for local residents·ifthey were able to Pay farmers at the beginning of the season and
consequently offer farmers an alternative to the GMB. But in 1993, sales to local store-
owners had largely occurred because of debt. In July 1993, store-owners had stoe' Iled
g1j Interview 103,4 September 1992, Njelele.
39 Interview 48a,.2 September 1992.
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maize as repayment for debts incurred in 1992. Farmers sold their last bags of maize to local
store-owners at 2$15 (per 91 kg bag) during 1992. One store-owner sold 20 litre tins of
maize for Z$32 in December 1992. He proposed selling the maize he received from debtors
at an even higher price once Njelete residents ran out of maize in 1993. Few could afford this
without further decapitalization. The sale of maize to local store-owners could have only
become a viable alternative to the GMB if fanners in the area were able to re-establish
themselves, an unlikely prospect in the short-term;
The poorest households ofNjelele. who had seen their ability to procure food from
local sources diminish since independence, !ofteted a complex explanation of their
predicament, Most of the poorest households were codsistently unable to market any crops,
regardless of the producer price, . Usually their plots were too small. or their household
requirements too large for them to sell. These families most often expressed ;~oncem over
J
the decline in inter-household exchanges that historically sustained them during both good
and bad years. They often ctal::';1\:that it was "better under [Ian] Smith", 'When asked why,
the invariable response was "because we could always eat''." This statement, while
instructive. should be interpreted cautiously. Such pfonouncements did not mean that NJelele
residents preferred the former system, but it does show that the perception held by the
government that it would playa transformative role in the rural areas was not shared by the
residents of'Gokwe, The statement highlighted some of the frustrations felt by many black
Zimbabweans whose condition ha~ not fundamentally changed since independence. What
this statement also indicates was that people believed that foodstuffs were always available
in the area before the expansion of the grain marketing system to Gokwe, The GMB Was
40 Interview 9, 19 May 1992, Njelele.
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seen as a significant source of'govemment intervention in people's lives, Food security would
remain tenuous, and people's ability to improve their condition would continue 11) be elusive.
Ironically, given their condition, Njelele residents were vulnerable to short-term, politically
motivated interventions, such as the distribution of food under the ZANU (PF) banner, that
could have ha~ important implications for the democratic process in the country,
Ii
,.
As a consequence, resentment and anger directed at 'both the government and the
GMB by Njelele residents grew. The loss of grains that was so clearly evident in Gokwe as
a whole, and Njelele in particular, was readily apparent to the most vulnerable households
in the region. They knew that surplus households in the area sold grains to the GMB.rather
than to them, and that ihe GMl3 had grain early in 1992. They also knew that maize was no
longer available, and that their situation would deteriorate further as the 1992 famine
continued to unfold.
Any assessment of a development intervention should be judged, in the final analysis,
by the amount of space it creates or eliminates for those most affected. Gokwe farmers saw
their marketing options decrease, through the expropriation of the sunflower market by the
government and the transformation in the nature of inter-household exchanges which
Historically ensured a greater degree offood securityfor deficit households. Accumulation
appeared to have been checked while a process of decapitalization undermined the long-term
viabi~ty of many poor households. But Gokwc fanners were by no means passive victims
in the unfolding situation. While Gokwe farmers contended that options had been taken
away from them, they attempted to create space for themselves. Efforts to diversifY, to
distance themselves from the GMB, had been made) despite the constraints faced by most
resource-poor households. Fish ponds had been constructed in the hope that this would
become a viable marketing option in the short-term, Vegetable gardens had increased in size,
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with import&~lt'implications for women. Discussions on rural industrialization, though limited
to a small number of people, had begun to spread. Mo~~'Importantly, questions pertaining
to government accountability had ~~tf'jt,raised.
'-_',:.s ,_-,
In light of the Gokwe findings. Ferguson's hypothesis o/a the impact of donor - state
development interventions must therefor» be expanded. Development progrHmmes can often
undermine the legitimacy of'a government, If schools are without adequate supplies, clinics
without drugs, or K;es introduced and int\reased, the legitimacy of the state is inevitably
questioned, Likewise, legitimacy is erodedwhen a government depot is ~ncreasingly viewed
as robbing people of their food and their ability to accumulate adequate resources. ZANU
(PF) credibility in rural areas, the supposed backbone of the ruling party, was clearly eroded.
President Mugabe's already tenuous popularity in the region declined further during his 1993
"meet-the-people" tour in Gokwe. During his speech to people in Gokwe, President Mugabe
promised all destitute Gokwe farmers free ploughing services and crop packages. Gokwe
was then allocated two tractors. AGlUTEX officials maintained that it would take two
tractors over five years to accomplish the task promised by the President. Both tractors had
broken down before any Njelele resident had received this service. Despite claims in the
media to the contrary, crop packages were inadequate. Njelele residents received enough
seed and fertilizer for one hectare of maize. Over 5S 'percent ofNjelele residents \\1ere
engaged in "zero tillage" techniques, as their draught power had either been sold, had died,
or were too weak to be used for ploughing. Only six of the 157 fanners interviewed could
utilize their entire fields in 1993/4 because of'the fact that seed was unavailable in the area.
Resentment increased despite the paucity of alternatives to the existing regime.
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5.4 Conclaslou
G~kwe is only one area of Zimbabwe. One must therefore take cognizance of
differences between region» within the country, and the effect that mark~ting had on these
areas. Evidence from Drinkwater (1992) suggests that some depots were used for residual
purposes during particularly good years. Bxcess stocks could be sold at these depots Withol!t
the grave tltteat to food security which characterised Gokwe. Further changes in the political
economy ofZitnbabwe migtlt however necessitate a re-examination of Drinkwater'" finding's.
The effe.ctsofthe country's Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), introduced
in the early 1990s, required larger sales to the statutory body in an effort to mitigate the
increasing costs associated with the programme, Rural communities dependent upon
remittances from family memberswere devastated by rising unemployment an&::theincreased
costs of urban living incurred by relatives. The decline or outright loss of thir support
adversely affected food security as smallholders became increasingly dependent upon
agricultural production for household income.
There were also suggestive indications from other parts of Zimbabwe that the
problem of food insecurity and agricultural marketing were directly linked. Since 1985,
tJSAID had financed a SADCe food security study that included extensive analyses of the
causes offood insecurity in vulnerable regions of the sub-continent (see Rukuni 1990). The
overwhelming conclusion of the USAJI)~spollsored study was that, despite differences
between regions, the extraction of food crops from vulnerable regions of Zimbabwe had
exacerbated the plight of deficit households. The evidence from Gokwe coincides with these
conclusions.
Importantly, the role of USAID in the marketing programme was not recognized in
recipient areas. No respondent was able to 1(1 .ntUY tlSAlD as the funding organization
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despite their frustration with the U.S ....funded GMB depot. The development institution
which dictates the terms of the intervention and funds the construction of these depots is
removed from criticism because it is viewed by the recipients as a government initiative,
Ms. Patricia. Buckles, Director of USAIDlHarare's Project Design and Implemeatation
Division, claimed. that liSAID played an instrumental role in increasing smallholder
contributions to the national food supply. Yet she refused to accept any responsibility for the
shortcomings of ZASA as it is a "Government of Zimbabwe project"." Consequently,
USAID was able to claim "success" and absolve itself from criticism-and accountability due
to the nature of donor n recipient assistance programmes.
At one level, there is justification for Ms .Buckles' claim as the operation of the GMB
u
is the government's responsibility. 'But US~1J) was by no means a benign actor ill the
unfolding marketing process. They wc~~,' in fact, intricately involved in the evolution ofth~
programme, USAIt> attempted to influence pridng policy and was involved in the siting of
numerous depots throughout Zimbnbwe.42 The Agency was able to show Congress
impressive agricultlrlral figures from Zimbabwe while demonstrating that the allotted mon~y
had been well spent. Infrastructure had been constructed that could be identified in
photographs, The history and nature of grain marketing and the effect of this Intervmtion
on household food security became irrelevant given the narrow goals and definitk of
"success" espoused by the U.S. Indeed, USAID succeeded within the absurd theatre of
United States development assistance despite the silent costs to the recipients of this joint
U. S. and government intervention.
41 Interview, 19 August 1992, Harare.
42 Interview, Mr. J. Mushauri, former USAID Agricultural and Natural Resources
Development Officer, 28 October 1992, Harare.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS
6.1 Introduetion
TlIif' ~tudy has explored the dynamics surrounding the implementation of a USAJD-
SLlPPQI*~d Srain marketing extension programme. The pt'ogramme, initiated in 1980
following Zimbabwean independence, extended the scope and operations of the Grain
Marketlng Board into areas of'the country historically neglected-by the previous minority
regimes. As was argued, the amount of African-produced maize sold to.the GMB increased
dramatic~l).y after 1980. This increase was partially attributed to the GMB extension.
initiative as farmers clearly had better access to the statutory marketing system after 1980.
Yet, despite the dramatic increases in the contribution of AfrlcanNproduced maize to
the GMB, households in food deficit regions of the country continued to be food insecure.
Evidence presented from Gokwe, as well as other naucnal studies, suggested that the r~ason
for this situation stemmed from the nature of maize marketing itself (see Chisvo et; al; 1990;
Govereh et: al.; layne et: al; 1990 and 1991; Matizaet al; 1989,Mlambo 1989; Rohrbach\,
1988; and Rukuni 1990), It was argued that mal,..e produced and sold to the GMB ill food
deficit regions of the country was transported out of these areas and processed in urban
centres. The processed maize meal was then sold in urban centres or, if transported back to
food deficit regions, was sold at exorbitant prices. Local grain markets had broken down and
fanners in Gokwe expressed dismay at their inability to accumulate resources. The drought
of the early 1990s further exacerbated the dilemma faqing food insecure households in
isolated parts of'the country.
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This chapter explores ways inwhich this programme's impact should be judged. The
chapter begins with an overview of a structural adjustment programme designed by USAID
to address the challenges faced by food insecure households in grain deficit regions of the
country. The programme was approved by the Zimbabwean Government shortly after the
author completed his field work in Gokwe so the impact of this programme on residents in
the study area cannot be determined. Important design and impact questions are however
raised. This is followed by an overview of USAJD's re-engineering efforts which are
designed to make the institution more effective and "results- oriented".' Questions are again
posed, and possible ways forward suggeSjp ..t ..based upon till!: findings oftms study.
I "
USAID provided a US$5 million grant to the Government of Zimbabwe to implement
6.2 Z.intbabwe Grain Marketing Reform Support Progl·tUnme
the "Zimbabwe Grain Marketing Reform Support Programme" (USAID 1991). The
programme is designed to
support the [Government of Zimbabwe] in the implementation of grain
marketing policy reforms required to achieve its strict adjustment objectives,
The program will contribute toward the lmprovetnent of rural consumer
welfareby supporting a (Government {)fZimbabwe] initiative to move grain
marketing towards a competitive, lower cost system by reducing market
controls and allowing expanded private pattlclpation in the grain trading
system. (USAID 1991: i)
The specific goals of the programme are to:
1. increase deficit household access to graln in deficient areas of the country;
1 At the time of writing) USAlD is finalising .their re ..engineering frameworks at both
international and country levels. As a result, there is no documentation on the re-engineering
process. The author has however been fortunate to be involved in USA.1Dts re..engineering
process as the organisation that he currently works for in South Africa is a recipient of USAID
flnancial support.
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2. reduce the contribution of domestic grain trading losses to the natlonal budget deficit
by ten percent {from Z$23.8 to Z$21.4 million);
3. increa)e the number of private traders purchasing maize from the GMB and re-selling
the grain throug-~'lvarious (unspecified) channels in deficit regions of the country by
at least ten percent;
4. increase the number of'lntormal traders operating in urban areas and in specific rural
areas (again unspecified);
S. contribute to the decline in informal an~iQrma1 processed maize meal prices in food
deficit regions of the country;
o. increase the number of informal sales bytlle 01\18 to informal buyers by at least 20
percent;
7. reduce the amount of grain moving from the GMl3 depots into the cities and back out
to the rural areas in the form of commercial maize meal;
8. to make more grain and stt~ght-runmeal available to consumers and traders in urban
areas; and
9. expand the scope for intra-rural trade and expand the scope of private millers in
deficit regions of the country, (USAlD 1991: 1~26)
The US$5 millionwould be used as a mechanism to reduce the powers of the G1V1B
and create the space for sn1a11~sc~1~)infonnal millers to purchase, process and resell the maize
both in their local areas and inneighbouring food deficit regions. The GMB would have had
to establish aroautonemcus Bo~:rd of'Dlrectors who would no longer be accountable to
government alone. The G:MB would also have to, in the end, become more commercially
viable. This would be done, in part) by reducing the transport costs incurred by tbe OMS,
who would no longer be solely responsible for the transport of maize to urban centres for
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processing. Commercial millers would have to increasingly collect maize at distant OMS
depots, which would dramatically increase their costs. Informal nuHersiiwould consequently
be advantaged.
USAID (1991: 42) highlighted a range of possible winners and losers under this
scheme. The winners included households inNatural Regions Ill, IV and V, whose food
se{f!.suf!iciencywould improve as a result of this programme; households in semi-arid regiolls
ofth~ country who would benefit from a decline in the cost of processed maize which would
still have to be transported to the area; rural villages in general as more income would
circulate in these areas as a result of this initiative; and the GMB and Exchanger who would
haV'.':ltheir respective deficits reduced. Urban-based commercial millers would be the main
losers in this scheme according to USAlD (1991: 42).
The initiativewas based on a sound understanding of some of the problems faced by
households in food deficit regions of the country, although USAJD's contribution to tins
problem' (the expansion of grain depots under ZASA) was not mentioned in the PAAD, As
this study has suggested, creative mechanisms were required that ensured that processed
maize meal was readily available' in food deficit regions and affordable to vulnerable
households. One way to tackle this problem would be.to reform the grain marketing system,
as USAID had done with this initiative.
Structural adjustment programmes are undoubtedly controversial. As Mosley et: at.
(1991a and 1991b) have demonstrated, no country has fully implemented a VVorldBank-
financed structural adjustment programme. The reasons for this are complex but can be
attributed to a combination of'the inability of the state to meet all of the requirements set out
in a structural adjustment programme as well as the ability of the state to continuously
renegotiate the terms of the programme in ways that, at times, serves to protect and
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strengthen the state vis-a-vis civil society. In contrast to World Bank or IMF-finanped
structural adjustment programmes, structural adjustment initiatives funded by ~ilateral donors"
tend to be more limited in scope. As the "Zimbabwe Grain Marketing Reform Support
Programme" demonstrates, the initiative is designed to liberalise the maize marketing system
by challenging what appears to be the root cause of the problem, the GMS. Unfortunately,
the programme was designed and implemented in a vacuum and makes the incorrect
assumption that the underlying reasons for food insecurity can be overcome simply by
reformi.ne the GlvIB.
Eff9rts to reduce the authority of the arvm, while valuable in many ways, would not
by itself spark a revival of informal mllers who would unproblematically process and sell
maize meal in deficit regions. The evidence presented earlier suggests the opposite as
Shirichena Milling; which was used as a model of the nascent informal yet commercially-
oriented nulling sector by USAID, contributed to the extraction of grains from Gokwe to
urban, wealthier parts of the country. Shirichena was.in many respects hegemonic in Gokwe
during the early 19905 and was by no means selling processed maize to residents of'Gokwe
at an affordable price. Nor was Shirichena willil1g to transport food to semi ..arid regions of
the country unless they received a subsidy from the government?
USAlDls Mission Director argued that the reason why Shirichena could sell maize
meal at such high prices in Gokwe, Of transport the food oUL of the area altogether, was
because "There's not enough competition yet"," Per\~aps, but what was particularly alarming
,
2 Interview, Mr. Zemura, Director, Shirichena Milling Co., 13 April 1993.
3 Interview, Mr, T. Morse, 8 April 1993. A transcript of the meeting with Mr. Morse is
included in Appendix One, along with a subsequent letter to Mr. Morse from the author and
USAlD's response to my queries, The meeting ofS April 1993 was difficult and degenerated as
the author pressed Mr. Morse on matters of impact.
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about the meeting with the USAID Mission Director was his inability to indicate where the
"competition" was to come from, how it Gould be supported or how, in practice, food was
I:
"
going to be de1iver:~dJe> .deficit regions of the country at an affordable cost simply by
reducing the powers ofthe GMB.
More importantly, the evidence presented earner suggests that-efforts to transform
the n~~ure of maize marketing would have a greater chance of success if such efforts were
done in a manner that also created the necessary space for farmers in areas like Gokwe to
diversify their productive base. Efforts to transform the GMB alone would not be very
effective given the ran,ae of problems faced by"'tanners and deficit households in areas like
,\
Gokwe whose capacity to purchase or secure access to processed maize meal had declined
throughout the 1980s .. As alluded to above, the government might hsve to playa greater (ole
in the distribution of processed maize meal 1f1twas to be delivered to deficit regions at a
reasonable price. This role could be indirect however as the government should not be
responsible for the actual delivery of maize. Liberalizing the maize marketing system could
be combined with efforts to support informal millers, in the form of credits, tax incentives
and/or loans. Thls might help a competitive and responsive rural-based milling sector to
emerge. Further incentives could be offered to millers who transported and sold processed
meal in deficit regions at a reasonable (and possibly pre-determined and subsidised) price.
If such a system was effective, agricultural pricing policies could be reconsidered in a way
that allowed farmers throughout the country to produce crops that are environmentally ..
appropriate and of high value. While complex, it appeared clear that one of the main
challenges facing the government was to find ways inwhich fanners could produce crops that
increased their income, In some places of the country, like Goromonzi, it might be prudent
to support maize production, while in other areas like Gokwe, fanners would welcome the 1\
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opportunity to diversifj into higher valued cash crops like sunflower, ccrton and groundnuts
as long as they had secure access to aftbrdabF: maize meal throughout the year. Exploring
these possibilitieswill undoubtedly create other challenges for policy makers. The intention
is netto be prescriptive but rather to illustrate ways in which amore considered approach
to the problem of.tUaize marketing and food insecurity might yield the desired, and laudable,
results set out by USAID.
6.3 Measu.ring Results
USAJD's re ..engineering efforts are based upon the correct assumption that the
developttent institution must shift its emphasis from demonstrating to Congress and the
American public that it has spent its allocated money properly to demonstrating that USAJD's
.,
resources have led to measurable development results. This is a critical step forward for the
institution.
(.L
For over 40 years, USAID has had to provide massive documentation to Congress
to show that resources have been spent in linewith Congressional stipulations, Now, USAID
win have greater scope to develop country-speciflc programmes that meet local needs and
are in line with specific government objectives. Importantly, the starting point in each
country is a clear assessment of what capacity USAID has to address a host of development
challenges and how the Institution's scarce resources can best be utilised to meet those
challenges. Difficult choices are being made in Missions throughout the world, and
programmes and organisations historically supported by USAID are being phased out if they
are not inline with USAID's revised country strategies. The process, at least in South Africa
and Zimbabwe, has been open and transparent, and USAID has engaged in a lengthy process
of consultation with government, NGOs and broader civil society to develop appropriate
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programmes that are inline wit' broadly accepted country strategies and wthin the financial
and technical capacity of US AID.
The challenge USAID now faces is to develop a set of locally-specific development
indicators that will accurately measure the impact of their interventions. This has proven to
be difficult however. Part of the tension comes from the legacy of US AID and Congress
interactions. USA.TOstaftal'e currently meeting Congressional leaders in Washingt0ll' D.C.
to "sell" their programmes. Developing a set of'Iocally-speciflc development indicators that
makes sense to CongressionalIeaders who are, in many cases, hostile to international aid,
is proving difficult.
More importantly, there are significant tensions within USAID that will undoubtcc.,
shape efforts to demonstrate measurable "results". USAID will have to show that the
objeviives established during the development of the country strategy have been met during
the stipulated time frame or future funding from Congress will be suspended. The danger
here is that USAID staff will develop a set of simple indicators that will ensure that they
sustain their funding but, in the process, masks impact.
To illustrate, ZASA was assessed by independent evaluators as a success for a host
of reasons described above. These included the expansion of the maize marketing system to
isolated areas offhe country and the increased contribution of African-produced maize to the
nation's food supply, Yet, as was also demonstrated, U;I,cUi) funded research as well as the
findings of this study suggest that the expansion of the maize marketing programme had an
adverse impact on household food security in large parts of the country. As the interview
with the Mr. Morse illustrates (see Appendix One), USAID distanced itself from the findings
ofJa~ne et. al: (1990 and 1991) despite the fact that USAID funded the research. Moreover,
USAID staff were consistently willing to accept credit for the positive aspects of the
"
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programme yet failed to take any responsibility for ZASA's shortcomings, as demonstrated
earlier. The "Zimbabwe Grain Marketing Reform Support Programme" is an initiative that
is designee, in many ways, to undo the damage caused by ZASA. Despite this, USAlD
remained silent on their responsibilities for the problem.
Questions coa'd also be asked about how the impact of the IIZimba~\,ie Grain
Marketing Reform Support Programme" would be reported back to Congress, USAlD could
demonstrate a decline in the OMS deficit and may even be able to demonstrate that the cost
of maize meal in Natural Regions III, IV, and V has decreased. USAID might also
demonstrate that the number of privaJe traders pure,basinn maize from the GMB and-re-
selling the grain through variouschannels in deficit regions of the country hM increased by
at least tell percent, although 110 baseline data on this subject was collected by USAID. They
will have l~more difficult time " roving that the nU~lber of informal tradMs op~~ating in urban
areas and in specifio rural areas h~o increased as a result of their reform programme.
Moreover, they will have difficulty proving that the reform programme expanded the scope
for intra-rural trade and expanded the scope of private millers in deficit regions of ...1~
country, again because 110 baseline data was collected prior to the initiation of the
programme. Finally, and most importantly, extensive research will be required to
demonstrate that deficit households are more food secure as a result of this initiative. As
indicated above, USAID has shown reluctance to accept research findings that suggest that
their interventions have had a detrimental impact or that aU of their objectives have not been
met. It is unclear whether this will change, especially considering the fact that research which
questions USAID programmes could undermine. future funding from Congress.
This research has shown that development interventions are shaped by numerous
factors umbreseen by donors, ~;i} state and the recipients of development support. There are
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numerous intangibles ill the development process and rarely dOes one development institution
fully shape the outcome of a development programme. The challenge faced by USAID is t~k~
,/ I \1' «( ",
develop a set of indicators that accurately measure change; Q.t:lnonstratewho is benefiting
from a particular programme, who is not and why; and highlight spin-oft's and unforeseen
consequences that have affected the outcome of an initiative.
Most importantly) USAID should become more humble in its approach to
development. Perhaps it is more important to recognise the limitations of development
programmes and create an environment of critical reflection that leads to more considered
intervenlions in the future rather than designing ambitious programmes and a set of indicators
that may be "provabte" but do not accurately reflect impact. In South Afrlca, USAID hopes
to prove to Congress that they have increased the participation of women in the development
process, The measure they are currently considering is to count the number of women
present at meetings and show that this number is increasing. This, in the end, may convince
Congress to allocate more money to the USAlD Mission ln South Africa but hardly reflects
the hnpMt "women" have on the decision making process, or whether "women" are the main
beneficiaries of the subsequent development intervention. The greater development challenge
would be to find ways to show VI,l-jich women are participatin~ in a programme, what impacts
such programmes had on (1' It c..{assesof women and how such programmes provided
broader b(('!l,E''''tsto the household, nell;;hbours or the larger village, and how these
,
programmes reshaped (however slightly) gender relations within the area. USAlD is not) at
present, considering such questions, The challenge facing development practitioners and
researchers is to find creative ways. to shift USAID, and Congress, in this direction.
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EDB:
c,)
APPENDIX ONE
Interview - Ted D. Morse
USAID Mission DirectorlHarare
8 Apri11993
When did you first join USAID?
October 1990 in Harare. Thirty three years ago was when I first joined.
EDB: Canyou tell me what some of the more important changes InUSAID have been
over the past 10-15 years? From the documents I have read, there seems to be
'>an increasing shift towards more targeted interventions directed at the private
sector as well as an increa~ein the reliance of the Agency on policy reform
initi&tives. Is that accurate?
T. Morse; you need to look at those in terms ottwenty nvc year changes. If you go
i"baeI{to where AID was the Marshall Plnn, in Europe after WWH, then you
loot"at how we approached Asia and Latin America and ignored, basicaUy~
Africa ill the 1950s and 19605, you look for pendulums, swinging trends.
WJnm. you say you see the policy and you see the private investment thrust,
tryou go back to what was done in Asia back in the 1960s, you will see that
that was very very much a part of the policy in Asia and Latin AR1e~·ica.
'When AID came into Afdea, it had to adjust, if you will, to more people
level institution building rather than policy reform kinds of things. The
governments here were still very state-controlled, they were not ready to
loosen up 911 the controls on the private sector. Itwas adjusted as it c~n))c
down thl'ougb here in the 19709 and 19808. So, as you said earlier, AID is
. not monolithic. Tile development problems are not the same in any
. continent or any country at any time, S(1,you almost have to look at bow
it is adjusted over quarters of centuries.
EDB: ))0 you think that the changes that you are talking about. and the potential that
AID will be abolished, do you think that what ,\Hay reconstitute itself as the
United States' development arm will concentrate orl'private sector illitiaaves and
policy reform?
T. MOI'se: Foreign add is not populal' with the public, and because it is not popular
with the Amerlcnn publie there is no constituency for it. I think that tile
body politic at home, and I mean the Executive and Legislative branches,
is going to have to say, "Where can you sustain, Over a long period of time
enough popular, people level support ill the JJS, for what kinds of
objectives." You must strueture a foreign assistance program to reflect'
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what can be sustained by tile Alnericnn people and threugh their ei.cctcd
officials and tbl'ough tbel r leadership_ Certainly in Africa there is a
sb~l'eotype tltat it is a disaster-prone area and therefore in Afl'ica what YORI
should be doillg is basically f~niine mitigation and disaster preparedness.
I tbhd, that is such a nerrow, incorrect stereotype that it is going to be
UJlfortcmnte jf that drives it. There is another group tbat says, look, our
historical and economic routs are fn EuriJpe. We are going to JUlYC to
recreate the Poiut Four Marshall Plan~ but this time not ror::~'estel·1lEurope
but for eastern Europe, and we are just going to have to write off the rest
of Africay Latin America, ili~Middle Enst, and Asia because they arc not
that impo~iallt to us. I think tbat that debate still has to go en in America.
BDB: I was speaking with fontiJr Ambassador Swing and Marshall McCallie in South
Africa. They did not tell me that USAID Was potentlally going to be dissolved,
but they did say that half ofUSAlD's Africa budget will be going to South Africa
once there is a new political dispensation, What are your thoughts on this?
T. Morse: No, that isJoo high, We have doubled it from $4(). million to $80 million.
The budget for Africa is roughly $800 millioll" That is ten percent now, it
may double from $80 to $160 million. I do uot thinl" yon. are going to see
it in ecucesslcaal aid. I thinl' you are going to see that come ill !inch things
.as housing investment guarantees fOl' low~co!:;lllousing because that is such
a high prim~ity need, You are going to see that there may be some
eeneessioual loans as opposed to grants beca-use thf}Yhave a repnytliclI.t
cRllnbility over time tbat can absorb loans instead of grants. That lAmld be
my reaction. We took two and a balf years to devel(;1! the $75 million low
cost housing scheme in Zimbabwr.. that was just announced ill the papers.
He (USAID hOllsing officer in So'ntb Africa) is going to boy and compress
that into a ye~U'period and have it ready to. go in the ~l'allsithmal perlod ill
Soutb Africa.
EDB~ I have sent a number of letters to Ms. Buckles that I have also forwarded to you.
In those letters I expressed some reservations with' ~heoriginal ~lP and ZASA.
r expressed concern over the allocation of agricultural machinery to the white
farming community at a time wben the Government was, rightly or wrongly,
trying to redress the agricultural imbalances characteristic of the Rhodesian era.
In addition, 1 stated th~t this policy was particularly troubling when'there was
clear evidence of'an emerging, viable black agricultural community, the Purchase
Area farmers, who clearly required access to such machinery, I have had an
interview with Mr. Joshua Mushauri who agrees with many ofmy concerns over
these programs. I realize that these programs were designed and implemented
prior to your arrival inHarare, but 1would be interested to hear your reaction to
my concerns.
1S5
T. Morse: I tlnnk it Was well designed and well targeted for this reason. The
GO'lernritent was not in a growth phase, but they decided not to destroy the
productive base oCtile economy. }fyou look at the model of what happened
in Angola and Mozambique in 1975 venus what happened here from 1980-
85, it was a very conscious decision. Mugabe made it clea~'under
recolll!iliatior •• he wanted the white commercial productive base to stay if
they could live under Ids leadership, unlike in Angola and MOZ8lllb:que
where tbey were just chased away, He had to focus beavily on redressiug
the sodal inequities and imbalances that tool' place, that be inherited. The
be:mty of the CIP was this. It allowed the foreign exchange to be used by
the productive sector to maintain the productive base so that it did not slip
into all Angolan or MoznmbicJHl Idnd of stagnation and regression. Tbey
needed that. Not just the farmers but the miners and the manufacturers sq
that the productive sector would not collapse, With the local cm'rettey
generations you cou;d get what happened, whicb was a conscious .poUcy~
tremendous expansion of the smaUboldel' agricultural,. tt'cmenduf
cxpallsiou of the educa(;ou, tremendous expansion of the services to reGr~
the social unbalances. If you look nt this table aud you see in terl.1S or fh~
large-scale commercial versus tile small-scale, communal and resettkm~ut;
you will see that the declining productivity L.~rtheJ9rge-scnle commercial
farmers] when tltey WCI'C up '~ere ill the .lliiHoJis and came dawn to tilt
20(;,000 and 400,000s, as the large-scale eommerclal f~U'mers got out of it
ami in exchange for which, wbich you saw in terms of tbe production over
here by the smitll-sr.nle and communal sector, went up signUicnntly whet'eas
a percentage of what tbey were producing was ••• there was another cbart
that I can't put my hand oil. Anyway, to me it did wbat you have to do OJ
preserve the productive sector but expand the socinl base, and it did beth,
EDB: At one level I agree with you. The commercial farmers who have received these
tractors express their satisfaction with them, and indicate how the tractors were
important for them in their efforts to diversii1' out of low-value crops such as
maize into higher-valued tobacco, soyabeans, and horticulture. My CCJlICern)
which is echoed by Joshua Mushauri, is that there was an undercapitalized small-
scale commercial sector, comprised of black farmers who llad been discriminated
against under the previous authorities, who did not have access to the agricultural
.machinery they needed to solidifY their tenuous position in the country Why
couldn't USAID have designed a programme that addressed these concerns with
the same implements that were targeted at the large-scale white fhrming
community?
T. Morse: I do not think that thty could hnve made as efficient use of these maehlnes,
at that time. They needed time fOl' the selection process, the training
process, for the expansion, fo.' land access, for water, The tractors by
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themselves were one small input, they had to be fitted ill to a different base.
The point that the small farmer production could increase from when tbey
were only doing 20 percent of the nmizeproduction to the point where they
were up at 70 percent, marketed, was a hell·of a success of both strategies
in OUI' opinion.
EOB: USAID in the PAAD documents made it very clear that tobacco production was
not to be supported because Zimbabwean tobacco competes with U.S.
unprocessed tobacco. Yet, as you demonstrate, the large..scale commercial
fanners have diversifiedinto tobacco with, in the final analysis, the assistance of
tractors suppliedunder the ClP, The farmers who I have spoken to explain how
US CilP tractors were "instrumental" in allowing them to move back into
tobacco. Now from a developmentperspectivethis is great. You are using your
tractors to enhance and exploit opportunities that exist. As far as the United
States is concerned, and people like JesseHelmswho;!s especially concerned that
Zimbabwe is out-exporting the United States in tobacco, is that a problem for
yon in relation to the CIP?
T. Morse: I v'ould have to look at the numbers. I am too far out of it to know bow
mallY tractors went to farmers that are diversified, how IUlmy went to
tobacco producers. Ido not have the background,
EDB: Could you explain to me your present maize marketing reform program in
Zimbabwe?
T. M()I'se: Basically, we feel that the marketfug ~fall agricultural products needs to be
liberalized, needs to be freed up, and be market-oriented and responsive to
market fOl'CCS. For reasons of both getting the GMB off of such a draln on
tile Govel'lllnclH because of its expensive w~y of marketlng, and by
changing the marketing pattern SQ that you can actually delivct' cheaper
food into the rural areas for the people who ate producing it, so that it does
not have to go through a centmlized marketing board, you can also get nil
expansion of eMployment by people who are then growing through the
maize trade, the agrieultu.'e trade, as rural traders, rum. millers, .'ural
truckers, rural input people that it is the right policy. OUl' own approft4'!b
is to have non-project assistance to support policy reform which is bused on
extensive research before the Gevemment and the t' eleven clients" in grain
marketiug, The research that tlley are all doing on wlaat is iu theil'
interests, the pace of reforms and the strategy, and the costs and the
benefits, and what has to be done to move is what we are supporting.
Research in r!r&in marketing and prlces, and rhen supporting the policy
reform with JlOll~pl'oject assistance followed by targeted interventions
through the Zbnbahwe Business Development Project, the Zimbabwe
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T. Morse:
EDB:
T. Morse:
EDB:
T..MOl'se:
EOB:
T.Morse:
Advisory frojer.t, the Zimbabwe 1'raining Projects, capitalization
opportunities so that you cansee that small black businesses in the rural
areas catt pick up on the openings, the policy reform openlngs, that are
there, these guys. can move into because they are real, they arc not just 011
paper.
It seems that a good deal of the policy positions come from the UZIMSU Food
Security Programme you sponsored.
We stopped that two year; ..go.
1know, but some of the policy positions did come from their work? For
example, Tom Jayne argues that the removal of restrictions on trade between
regions is necessary to address questions offood inseourity.; \!
You are talking about Tom's work fol' th~ World Bank and CIDA. That's
where he did t.hat work, not for us.
One of the things that I think he was concerned with is the limited scope of your
reform initiative in relation to liberalising trade between Natural Regions IV and
Vonly ...
'Ihe end game over time when people can implement reform, you have to. . ... \\
be sure that people can implement reform. Its j~~~taot going for a \,
theoretical, hypothetical everytbing is free-market at one thue, You have
to phase it in a ~ay that people can implement it. I do not think that there
is any disagreement with the CFU, the ZFU, the GMB? the AMA, the
Minish~I' of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture, ourselves. Anybody,
'What the end game is, the stt'ategy to get there is the difference between all
ncademicts approuch that Tom might look at versus an operationni person
who bus to be sure that you are not screwing uil tile economy.
I have a question related to Shirichena Milling Company. The Company's
Director, Mr. Zemura, talks quite favourably of you. Did you push for them
being licensed?
I don't even know if bets licensed. What we were interested in is thalt he
produces mills. lie not only produces them, he sets rural millers up. He
trains them. He shows them bow to market, So that you're l'cRying on the
private sector to get into filling tile gnp that we expect to be left by the
Grain ]\rIarketing Board. He's just one ofwJtat we hope will be hundreds
of smaller' miUel's.
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EDB:' Mr. Zemura also says that you're funding some of the. training that I think you
mentioned earlier. Are you also funding capital expenditure?
T. Morse: No.
EDS: SO how is the small ~~alemilling community going to emerge?
T. Morse: Suppliers credit on his part, I think, where he is financing the capitalization
of people who want to buy them. I think that's where it is. On others,
there's now probably twenty different schemes that people can go into that
we refer them to. We dontt have to have direct U.S. Government
iutcl"Velltion.
EDB: How is food going to move from a surplus area to a deficit area like Gokwe,
which is a deficit area, at a cost that is affordable to resource poor, vulnerable
households in that area?
t.Mm'Sc: Howls he golng to move ill there? Are you taUdng about fiscally or the
economics orit?
BDB: The economics of it. How do you see it evolving because I know where the
maize belt is, and the people in Gokwe who I have been interviewing are clearly
tryihg to get out of maize production. [hey don't want to grow maize in this
area. They want to buy it. They can't buy 1t because National Foods and
MidlandsMilling company bring up very little. They bring up about 400; 20 kg
bags of maize meal amonth for a community of 80,000 people. Shirichena has
come into this area and now there is a little 1110remaize, but the price of maize
meal from Shirichena is significantly higher.
T. MOl'S\!: 'Ihere's not enough competition yet.
BDB: There's not enough competition yet, I agree. So my question is how do you think
maize from surplus areas is going to be able to get to areas like Gokwe at a
competitive price considering Shirichena effectivelyhas created a rural monopoly
now? I recognize its the beginning of a process, but he's the only game in town
and he's charging prices that most people can't afford.
T. !\forse: 'Ihen they should not pay them.
EDB: Well, they don't pay him and they don't buy the maize meal, and they remain
insecure.
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T. Morse: No, they've get options. 1 tbillk the economic models would show that as
there is pI'ofit to be made and ifits that high a profit other people are going
to boy to get into it and as they come into it, they're going to get the
competition and they're going to drive down the price because then its not
just the three big millers coming in there, and not just the one you
mentioned. You're going to draw others into there. In the mean time~ if its
that expensive for them, then maybe people will go back in to growIng
maize. You say they have a preference for eating the maize meal, but we
are finding that througb taste preferences between super refined and roller
meal and then hammer milled, straigbt l'un, then people will switch when
the prices is as low as only 11 percent differential. Ifthey're switching 011
11 percent, they are price sensitive. People will move, and that's what we're
banking on, Jfyou deregulate so that the movement can come and go, and
people can continue to grow. Gokwe is not an area that is so depleted of
rain and soil and cattle that they eouldn't grow that; More importantly,
our own strategy is that they should not be totally dependent on just maize.
They should also be dependent 011 sorghum and millet. People said that
they wouldn't go back to sorghum and millet. We've had a tremendous
response on the sorghum, A tremendous outcry.
EDB: They brew it though.
T. Morse: No, that stuff is llot the stuff we brought in because it won't brew. The
t.rmning qu1tlity is as such that it won't. Be that as it may, tbe tremendeus
eutpnurhig of people who will ask for more of the drought resistant seed
because the Sf~ that ICROSAT and we developed over the last eight years
at quite an expense down ill Matopos will out ..produce maize even under a
normal rain fall now, not just drought and of course under drought
conditiolls it really out produces it by as much :.s 45 percent.
EDB: The point I'm trying to get across is in Gokwe, 81 percent of the family's I've
interviewed, and I've talked to Agritex people, and I've gone to other areas to
confirm the generalization of this, devote a disproportionate amount of'their land
to maize because they cant buy it. What they're trying to do is what you're trying
to doas well inmany respects, They want to diversify out of maize. They want
to grow sunflower, groundnuts and cotton. They can't do that because the price
of maize is too much and the supply is irregular.
T. Morse: 0 .. that the price r etur u from the sunflowers is DDt 115gh enough or the
groundnuts is not high enough for the farmer to buy it. Because, you have
to admit that there is, in the market in Gokwe, you can buy commel'dally
milled, commercially distributed maize meal.
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EOB: Well, you can and you can't. The people from Njelele will get on a bus and go -:
into Gokwe which takes them in at 6 a.m. and brings them back at 9 o'clock at
night to buy a bag of maize meal and there's none there.
T. Morse: None there when?
EDD: Usually toward the end of the month.
T.1\I01'5e: Loek,you are coming to a place when the country had no food. I wouldn't
consider anytbing until after this harvest is in the market that you would
say that that is typical. You're going to have to cut ofl' because I've got
people waiting.
EOB: The point is according to the people in the area, according to Agritex, according
to the store owners who I've interviewed, this is not actually unusual.
Commercially-refined maize meal is simply not available in most rural areas
during periods of peak demand. People run out of food anywhere between
September and December.
T. Morse: Always •
.EOB: Yes, even during good years. I know...
'1'.lVlor8e: Always. Look here, there are people who don't produce a twelve months
supply. 30 what's you're poillt?
EDB: My point is that when they have to go buy it in Gokwe centre, that maize meal
is, for the tl1qjorityof the period not there because National Foods and Midlands
Milling don't bring it out there. This is why I'm saying the restructuring
programme that you're talking about, I agree with. You have to get people in
these areaswho are going to ensure a supplyso people can diversify out of these
crops, out of maize. The point that I'm making is that Shirichena right now has
priced himself out of the market for most vulnerable people. He is not solving
the problem offood insecurity in the area.
T. Morse: Then people should not buy from him.
EDB: Well they can't buy from him even though they want to.
T.1\forse: He won't stay in business very long will he?
EDB: No, he will be able to feed Gokwe Centre, and he also takes his food to
Bulawayo and Highfield.
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T. Morse: But he won't ShlY in business very long if people aren't going to buy from
him.
EDB: But he does bring it to towns that buy it from him.
T. Morse: Wbat's you're I)oint?
EDB: My point is that from September to the next harvest there is a very small supply
ofmaize in the area. That's because tt's being transported out of there entirely.
Again, Tom found this over 3 or 4 years,
T. Morse: You don't have to quote Tom. I mean Agritelllas got data on tbis for every
yellr going back for tI!irty years tJaat there arc areas here where they don't
produce a twelve month supply of domestic cousumpuen let alone enough
that they can sell out of it. 80 I don't understand your point?
EDB: My point is that inorder to get food into the area from surplus regions its- going
to haveto be brought inconsistentlyat a cost that people can afford. I'm still not
sure how that's going to work.
T. Morse: Don't you have any faitb in the market fotces?
EDB: 1 have a lot of faith in the market forces. But let's say you sellmaize meal at
Z$1700 a ton which is what most people will say it will be if you took away the
subsidies.Nobody in Gokwe can afford that. So how are they going to be fed?
T. Morse: They can either g.'QW their own then because its a lot better tor them and
stop diversifying out.
EDB: O.I<.but then they are completely vulnerable.
T. MOl'se: Not neccssal'ily.
EDB: Well, its a poor maize growing area.
T. Morse; If its a 1)001'maize gS'owing area, don't grow maize. Why do you think this
stuffis here (sorghum and millet).· What do you think this is?
EDB: O.K., but what you're saying is they should be growing more maize.
T. Morse: They will. People are 110t going to sit ther..: and starve to death. They're
going to swit,.,b.
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EDB: To what?
T. Morse: Tlu.~ytregoing to switcll either to the groundnuts 01' to the sunflower or to
the cotton and buy it at a plice they can alford it, or they're going to switch
over and start going back to sorghum, millet, and rapoko and eating the
small gre~ms. Anyway, you can debnte t~is forever•
.EDD: Sure, I still don't reany see how the system is going to work to be honest with
you,
"
T. Morse: Come 011 back in three years and see if it worked,
:B-1. ',Ie' Well, I'll do my best to monitor it for the next three years.
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20 April 1993
Mr. T. Morse
Mission Director
USAID/Zitnbabwe
1Pascoe Avenue
P.O. Box 6988
Harare
Dear Mr. Morse:
I would like to thank you for taking time out of your busy schedule to meet with me the other
day. The inferview was extremely helpful,
As promised, I have enclosed a copy of our discussion for your review. I would appreciate any
lllrther comments you may have in relation to our discussion.
I have a number of questions that 1would appreciate your thoughts on, as the interview was
shortened due to your tight schedule. tfyou could send your comments to the address below,
it would be appreciated.
1. Does lJSAID bear any responsibility for the problems associated with *'he Grain
Marketing Board, and other parastatals, given the large degree of support these institutions
received under ZASA?
2. While I recognize that, at one level, your comments on the dramatic increase in maize
sold to the GMB by communal, resettlement and small-scale commercial farmers is impressive,
could it not be argued that a situation has emerged where African producers are, for various
reasons, producing Iow-value commodities while large-scale commercial farmers are
concentrating their efforts on higher-valued crops such as tobacco, soya beans, and increasingly
horticulture? Iwant to be clear on this point - I by no means blame USAlD for ~his. My point
is only that USAID claims that the gap between large-scale commercial farmers and African
producers would be rectified tnrough programmes such as ZASA and the original C!P. How are
we to measure this?
3. Could you clarify who the "eleven clients" in grain marketing are?
4. While I agree witl you that the idea of liberalizing the grain trade is important (and
relatively uncontentious), 1,.)till am uncertain as to how grain is going to move from food surplus
to food deficit regions at an affordable cost to vulnerable households. The issue is far more
complicated than simply growing your own maize, or switching to sorghum and millet, as you
know. Fanners throughout this country, especially in the poorer Natural Regions, are trying to
diversify into crops that will secure them the highest return and are better suited to their
environmental conditions. Farmers in Gokwe, Zaka, Nkayi, and Nembudziya (for example) do
not want to grow maize. They want to iltPw sunflower, cotton and greundm.c, and buy maize.
They do not like the taste of millet o~:sorghum meal, although that may change if the varieties
US AID supports are truly acceptable. They are constrained by their inability to procure food
at a reasonable cost or because food is unavailable in outlying areas of the country. Therefore
they grow maize, despite the vulnerability of this crop in these. regions. Commercial millers will
readily concede that their deliveries of maize meal to outlying areas of the country b !I\rgely
token, stemming from the problems with subsidies and the lack of incentives to bring rood, at
a reason.able cost, to places far from central milling points. This, in fact, seems to be the whole
reason for a decentralized system. The problem is that farmers in vulnerable Natural Regions
will still have to produce their own food, thus stifling efforts to diversify, unless food can be
consistently brought in from surplus regions. Again, how is fr'od going to move into deficit
regions at a cost that IS affordable to families with limited resources?
5. Could you provide me with more information in relation to the sorghum ann millet
program USAlD is supporting? Specifically) I would be interested to know the levels of US AID
support for the initiative, and the location where the experimental plots are located,
o. What role dOffSthe State have in your maize marketing reform initiative, besides buying
maize and selling it!;iowhoever wants it?
1/
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7. You state that the reform initiative is based on extensive research - could you provide me
with your findings? You also state that African producers are selling 70 percent of their
commodities to the GMB. Could you give me your sources for this information?
8. Mr. Zernura, Director of Shirichena, told me that he has not been able to sell any of his
grinding machines because of the economic problems.faced by the country. He also says that the
start-up cost for a '~rilall-scale milHng operation would be well over Z$SOO,OOO. Who is going
to be able to afford such an initial outlay given the situation in the country? Moreover, if the
response by the nrivate sector to the liberalization of maize marketing, is slow, as is already
apparent, wl .twill be the consequence of US AID's reform initiative? What contingency plans
<ll'ethere? How is there going to be adequate competition in rural areas given the fact that, to
date, the only rural private sector response is Shlrichena? How do we fill the gap between
liberalization and response? This, to me, is critical, ifwe are to move beyond the hypothetical
realm of free-markets to an adequate response to the problem of food ::1~ecu~ity in this country.
9. Mr. Zemura is not financing the capitalization of any millers, as you argue. You do
mention that "there's now probably twenty different schemes that people can go into that we
refer them to." Could you supply me with a list of'these schemes, plus the name of the contact
person at each, so that Imay follow this up?
10. Finally, on Shirichena, I think Mr . Zemura is a tremendous businessman, yet I fear that
he is doing exactly what the private Sector will do. He sells maize in Gokwe at an extremely high
2
I
price. You say that this is because there is not enough competition (sec my concerns. on the
emergence of more millers above), and that people will not buy from him in Gokwe, They do
not. He will not go out of business because he is selling Gokwe-produced maize meal in
KweKwe, Bulawayo, Highfield and elsewhere. This is, in fact, exactly what the OMS was doing
- buying maize indeficit:areas and selling in city centres because rural households cannot afford
the price. This does not address the issue offood insecurity in rural areas, and evidence suggests
that it exacerbates the #uation. Shirichena has no intention of selling maize in outlying areas
of Gokwe, because households can't afford it (he states this emphatically in my discussions with
him), Consequently, Shirichena exports food to urban areas that can afford it. This is how the
private sector works, but it unfortunately does not address the problem offood insecurity faced
by the plethora of rural households that do not grow a twelve month supply offhod. How is
such a situation to be rectified? Incidently, Mr. Zemura will not go out of business because
farmers will sell directly to him at low prices because he pays them cash up front and farmers can
therefore-avoid AFe repayment.
Thank you for your time and consideration. I look forward to your responses, and hope to hear
from you at your earliest possible convenience.
Sincerely,
£...,,'?>. ~ ............ G.
Edward D. Breslin
Address;
Department of Politic at Studies
The University of the Witwatersrand
P,O. WITS
Johannesburg 2050
South Africa
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UNITEO STATES A(;ENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPME~~
MISSION TO ZIMBABWE
INTERNA nONAL MAIL
t Pascoe A"enue
.P.O. &x.6988
Harare, Zirnbllbwo:;
UNITED STATES MAIL
Agency for rnt~mati!Jnal Development
Harare (%0)
Washini\ton DC 20S21·Z11~O
U.S.A..
June 2, 1993
Mr. Edward D. Breslin
Department of Political studies
~he University 9£ the WitwatersrandP.O. WITS .
Johannesburg 2050South Africa
Dear Mr. Breslin:
((
~hank you for your April 20 letter to which you should have
received an interim r~ply on April 23 from my Administrative
Assistant Mrs. Fribley.
The staft and I have spent many bouts talking with you about
your research an~we hope that some of this has been helpful to
you. HoweVer, the press of the A.!.D. business for which we
are accountable unfortunately precludes spending more time on
your research.
Good luck in your academic endeavours and your future work.
Sincerely yours,
.c (? /
(~)n~
Ted D. Morse
Director
Pbones 720630m.0139J1201S1
Country Cllde .263.City Code 4
Telex No. 24428 ZW
Fax No. 722418
APPENDIX TWO
QUESTIONNAIRE AND INTERVIEW RESULTS
Research for this dissertation was conducted in the Gwanylka Plateau region ofNjeleie Ward ill
between February 1992 ~ June 1993. One hundred and fifty seven formal interviews were
conducted as purt of this research.
The formal questionnaire was administered during each interview and was used to
establish a basic baseline. The questionnaire was short and provided the foundations for further
discussion that highlighted the changing nature of marketing and food security in the village.
::::,;;-
TIle formal questionnaire is included on the following page. This is followed by the data
results, Interviewees were.not asked what quantities were produced for each crop as the pre-test
demonstrated that this was difficult to determine with any accuracy. Moreover, while income
sources were explored, the amounts received from each income source were not discussed for
reasons of privacy.
It should be noted that much of the historical information contained ill the dissertation, and
especially in Chapter Five~was gathered through extensive conversations with elders, local
leaders, interviewees and AGR.lTEX officials. It is not possible to place these conversations in
tabular form. The outcomes ofthese discussions are contained in the body of the dissertation.
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Format Questionnaire
Interview Number: __ __,__......-_ __.._~ ___
Interviewee: _
Interpreter:
Name ofhousehold: __ ~~~ ......___
Household Head (ifdifferent from interviewee): ~ _
Number of Hectares: __ - ~ __
Date of Interview: ------~~----------------
Yes No~-------------------------------------4----------~------~1. Whal types of crops do you produce on your land?
1.1 Maize
1.2 Sunflower
,
1.3 Cotton
1.4 Groundnuts
1.5 Sorghum
1.6 Soya Beans
1.7 Vegetables
1.8 Pumpkins~-------~--~---- .------~----------~.+-~-------+.--------~
Is your land fully utilised (outside ofland left
fallowj?
2.
Have you produced a maize surplus in the last three
years?
3.
D'O you sell/exchange maize?4.
If yes, where do you sell/exchange maize?~----------- ~------r--------~--------~5.
5.1 GMB
5.2 local residents
5.3 store 'Owners
5.4 other
In the past, were you able to seli/tlxchange surplus
maize locally?~---------,--~----~--------------------~--~~---+---------
7. Have you ,!!lkena loan fi'om the AF£!__.,_------'- ~ __ .....,J.,. ......
6.
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8. Have you tried to diversify the crops you grow?
9. If yes, have you been able to sustain these changes
in your crop mix?
10. How do you prepare your field?
10.1 mechanised plough
10.2 animal plough
10.3 zero tillage
lL What agricultural implements have you purchased
over the l~~tfive years?
11.1 basic tools (example: hoe)
f---.
11.2 scotch cart
11.3 plough
11.4 improvements on storage facilities
11.5 fencing
12. What agricultural commodities, besides crops, have
you sold in the last five years?
12.1 agricultural implements- -
12.2 livestock
12.3 land
12.4 household labour
13. What sources of income are available to the
household?
~ 'I(._
13 I Remittances..- ~-
13.2 Sales of agricultural goods to statutory
marketing agency
..-~
13.3 local agricultural jobs
13.4 sale of home made goods
13.5 other ............_
14. Can you purchase maize meal from local shops all
yearlong?
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Would you diversify your crop mix if you could
purchasemaize meal locally?~~----------------~---------------~--------~--------~
H5.
15. Can you purchasemaize meal from local surplus
producers all year long?
.....-.........--
I
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INTERVIEW RESULTS
r-
Yes No
1. What types of crops do you produce on your land?
1.1 Maize 157 0r--........,..__ .......,_
1.2 Sunflower 98 59
1.3 Cotton 101 56
1.4 Groundnuts 66 91
1.5 Sorghum 19 138-
1.6 Soya Beans 122 3S
1.7 Vegetables 157 0
1.8 Pumpkins 133 24
2. Is your land fully utilised (outside of land left 6 151
fallow)?
3. Have you produced a maize surplus in the last three 36 121
years? - -.'
4. Do you sell/exchange maize? 152 5
5, If yes, where do you sell/exchange maize?
5.1 6MB 149 3-~ - ,_
5.2 local residents 3 149--
5.3 store owners 19 133
I--""""""__
5.4 other 7 145.
6. In the past, were you able to sell/exchange surplus 32 125
maize locally? .
7. Have you taken a loan from the AFe? 2 155.
8. Have you tried to diversizy the crops you grow? 102 S5
,-.\
9. If yes, have you been able to sustain these changes 23 79
in your crop mix?
~
10. How do you prepare your field?
.;...-
10.1 mechanised plough 2 155--- -
10.2 animal plough 69 88
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10.3 zero tillage 71
11. What agricultural implements have you purchased
over the last five years?
86
11.1 basic tools (example: hoe) 127 30
0 157
0 157
15 142
8 149
11.2 scotch cart
B.3 plough
11.4 impro'tielr!p.Jlt.?on storage facilities
12, What agricultural commodities, besides crops, have
you sold in the last five years?
12.1 agricultural implements
"
12.2 livestock
73 84
102 5S
2 15712.3 land
1__ ~-- 4-_>, ~~'~' ~ ~-+ ~
13.1 Remittances ':\,
13. What sources of income are currently aV2:Aible to
the household?
13.2 Sales ef'agriculture» goods to statutory
marketing agency
13.3 local a..:;riculturaljobs
1----....- ....'
13.4 sale of'home.made goods
29 128
157 0
14 143
49 108
17 140
0 157
0 157
13C 19
a;,_
13.5 other~--------,~--------------~----------r---------'_~----__'
15. Cad you purchase maize meal from local surplus
producers all year long?---------------------~~-------+~------~16. Would you diversify your crop mix if you could
purchase maize meal locally?
14. Can you purchase maize meal from local shops all
year long?
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